Debt Collection Laws by State: Garnishment, SOL, and Repossession Rules
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 12, 2026). · 10 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

A debt does not disappear because the calendar runs out on it, and a collector does not lose every tool just because a state's constitution mentions wages. Those two half-truths are the most common ways this topic gets misreported, in opposite directions, and untangling them is what this page is for. The honest version is this: the debt does not die, but the collector's power does. Time-barred debt still exists; it just cannot be sued on. A "no wage garnishment" state still has bank accounts, tax levies, and federal student-loan withholding that reach the same paycheck a different way. Neither half of that sentence means what a quick search usually implies.
Every one of the 51 pages behind the table below starts from the same process truth, because it is the fact readers get wrong most often in both directions: an ordinary consumer creditor, meaning a credit card issuer, a medical biller, or a debt buyer, cannot touch a paycheck or a bank account without first suing, winning a judgment, and getting a court-issued writ. Child support, tax debt, and federal administrative garnishment are different regimes that skip some or all of that sequence, and each state page says so explicitly. For everyone else, the sequence matters because most garnishments in America start with a default judgment entered after the person being sued never answered the complaint. Responding to a summons, even with a bare denial, is the single highest-value action on every page in this cluster, in every state, regardless of how generous or strict that state's exemptions turn out to be.
Debt Collection Laws by State: Full Comparison Table
The table below reflects each state's own dedicated page, current as of August 2026, and is computed directly from those 51 pages rather than restated from research notes. «Wage Garnishment Cap» compresses that state's actual formula for ordinary consumer debt. «Ordinary Creditors Can Garnish?» asks specifically about credit card issuers, medical billers, and debt buyers, not support, tax, or federal creditors. «Payment Restarts Clock?» answers whether making a payment on an old debt revives an expired statute of limitations; «Writing required» means only a signed acknowledgment is confirmed to do that, not a bare payment. «Writing confirmed; payment unresolved» (Arizona, Michigan, Virginia, West Virginia) means the same signed-writing route is confirmed, with one added warning: whether a bare payment alone also revives was never confirmed in that state, so it should not be assumed safe. «Unresolved» in any column means the state's own page could not confirm a clean answer against a primary source, and hedges accordingly rather than guessing. States marked † are covered in the restrictive-five callout below. Click a state's name for the full page, including exemptions, bank-account protections, and repossession rules.
| State | Wage Garnishment Cap | Ordinary Creditors Can Garnish? | SOL (Card / Written) | Payment Restarts Clock? | Repo Cure Right? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | 25% flat (general) or lesser of 25%/30x fed MW (consumer credit) | Yes | 3y open acct (card, contested) / 6y written contract | Yes | No |
| Alaska | flat $473/$743 wk exempt (AS 09.38.030, 8 AAC 95.030) | Yes | 3y (AS 09.10.053, written or oral) | Yes | No |
| Arizona | 10% or excess over 60x highest MW (Prop 209, ARS 33-1131) | Yes | 6y explicit (ARS 12-548(A)(2)) | Writing confirmed; payment unresolved | No |
| Arkansas | 25% or excess over $217.50/wk (federal formula, no AR cap) (hedged) | Yes | 5y written / 3y oral (card characterization contested; Born v. Hosto & Buchan is a misattribution) | Yes | No |
| California | lesser of 20% or 40% of excess over 48x local MW (SB 1477, ~$811.20/wk) | Yes | 4y (CCP 337, written contract/book account) | No | Yes |
| Colorado | 20% or excess over 40x higher of fed/CO MW (CRS 13-54-104, ~$606.40/wk) | Yes | 6y likely (liquidated/determinable debt bucket, CRS 13-80-103.5, per Portercare line) | Unresolved | Yes |
| Connecticut | 25% or excess over 40x higher of fed/CT MW (CGS 52-361a(f), ~$677.60/wk) | Yes | 6y (treated as account/simple contract, CGS 52-576; 3y only for executory oral contracts) | No (debt-buyer debt only) | Yes |
| Delaware | 15% flat (85% exempt, 10 Del. C. 4913(a); inapplicable to state fines/taxes) | Yes | 3y uniform, written/oral/open acct (10 Del. C. 8106(a)) | Unresolved | No |
| District of Columbia | 25% of excess over 40x DC MW (DC Code 16-572(1), ~$736/wk untouchable) | Yes | 3y (simple contract, written or oral, DC Code 12-301(7)) | No | Unresolved |
| Florida | 25%/30x fed MW; head-of-family 100% exempt up to $750/wk | Limited | 5y written contract / 4y open acct (card characterization contested) | Writing required | No |
| Georgia | 25% (15% private student loan) or excess over $217.50/wk (OCGA 18-4-5) | Yes | 4-6y contested: open account (4y, OCGA 9-3-25) vs written contract (6y, OCGA 9-3-24) | Writing required | No |
| Hawaii | 5/10/20% brackets or fed 25%/30xMW, lesser applies | Yes | 6y flat, no written/oral split (HRS 657-1) | Unresolved | Unresolved |
| Idaho | 25% or excess over 30x fed MW ($217.50/wk) | Yes | 5y written / 4y oral; card characterization unsettled | Yes | No |
| Illinois | 15% gross or excess over 45x greater-of MW (~$675/wk) | Yes | 5y (card = unwritten account, Feltman) / 10y written | Writing required | Yes |
| Indiana | 25% (or down to 10% by good-cause) / 30x fed MW | Yes | 6y flat, written & unwritten converge; card = unwritten (Smither) | Unresolved | Unresolved |
| Iowa | 25%/40x fed MW ($290/wk) + annual per-creditor dollar cap | Yes | 10y written / 5y unwritten; card characterization unverified | Writing required | Yes |
