District of Columbia
DC Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 12, 2026). · 7 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

A collector cannot start taking money from your paycheck in the District of Columbia the moment you fall behind. The creditor first has to sue you, win a judgment, and then obtain a writ of garnishment from the court before your employer withholds anything. That sequence is where most garnishments are actually decided, because the large majority happen through a default judgment entered when the person being sued never filed an answer. If you take one action from this page, answer any lawsuit you are served with, even if you believe the debt is too old or is not yours.
Wage Garnishment in the District of Columbia
DC's garnishment formula works differently from most states, and the difference strongly favors the debtor. Under D.C. Code 16-572(1), the garnishable amount is 25% of the excess of weekly disposable wages over 40 times the DC minimum hourly wage, referencing D.C. Code 32-1003. That is not the same as taking 25% of all disposable earnings the way many states' formulas work; instead, a large block of income is fully protected before the 25% figure even applies.
With DC's minimum wage at $18.40 an hour, 40 times that wage is $736 a week. Wages up to that amount cannot be garnished at all. Only the portion above $736 a week is exposed, and even then only 25% of that excess can be taken. A garnishment continues week after week until the judgment is satisfied, and if more than one creditor has garnished the same wages, only one is satisfied at a time, in the order the writ was delivered to the U.S. Marshal.
DC has no head-of-household exemption as a fixed rule, but it offers something arguably more useful: under D.C. Code 16-572.01, a debtor can move the court to exempt more than the statutory floor on a showing of «undue financial hardship,» with a hearing held within 30 days. A debtor who is receiving public assistance benefits gets a presumption that this hardship standard is met, which shifts the burden onto the creditor.
We did not confirm whether DC extends firing protection beyond the federal rule that bars discharge over a garnishment for any one debt; treat any broader claim about DC firing protection as unverified.
Bank Account Protections
We did not locate a DC statute creating an automatic, self-executing exemption for money sitting in a bank account. DC's general wildcard exemption statute may reach bank funds if properly claimed, but that requires an affirmative filing rather than working automatically the way some states' bank-account shields do; treat this as an open question and plan to raise any exemption claim promptly if a DC bank account is garnished.

Federal benefits carry a separate, well-established shield regardless of local law. Social Security, VA, and similar federal benefits that arrive by direct deposit are automatically protected for the trailing two months of deposits under 31 CFR Part 212, and the bank applies that protection without you filing anything. Benefits paid by paper check and later deposited do not get this automatic treatment and must be claimed as exempt through the court.
Statute of Limitations on Debt in the District of Columbia
DC's general debt limitations period is short and applies broadly. Under D.C. Code 12-301(7), an action «on a simple contract, express or implied,» whether written or oral, must be brought within 3 years. Outside the consumer context, a separate 12-year period applies to instruments under seal, D.C. Code 12-301(6).
For consumer debt, which is what almost every collection suit involves, a flat 3-year ceiling overrides those longer periods. D.C. Code 28-3814(o) provides that any action to collect a consumer debt commenced on or after September 1, 2021 «shall only be commenced within 3 years of accrual,» and that this period applies «whether the legal basis of the claim sounds in contract, account stated, open account, or other cause, and notwithstanding the provisions of any other statute of limitations unless that statute provides for a shorter limitations period. This time period also applies to contracts under seal.» So neither the 12-year sealed-instrument period nor the 6-year period for negotiable promissory notes buys a collector extra time on a consumer debt.
| Debt type | Limitations period | Statute |
|---|---|---|
| Any consumer debt, suit filed on or after Sept. 1, 2021 | 3 years from accrual | D.C. Code 28-3814(o) |
| Simple contract, written or oral | 3 years | D.C. Code 12-301(7) |
| Open account (catch-all) | 3 years | D.C. Code 12-301(8) |
| Instrument under seal, non-consumer debt (3 years if consumer debt) | 12 years | D.C. Code 12-301(6); 28-3814(o) |
| Promissory note, non-consumer debt (3 years if consumer debt) | 6 years | D.C. Code 28:3-118; 28-3814(o) |
DC does not treat credit-card debt differently from other simple contracts; it falls under the general 3-year period.
The revival rule: a strong statutory anti-revival provision
DC's 2022 overhaul of its debt collection law, D.C. Code 28-3814, gives consumers protection well beyond the federal baseline. It prohibits a debt collector from initiating a lawsuit to collect a consumer debt «when the debt collector knows or reasonably should know» that the statute of limitations has already run. Once the limitations period has expired, a related provision bars revival entirely: any later payment toward the debt, or any oral or written affirmation of it, does not extend the limitations period. In plain terms, once a DC consumer debt is time-barred, nothing the consumer says or pays afterward brings it back to life. The statute reaches original creditors, not only third-party collection agencies: D.C. Code 28-3814(b)(5) defines «debt collector» to include «an original creditor or debt buyer engaging directly or indirectly in debt collection.» The one narrow carve-out is in subsection (m)(3), which exempts original creditors collecting their own debt from that subsection's debt-documentation and notice duties.
Time-barred does not mean the debt disappears. A collector may still contact you about an old debt, but federal Regulation F, 12 CFR 1006.26, independently bars a debt collector from suing or threatening to sue on a debt once the statute of limitations has expired. Credit reporting runs on its own separate clock, roughly seven years, regardless of the limitations period.
What Debt Collectors Can and Cannot Do
The federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act governs third-party collectors operating in DC. They cannot use false, deceptive, or misleading statements, including misrepresenting the amount or legal status of a debt, and cannot threaten action they cannot legally take or do not intend to take, 15 U.S.C. 1692e. Regulation F adds specific limits on call frequency and requires collectors to provide validation information. DC's own debt collection law, D.C. Code 28-3814, layers additional protections on top, including the time-barred-suit ban described above, and is enforced by the DC Attorney General's Office of Consumer Protection.
Car Repossession Rules
DC enacted the Uniform Commercial Code's self-help repossession rule at D.C. Code 28:9-609: after default, a secured party may take possession of collateral without judicial process, as long as it can do so without a breach of the peace, a standard the statute leaves undefined and courts interpret case by case.

Secondary sources describe DC consumer-protection regulations and the installment sales chapter of the DC Code as requiring a notice of intended repossession where the default is solely missed payments no more than 15 days past due, along with a written post-repossession notice within 5 days and a 15-day retention or redemption window. We were not able to independently open and confirm that specific regulatory text this session, so treat the details of any DC repossession cure window as a lead to verify rather than a confirmed rule, and do not rely on a specific day-count without checking the current regulation.
Servicemembers get an additional federal layer regardless of any DC-specific rule. For an installment contract entered into before military service, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. 3952, requires a court order before the property can be repossessed for a pre-service breach.
If You Are Being Garnished or Sued in the District of Columbia
Work the problem in this order:
- Answer the lawsuit. A default judgment is how most DC garnishments start. Filing an answer, even a simple one disputing the amount, forces the creditor to prove its case and often opens the door to a payment arrangement.
- Check the garnishment math. DC's formula protects far more income than most states: nothing can be