| Kansas | 25% or excess over 30x fed MW ($217.50/wk) | Limited | 5y written / 3y unwritten; card ~3y (unconfirmed by controlling case) | Yes | Yes |
| Kentucky | 25% or excess over 30x fed MW ($217.50/wk), no hardship reduction | Yes | 15y (pre-7/15/2014) or 10y (post) written; 5y unwritten; card unresolved | Unresolved | Unresolved |
| Louisiana | 25% max (75% exempt), floor 30x fed MW ($217.50/wk) | Yes | 3y open-account (card, contested) / 5y notes / 10y residual | Yes | No |
| Maine | 25% or excess over 40x greater-of MW ($604/wk) | Yes | 6y flat, no split, includes card (14 M.R.S. 752) | Unresolved | Yes |
| Maryland | 25% max (75% exempt), floor 30x state MW ($450/wk) | Yes | 3y general contract (card presumed, not under seal) | No | Yes |
| Massachusetts | greater-of 85% or 50x MW protected (trustee process) | Yes | 6y (G.L. c.260 Section 2, no written/oral split) | Yes | Yes |
| Michigan | 25% / 30x fed MW (no state formula) | Yes | 6y (contract Section 5807(9) and residual Section 5813) | Writing confirmed; payment unresolved | No |
| Minnesota | tiered 10/15/25% above 40x reference wage (no 5% tier) | Yes | 6y (Section 541.05, uniform written/oral/open acct) | Yes | No |
| Mississippi | 0% first 30 days, then 25% / 30x fed MW | Yes | 3y (both written Section 15-1-49 and unwritten Section 15-1-29) | Writing required | No |
| Missouri | 25%/30x fed MW, or 10% head-of-family (claim CV96, not automatic) | Yes | 5y (Section 516.120, courts apply to cards; 10y writing-for-money statute creates unresolved tension) | Yes | Yes |
| Montana | 25%/30x fed MW ($217.50/wk) | Yes | 6y written (cut from 8y by SB 143, 2025) / 5y oral; card characterization unsettled | Yes | No |
| Nebraska | 25%/30x fed MW; 15% head-of-family (Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1558) | Yes | 5y written (Section 25-205) / 4y oral (Section 25-206), contested for cards | Yes | Yes |
| Nevada | 82% exempt (≤$770/wk) or 75% exempt; floor 50x fed MW | Yes | 6y written / 4y open acct (NRS 11.190), contested for cards | Yes | Unresolved |
| New Hampshire † | none, no continuing wage garnishment (RSA 512:21) | Limited | 3y (RSA 508:4, no written/oral split) | Yes | No |
| New Jersey | 10% of gross (least-of-three, capped at 10%) | Yes | 6y (N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1) (hedged, primary source unreachable) | Unresolved | Unresolved |
| New Mexico | greater-of 75% or 40x highest local MW | Yes | 6y written (Section 37-1-3) / 4y open acct (Section 37-1-4), contested for cards | Yes | Unresolved |
| New York | 10% gross (or 25%/30x MW, lesser binds) | Yes | 3y consumer credit (CPLR 214-i); 6y non-consumer contract | No | No |
| North Carolina † | absent procedure, not a true bar (NC DOL) | Limited | 3y (G.S. 1-52(1)), no written/oral split | Yes | Unresolved |
| North Dakota | 25%/40x fed MW, minus $20/wk per dependent | Yes | 6y uniform, written/oral/open-account alike (28-01-16(1)) | Yes | Unresolved |
| Ohio | 25% (or above 75%/30x fed MW floor, $217.50/wk) | Yes | 6y consumer transactions (ORC 2305.07(C)), written/oral moot | Yes | Unresolved |
| Oklahoma | 25%/30x fed MW ($217.50/wk) | Yes | 5y written / 3y oral-open account; card characterization unsettled | Unresolved | No |
| Oregon | 25% (75% exempt), flat floor $338/wk (SB 1595, →$400 on 7/1/26) | Yes | 6y (ORS 12.080), written/oral same | Yes | No |
| Pennsylvania † | none for ordinary consumer debt (42 Pa.C.S. 8127) | No | 4y flat, no written/oral split (42 Pa.C.S. 5525) | Unresolved | No |
| Rhode Island | no state formula, federal 25%/30x fed MW ($217.50/wk); medical-debt garnishment banned (P.L. 2025 ch. 300) | Limited | 10y general (9-1-13(a)); page notes this is often mis-cited as 6y (that's the separate execution-writ deadline) | Unresolved | Unresolved |
| South Carolina † | 0% for consumer credit (37-5-104 bar); SCDOR/GEAR tax-and-public-debt levy up to 25% of gross | No | 3y (15-3-530(1)), written/oral same | Yes | Yes |
| South Dakota | 20%/40x greater-of fed-or-state MW, minus $25/wk per dependent | Yes | 6y uniform, written/oral alike (SDCL 15-2-13) | Unresolved | No |
| Tennessee | 25%/30x fed MW ($217.50/wk) + $2.50/wk per dependent child under 16 | Yes | 6y (Sec. 28-3-109(a)(3)) (hedged, primary code text paywalled, secondary-sourced) | Unresolved | No |
| Texas † | none, constitutional wage exemption (Art. XVI Section 28); wages lose protection once deposited | No | 4y (debt/open account) / 6y (notes) | Writing required | No |
| Utah | lesser of 25% or 30x fed MW (15% for education loans) | Yes | 4y open acct or 6y written (characterization unresolved, hedged) | Yes | No |
| Vermont | 25% max ordinary; 15% max consumer credit (75%/85% protected) | Yes | 6y unified (written, oral, and open account all the same) | Yes | Unresolved |
| Virginia | lesser of 25% or 40x greater-of MW, plus dependent-child credit | Yes | 5y if signed agreement produced, else 3y (unresolved which governs, hedged) | Writing confirmed; payment unresolved | Yes |
| Washington | 20% max on consumer debt (35x state MW or 80%, ~$600/wk) | Yes | 6y assumed (written contracts/accounts receivable); card characterization not pinned down (hedged) | No | No |
| West Virginia | 20% cap on both tracks (or excess over 50x fed MW) | Yes | 10y written or 5y unwritten; card characterization unsettled (hedged) | Writing confirmed; payment unresolved | Yes |
| Wisconsin | 20% cap; fully exempt if household income is below poverty line | Yes | 6y unified (written and oral debt both run the same period) | No | Yes |
| Wyoming | standard federal copy: lesser of 25% or 30x fed MW (~$217.50/wk) | Yes | 10y written or 8y unwritten; card characterization unresolved (hedged) | Yes | No |
The Restrictive Five: Where Ordinary Creditors Cannot Touch Wages
Five states come the closest in the country to a real bar on wage garnishment for ordinary consumer debt: Texas, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, and New Hampshire. None of them means what «garnishment is illegal here» implies, and each fails in a different way.
Texas protects current wages by constitutional text (Article XVI, Section 28) and statute (Civil Practice and Remedies Code 63.004), but the protection is genuinely fragile: Texas courts have held that wages lose their exempt status the moment they are deposited, direct deposit included, so a bank garnishment writ reaches money an employer-directed wage writ never could. Child support, spousal maintenance, federal student-loan garnishment, and IRS levies all still reach a Texas paycheck.
Pennsylvania bars wage attachment for ordinary judgments under 42 Pa.C.S. 8127, but the exception list is exact and narrow: divorce obligations, support, board debts of four weeks or less, a capped residential-landlord judgment, PHEAA student loans, and criminal restitution or fines. Taxes are conspicuously absent from that list, and Pennsylvania's Department of Revenue garnishes up to 10% of gross wages for state tax debt under separate authority with no court order at all. The wage protection, like Texas's, ends at the bank.
North Carolina is not a formal prohibition at all; North Carolina's own Department of Labor describes it as the absence of a wage-garnishment procedure for ordinary judgment creditors, combined with broad exemptions, rather than a statutory ban. State and local tax garnishment, and ambulance-bill collection in roughly 90 counties, both pierce it, and an out-of-state creditor suing in its own state's courts can still garnish a North Carolina paycheck from there.
South Carolina blocks wage garnishment for consumer-credit judgments specifically under 37-5-104; other, non-consumer judgment creditors are blocked by a different mechanism, the absence of a garnishment procedure under 15-39-410. The South Carolina Department of Revenue can still levy up to 25% of gross wages for state taxes and certain public debts, including public-hospital medical bills, under its own administrative authority.
New Hampshire is the closest thing to a genuine bar: RSA 512:21 provides no continuing wage garnishment mechanism at all for ordinary debt, reaching only wages already earned but unpaid at the moment a writ is served, and only on New Hampshire judgments. Collection in practice runs through a separate periodic-payment order process under RSA 524:6-a rather than a paycheck withholding.
Every one of these five still leaves bank accounts, non-wage property, and federal or tax garnishment fully exposed, and every one of them still requires a lawsuit and a judgment before anything happens at all.
How Payment Revives (or Doesn't) Time-Barred Debt: The 51-State Spectrum
Whether making a payment on an old debt restarts the statute of limitations is one of the most consequential and most inconsistently reported questions in debt collection, because the same action, a small good-faith payment, has the opposite effect depending on which of four regimes a state falls into. Computed directly from the 51 state pages behind this hub:

- Bare payment revives, no writing needed (22 states): Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. In these states, a partial payment by itself hands the collector a fresh limitations period, sometimes even if a third party makes the payment (Utah) or the debt has already technically expired (Wyoming's text sets no cutoff).
- Only a signed writing is confirmed to revive (10 states): Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi (once the debt is already time-barred), Texas (original creditors only; debt buyers can never revive a time-barred debt in Texas under any circumstance), Virginia, and West Virginia. In Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, and Texas, a bare payment alone is confirmed not to restart the clock. In Arizona, Michigan, Virginia, and West Virginia, only the signed-writing route is confirmed; whether a bare payment alone also revives is genuinely unresolved in each state's own statute and case law, not a confirmed no, so do not treat a payment there as safe.
- Nothing revives it once expired (7 states): California, Connecticut (for debt-buyer-purchased consumer debt specifically; whether original-creditor debt can be revived was not confirmed either way), the District of Columbia (whether the statute's scope reaches original creditors, not just third-party collectors, was not independently confirmed), Maryland, New York (for consumer credit), Washington, and Wisconsin. These states either extinguish the underlying right once the period runs (Wisconsin) or statutorily bar any revival by payment, acknowledgment, or other activity (the rest).
- Genuinely unresolved (12 states): Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Tennessee. Each state's own page could not tie a clear revival rule to a current statute or confirmed case, and says so rather than guessing. Treat a payment on old debt in any of these states as a real, unquantified risk rather than a safe move.
The practical rule that follows from all four columns is the same: before paying anything on a debt that might already be old, find out which of these four groups your state falls into. In the first group, a $20 goodwill payment can buy a collector years. In the third, it may do nothing at all. In the fourth, nobody currently knows for certain, including the state pages behind this hub, which is why they say so.
The 2024-2026 Medical-Debt Garnishment Wave: What Is Actually Law
A real legislative wave has protected medical-debt judgments since 2024, distinct from ordinary consumer-debt garnishment. Verified as enacted, current as of August 2026:

- Rhode Island: Public Law 2025, Chapter 300, effective January 1, 2026, categorically bans wage garnishment on medical-debt judgments. The codified version of R.I. Gen. Laws 10-5-8 lags behind the session law online; cite the session law directly where the two differ.
- New Jersey: the Louisa Carman Act, effective July 22, 2025, protects patients under 600% of the federal poverty level and caps medical-debt interest at 3%.
- New Mexico: the Patient Debt Collection Protection Act bars medical-debt collection entirely for patients at or below 200% of the federal poverty level.
- New York: CPLR 5231 limits garnishment on judgments held by hospitals and health professionals.
- Virginia: the Medical Debt Protection Act (59.1-612) protects charity-care-qualified patients specifically; it is not a blanket medical-debt garnishment ban, and Virginia's separate 3-year medical-debt statute of limitations (8.01-246(B)) runs alongside it.
- Maryland: HG 19-214.2 protects patients who qualify for a hospital's free or reduced-care program.
- North Carolina: the Hospital Assistance and Support Program has applied to participating hospitals since July 2025.
- Louisiana: Act 897, enacted June 9, 2026; the substantive dollar figures were not independently confirmed as of this hub's last update.
- Maine: LD 2129 (chapter 649), signed April 6, 2026; text not independently confirmed as of this hub's last update.
Just as important is what did not become law, because several of these get reported as if they had. Vermont's widely cited medical-debt garnishment ban traces to an unenacted bill (S.83); the law Vermont actually passed, Act 21, addresses medical-debt credit reporting only, not garnishment. Ohio's House Bill 257 remains pending, not enacted. Indiana's SB 85, which would have capped medical-debt garnishment, passed the Senate and died in the House. Washington's SB 6105 died in committee; the state's enacted SB 5480 addresses credit reporting, not garnishment. Missouri's H.B. 1870 exemption increases take effect January 1, 2027, not before, no matter how the current statute text is served online. None of these five states currently has a medical-debt-specific garnishment law on the books; medical debt in each is collected like any other consumer judgment until and unless that changes.
The Federal Floor Under Every State
Every state formula above sits on top of the same federal minimum, and no state may go below it. The Consumer Credit Protection Act's Title III, 15 U.S.C. 1673, caps wage garnishment nationwide at the lesser of 25% of disposable earnings for the week, or the amount by which those earnings exceed 30 times the federal minimum hourly wage, currently $217.50 a week at the $7.25 federal floor. Disposable earnings means what remains after legally required deductions like taxes and Social Security; voluntary deductions such as insurance premiums or 401(k) contributions do not reduce the figure. A state may protect more than this floor (many of the states above do, especially states that multiply a higher state minimum wage), but under 15 U.S.C. 1677 no state or court may enforce a garnishment order that goes below it.

The federal floor does not apply to everything. Support orders run on a separate scale, up to 50-65% of disposable earnings depending on remarriage status and arrears. Federal and state tax levies are expressly carved out of the CCPA cap; the IRS instead levies everything above a statutory exempt amount, the inverse of the CCPA's structure. And federal administrative wage garnishment, the tool behind defaulted federal student loans, reaches up to 15% of disposable pay with a 30-day notice and no court judgment at all, operating, per the U.S. Department of Labor, without regard to state garnishment law. That last point is the specific mechanism behind every "no wage garnishment" state still garnishing wages for a defaulted federal loan.
Two federal consumer-protection rules apply regardless of which state page you are reading. First, 42 U.S.C. 407 shields Social Security and most other federal benefits from commercial creditors, and a companion rule, 31 CFR Part 212, automatically shields the last two months of directly deposited federal benefits in a bank account without the account holder having to claim anything, though only for direct deposits, not paper checks. Second, under Regulation F, 12 CFR 1006.26, a debt collector must not sue or threaten to sue on a debt once the statute of limitations has run, in every state, regardless of that state's own SOL rules; the text of the rule carries no requirement that the collector know the debt is time-barred. Collecting by phone or letter on an old debt stays legal everywhere; suing on it does not.
If You Are Being Garnished or Sued
The order of operations is the same in every state on this hub, restrictive-five or not. First, answer any lawsuit before the deadline in the summons, even with a simple denial. A default judgment gives the creditor every tool state law allows and forfeits defenses you would otherwise have, including an expired statute of limitations, which a court will not raise on your own behalf. Second, if a garnishment has already started, check the math against your state's actual formula in the table above; errors happen, and exemptions like a head-of-household or head-of-family carve-out often have to be claimed affirmatively within a short deadline rather than applying automatically. Third, if the debt looks old, find out which of the four revival regimes above your state falls into before paying anything or signing anything, because the same payment that means nothing in one state can hand a collector a fresh multi-year window in another. Fourth, if a default judgment already exists and you were never properly served or notified, ask about a motion to vacate; it is often the only way back into a case after the fact.

Finally, when judgments and garnishments have stacked up faster than any one of these steps can handle, a bankruptcy filing's automatic stay stops garnishment and collection activity immediately while the underlying debts get resolved. Whether that trade is the right one depends on the full financial picture, not any single debt, and it is worth a professional's assessment rather than a guess.
Information last verified on 2026-08-12, extracted directly from the 51 individual state pages linked in the table above. This article has not yet been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.
Related Resources
- Statute of Limitations on Debt: The 50-State Payment-Revival Table: the full state-by-state SOL and revival breakdown behind the spectrum above, plus the credit-report-7-years conflation corrective.
- How to Stop Wage Garnishment: the step-by-step path: claiming exemptions, requesting a hearing, vacating a default judgment, and the bankruptcy stay.
- Car Repossession Laws: breach of the peace, deficiency judgments, voluntary repossession, and servicemember protections in full.
- Can Social Security Be Garnished?: what Section 407 actually protects, the two-month bank rule, and exactly what pierces it.
Last updated: 2026-08-12.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a debt collector garnish my wages without suing me first?
Not for ordinary consumer debt like a credit card, medical bill, or personal loan. A collector must sue you, win a judgment, and get a court-issued writ before any wage or bank garnishment starts. Child support, tax debt, and federal administrative garnishment for defaulted student loans are different regimes that skip some or all of that process.
Is wage garnishment illegal in Texas, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, or New Hampshire?
Not exactly, and the popular framing is wrong in a specific way for each. All five block or nearly block ordinary consumer-creditor wage garnishment, but child support, tax levies, and federal administrative garnishment for student loans still reach paychecks in every one of them, and in Texas the protection disappears once a paycheck is deposited into a bank account.
Does making a payment restart the clock on an old debt?
It depends entirely on the state, and the answer splits into four groups nationally. In 22 states a bare payment revives an expired debt with no writing required. In 10 states only a signed writing does that. In 7 states nothing revives a debt once it is fully time-barred. In 12 states the rule is genuinely unresolved in the available statutes and case law. Check your state's column in the table above before paying anything on an old account.
If a debt is past the statute of limitations, can I still be sued?
You can still be sued, but the lawsuit is improper. Federal Regulation F, 12 CFR 1006.26, prohibits a debt collector from suing or threatening to sue on a time-barred debt everywhere in the country, with no exception for a collector who claims not to have known the debt was old. The statute of limitations is a defense you have to raise yourself; a court will not raise it for you if you do not answer the lawsuit.
Can Social Security or other federal benefits be garnished for a credit card debt?
No. Section 407 of the Social Security Act shields Social Security and most other federal benefits from commercial creditors, and a companion federal rule automatically protects the last two months of directly deposited federal benefits in a bank account. That protection does not extend to child support, federal tax debt, or federal student loan offsets, which reach benefits through separate federal authority.
Which states actually have a medical-debt garnishment ban right now?
As of August 2026, Rhode Island, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, Louisiana, and Maine have enacted medical-debt-specific protections, though they vary in scope from a full ban to income-qualified relief. Widely reported bans in Vermont, Ohio, Indiana, and Washington describe bills that did not become law; medical debt in those states is collected like any other consumer judgment.
Does a car lender have to warn me before repossessing my car?
In most states, no. Self-help repossession is allowed nationwide once a loan is in default, as long as it happens without a breach of the peace, and most states impose no advance-notice or right-to-cure requirement. A minority of states do give a statutory right to cure the default before repossession; check your state's dedicated page for whether yours is one of them.
Updates
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
State-by-state comparison
Each state guide below is paired with the governing statute our editors adjudicated for it, held in our own legal record and verified against the official source.
Each statute shown is the same adjudicated anchor its state guide renders, independently verified against primary sources. A dash means not yet adjudicated in our record — never that no law exists.
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Official Code of Georgia Annotated
§ 18-4-5Maximum part of disposable earnings subject to garnishment; adverse employment action prohibited.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a)(1) For purposes of this subsection, a "private student loan" shall be defined as an educational or student loan for postsecondary educational expenses but not a loan guaranteed under 20 U.S.C.…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at gov.georgia.gov
Cited in 2 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2021
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- TRUIST BANK F/K/A BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY v. GORDON D. STARK (Court of Appeals of Georgia 2021)“…sposable earnings limitation on garnishment under former OCGA § 18-4-5 (a) (1).1 For the reasons that follow,…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Georgia Debt Collection Laws: Garnishment Caps, the 10-Day Repo Notice, and Debt Time Limits
§ 9-3-24Actions on simple written contracts; exceptions.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
All actions upon simple contracts in writing shall be brought within six years after the same become due and payable. However, this Code section shall not apply to actions for the breach of contracts for the sale of goods under Article 2 of Title 11 or to negotiable instruments under Article 3 of…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2021-08-17 · Read the full text in our law library
Cited in 207 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Hamburger v. PFM Capital Management, Inc. (Court of Appeals of Georgia 2007, 286 Ga. App. 382)“…that her breach of contract claims were time-barred. Under OCGA § 9-3-24, an action for breach of a written cont…”
- Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Pattillo Construction Co. (Supreme Court of Georgia 1985, 254 Ga. 461)“…f limitations for actions arising under a written contract, OCGA § 9-3-24, and the Court *462 of Appeals affirm…”
- Thornton v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance (Supreme Court of Georgia 2010, 287 Ga. 379)“…statute of limitation for contract claims is six years, see OCGA § 9-3-24, but the courts have nevertheless enfor…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Georgia Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type
§ 9-3-25Open accounts; breach of certain contracts; implied promise; exception.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
All actions upon open account, or for the breach of any contract not under the hand of the party sought to be charged, or upon any implied promise or undertaking shall be brought within four years after the right of action accrues.…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2021-08-17 · Read the full text in our law library
Cited in 121 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Kicklighter v. Kicklighter (Supreme Court of Georgia 1996, 267 Ga. 157)“…n 1980 was barred by the four-year statute of limitation in OCGA § 9-3-25; and (2) the will classified the timber…”
- Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue v. American Envirecycle, Inc. (Court of Appeals of Georgia 1995, 217 Ga. App. 80)“…ement, is subject to the four-year statute of limitation in OCGA § 9-3-25. (Cits.)’ [Cits.] ‘ “In Georgia legal m…”
- DOUGLAS COE v. PROSKAUER ROSE LLP (Supreme Court of Georgia 2022, 314 Ga. 519)“…e of limitation for legal malpractice claims is set out in OCGA § 9-3-25. 13 See Armstrong v. Cuffie, 311 Ga. 79…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, TITLE LII ACTIONS, PROCESS, AND SERVICE OF PROCESS, CHAPTER 512 TRUSTEE PROCESS
§ 512:21List of Exemptions.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
The money, rights, and credits of the defendant shall be exempt from trustee process in the following instances, and the trustee shall not be chargeable therefor: I. Wages for labor performed by the defendant after the service of the writ upon the trustee. II. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph X of this section, wages of the defendant earned before the service of the writ upon the trustee shall be exempt except in actions founded upon a debt on a judgment issued by a New Hampshire court of competent jurisdiction. In such case, the wages of the defendant earned before the service of a writ upon the trustee founded upon a debt on a judgment to the amount of 50 times the minimum hourly wage as established by the Fair Labor Standards Act for each week shall be exempt. The employer shall pay said exempted amount to the employee on the usual payday unless other cause exists prohibiting such payment. III. Wages for the personal services and earnings of the wife and minor children of the defendant. IV. Any pension or bounty money of the defendant allowed by any law of the United States before it has come into his actual possession. V.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at gc.nh.gov
Cited in 6 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2021
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):In Re Damast (1991) read RSA 512:21 as an exemption only from trustee process rather than a bankruptcy exemption, and held a debtor's IRA was not exempt. Sheedy v. Merrimack County Superior Court (1986) applied the same exemptions, holding a judge weighing ability to pay under RSA 524:6-a may not count property exempt under chapter 512.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Opinion of the Justices (Supreme Court of New Hampshire 1981, 121 N.H. 531)✓Asked about a bill letting courts garnish former defendants' wages to recoup counsel fees notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the justices advised that stripping indigent defendants of the RSA 512:21 exemptions other judgment debtors keep would violate equal protection.
- Sheedy v. Merrimack County Superior Court (Supreme Court of New Hampshire 1986, 128 N.H. 51)✓A debtor ordered jailed for civil contempt over an unpaid judgment challenged the payment statute as vague; the court upheld the statute, reasoning that a judge weighing ability to pay may not count property exempt from attachment or trustee process, citing RSA 512:21.
- Francis X. O'Brien & a. v. Dynacon Builders, Inc. (Supreme Court of New Hampshire 2021)“…cate the arbitration award; and (2) the attachment violated RSA 512:21, XI (2010), which exempts funds “deposi…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: New Hampshire Debt Collection Laws: The State Without Continuing Wage Garnishment
Ohio Revised Code
§ 2305.07Contract not in writing; statutory liability; consumer transactionsIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
(A) Except as provided in sections 126.301 and 1302.98 of the Revised Code, an action upon a contract not in writing, express or implied, shall be brought within four years after the cause of action accrued.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at codes.ohio.gov
Cited in 384 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp. (Ohio Supreme Court 1984, 12 Ohio St. 3d 179)“…ract so as to invoke the six-year statute of limitations of R.C. 2305.07. 2 For the reasons that follow, this c…”
- Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation v. McKinley (Ohio Supreme Court 2011, 130 Ohio St. 3d 156)“…e subject to the six-year statute of limitations of R.C. 2305.07. (No. 2010-0720—Submitted March 2, 2…”
- Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati Management Co. (Ohio Supreme Court 1994, 70 Ohio St. 3d 281)“…R.C. 4112.99 does not contain a statute of limitations. R.C. 2305.07 provides a six-year limitations period…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Ohio Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type, Ohio Debt Collection Laws: Garnishment Formula, the 6-Year Consumer Debt Rule, and Repossession
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Title 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure)
§ 8127Personal earnings exempt from processIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) General rule and exceptions.--The wages, salaries and commissions of individuals shall while in the hands of the employer be exempt from any attachment, execution or other process except upon an action or proceeding: (1) Under 23 Pa.C.S. Pt. IV (relating to divorce). (2) For support. (3) For board for four weeks or less. (3.1) For amounts awarded to a judgment creditor-landlord arising out of a residential lease upon which the court has rendered judgment which is final. However, the amount subject to attachment shall have deducted from it any security deposit held by the judgment creditor-landlord and forfeited by the judgment debtor-tenant under section 511.1 of the act of April 6, 1951 (P.L.69, No.20), known as The Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951, unless the security deposit has been applied to payment of rent due on the same premises for which the judgment for attachment has been entered. The judgment creditor-landlord shall have the burden of proving that such security deposit has been applied to payment of rent due on the premises herein described.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at palegis.us
Cited in 43 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Danysh v. Department of Corrections (2004) read the 42 Pa.C.S. 8127(a)(5) exception broadly, covering all funds in an employer's custody, even personal gifts, and found no right to added hearings. Boofer v. Lotz (2002) barred a clerk's 20 percent inmate deduction, but Harding v. Stickman (2003) confined it to that posture.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Danysh v. Department of Corrections (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 2004, 845 A.2d 260)✓An inmate objected to the prison deducting 20% of his account, including personal gifts, toward restitution; the court held Section 8127's earnings exemption did not bar the deductions because subsection (a)(5) excepts court-ordered criminal restitution, costs and fines.
- Harding v. Stickman (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 2003, 823 A.2d 1110)“…earing. See Boofer; section 8127(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8127(a); and section 9728(b) of the Sentenci…”
- Sweeney v. Lotz (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 2001, 787 A.2d 449)✓An inmate contesting prison-account deductions for restitution invoked Section 8127(a)(3.1)'s 10% cap for landlord judgments; the court rejected that reliance as addressing a landlord-tenant dispute, noted subsection (a)(5) excepts criminal restitution and fines, and affirmed.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Pennsylvania Debt Collection Laws: The Wage Garnishment Ban and Its Exact Exceptions
Texas Finance Code
§ 392.307COLLECTION OF CERTAIN CONSUMER DEBT BY DEBT BUYERSIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
(a) In this section: (1) "Charged-off debt" means a consumer debt that a creditor has determined to be a loss or expense to the creditor instead of an asset. (2) "Debt buyer" means a person who purchases or otherwise acquires a consumer debt from a creditor or other subsequent owner of the consumer debt, regardless of whether the person collects the consumer debt, hires a third party to collect the consumer debt, or hires an attorney to pursue collection litigation in connection with the consumer debt. The term does not include: (A) a person who acquires in-default or charged-off debt that is incidental to the purchase of a portfolio that predominantly consists of consumer debt that has not been charged off; or (B) a check services company that acquires the right to collect on a paper or electronic negotiable instrument, including an Automated Clearing House (ACH) authorization to debit an account that has not been processed. (b) Unless otherwise expressly provided, this section prevails to the extent of any conflict between this section and any other law of this state.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at statutes.capitol.texas.gov
Also relied on in: Texas Debt Collection Laws: Protected Wages, Exposed Bank Accounts, Statute of Limitations on Debt: The 50-State Payment-Revival Table
Code of Federal Regulations Title 12
§ 1006.26Collection of time-barred debts.In forcecited in 37 of our articles
(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section: (1) Statute of limitations means the period prescribed by applicable law for bringing a legal action against the consumer to collect a debt. (2) Time-barred debt means a debt for which the applicable statute of limitations has expired. (b) Legal actions and threats of legal actions prohibited. A debt collector must not bring or threaten to bring a legal action against a consumer to collect a time-barred debt. This paragraph (b) does not apply to proofs of claim filed in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ecfr.gov
Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Hanover v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (2024) dismissed FDCPA claims built on 12 CFR 1006.26(b), reasoning it bars only collection of time-barred debts and the loans at issue were not time barred. Raja v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (2025) dismissed a Regulation F claim because nonjudicial foreclosure is not covered by the FDCPA.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Hanover v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (District Court, S.D. Ohio 2024)✓A borrower claimed a servicer's letter and billing statement lacked language required by 12 CFR 1006.26(b); the court granted the servicer summary judgment, since the rule only bars collecting time-barred debts and it had already found her HELOC and mortgage enforceable.
- Raja v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (District Court, E.D. Virginia 2025)✓Pro se homeowners alleged a servicer and foreclosure attorneys pursued a time-barred, discharged second mortgage in violation of 12 CFR 1006.26(b); the court dismissed that claim, holding parties carrying out a nonjudicial foreclosure are not FDCPA debt collectors.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Idaho Debt Collection Laws: Garnishment Limits, Debt Deadlines, and Repossession, Maine Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession, Michigan Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
Code of Federal Regulations Title 31
§ 212.6Rules and procedures to protect benefits.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
The following provisions apply if an account review shows that a benefit agency deposited a benefit payment into an account during the lookback period. (a) Protected amount. The financial institution shall immediately calculate and establish the protected amount for an account. The financial institution shall ensure that the account holder has full and customary access to the protected amount, which the financial institution shall not freeze in response to the garnishment order. An account holder shall have no requirement to assert any right of garnishment exemption prior to accessing the protected amount in the account. (b) Separate protected amounts. The financial institution shall calculate and establish the protected amount separately for each account in the name of an account holder, consistent with the requirements in § 212.5(f) to conduct distinct account reviews. (c) No challenge of protection. A protected amount calculated and established by a financial institution pursuant to this section shall be conclusively considered to be exempt from garnishment under law. (d) Funds in excess of the protected amount.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ecfr.gov
Cited in 4 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Huffman v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 2026)“…2 under federal law. See 31 C.F.R. § 212.6(c) (“A protected amount calculated and…”
- Deal v. First & Farmers National Bank, Inc. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky 2017, 518 S.W.3d 159)“…count holder has full and customary access to those funds. 31 C.F.R. § 212.6 . These funds are to be “conclusively c…”
- Matter of O'Sullivan v. Schebilski (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York 2016, 138 A.D.3d 1170)“…it by other legal process (see 20 CFR 416.533, 416.534 [a]; 31 CFR 212.6). The Second Circuit has provided three…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Can Social Security Be Garnished? What Section 407 Actually Protects
United States Code Title 15
§ 1673Restriction on garnishmentIn forcecited in 8 of our articles
Except as provided in subsection (b) and in section 1675 of this title, the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week, or the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by section 206(a)(1) of title 29 in effect at the time the earnings are payable, whichever is less. In the case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, the Secretary of Labor shall by regulation prescribe a multiple of the Federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in paragraph (2). The restrictions of subsection (a) do not apply in the case of any order for the support of any person issued by a court of competent jurisdiction or in accordance with an administrative procedure, which is established by State law, which affords substantial due process, and which is subject to judicial review. any order of any court of the United States having jurisdiction over cases under chapter 13 of title 11. any debt due for any State or Federal tax.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 450 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Courts have read the section 1673 garnishment cap narrowly. Kokoszka v. Belford (1974) held that "disposable earnings" reaches periodic compensation and not an income tax refund, so the cap did not keep a refund out of the bankruptcy estate. Jordan v. Chase Manhattan Bank (2015) held section 1673 creates no private right of action.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo (Supreme Court of the United States 1979, 439 U.S. 572)“…and amended § 303 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1673 (b), to pre-empt state law by limiting…”
- Kokoszka v. Belford (Supreme Court of the United States 1974, 417 U.S. 642)✓A bankrupt argued the 25 percent garnishment cap exempted 75 percent of his $250.90 income tax refund from the trustee; the Supreme Court held Section 1673's limit covers periodic compensation, not a tax refund, so the whole refund passed to the estate.
- Jordan v. Chase Manhattan Bank (District Court, S.D. New York 2015, 91 F. Supp. 3d 491)✓After a Florida garnishment froze a disabled borrower's bank account holding disability benefits, she sued under Section 1673; the court held the section creates no private right of action and is enforced by the Secretary of Labor, and dismissed the claim.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Bankruptcy in South Dakota (2026): Exemptions & Means Test, Alaska Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession, Alabama Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
§ 1677Effect on State lawsIn force
This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person from complying with, the laws of any State prohibiting garnishments or providing for more limited garnishment than are allowed under this subchapter, or prohibiting the discharge of any employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for more than one indebtedness.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 31 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2015
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Hodgson v. Cleveland Municipal Court (District Court, N.D. Ohio 1971, 326 F. Supp. 419)“…Defendants, in substance, ask this court to resort to 15 U.S.C. § 1677 (1970), the anchor section of this tit…”
- Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court (District Court, S.D. Ohio 1972, 349 F. Supp. 1125)“…eyond these two areas, Congress expressly stated in § 307 ( 15 U.S.C. § 1677 ) that Title III: “. . . does no…”
- First National Bank of Jasper v. Robinson (In Re Robinson) (United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Alabama 1999, 240 B.R. 70)“…ishment than are allowed under this subchapter.... ” 15 U.S.C.S. § 1677 (1) (Law.Co-op.1993) (emphasis added).…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
United States Code Title 42
§ 407Assignment of benefitsIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law. No other provision of law, enacted before, on, or after April 20, 1983, may be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit withholding taxes from any benefit under this subchapter, if such withholding is done pursuant to a request made in accordance with section 3402(p)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by the person entitled to such benefit or such person’s representative payee.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 1,007 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Federal courts have read section 407 against its own exceptions. Sykes v. Bank of America (2013) held SSI benefits are not attachable under the section 659(a) child-support exception because they are not remuneration for employment. Lee v. Schweiker (1984) held section 407 shields beneficiaries from creditors, not SSA in bankruptcy.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Sykes v. Bank of America (Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2013, 723 F.3d 399)✓A child support agency restrained an SSI recipient's bank account; the Second Circuit held SSI benefits are not remuneration for employment, so Section 659(a) does not authorize the levy, and it revived his Section 407(a) claim, leaving the merits open.
- Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons (Supreme Court of the United States 2008, 552 U.S. 214)“…NS Opinion of the Court process” in 42 U. S. C. §407(a). Applying ejusdem generis, we conclu…”
- Lee v. Schweiker (Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 1984, 739 F.2d 870)✓The SSA kept deducting a $746.50 overpayment from a retiree's monthly benefits after she filed Chapter 13; the Third Circuit held Section 407 protects recipients from creditors and gives the SSA no shield against the Bankruptcy Code's limits.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Hawaii Debt Collection Laws: The Bracket Garnishment Formula, 6-Year Debt Limit, and Repossession
Search our full record of US law — 2.1 million sections, every state + federal →
Sources and References
- 15 U.S.C. 1673, Restriction on Garnishment (the CCPA 25%/30x formula)(govinfo.gov).gov
- 15 U.S.C. 1677, Effect on State Laws (states may protect more, never less)(govinfo.gov).gov
- 12 CFR 1006.26, Regulation F: Collection of Time-Barred Debt(ecfr.gov).gov
- 42 U.S.C. 407, Social Security Benefits Protected From Legal Process(govinfo.gov).gov
- 31 CFR 212.6, Automatic Protection of Directly Deposited Federal Benefits(ecfr.gov).gov
- U.S. Department of Labor, Fact Sheet #30: The Federal Wage Garnishment Law (CCPA)(dol.gov).gov
- Tex. Fin. Code Section 392.307, Collection of Time-Barred Debt by Debt Buyers(statutes.capitol.texas.gov).gov
- 42 Pa.C.S. Section 8127, Personal Earnings Exempt From Process(legis.state.pa.us).gov
- N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 512:21, Trustee Process: Exemptions (Wages, Small Loans, Payroll Accounts)(gc.nh.gov).gov
- Rhode Island Public Law 2025, Chapter 300, Medical Debt Garnishment and Residence Protections(webserver.rilegislature.gov).gov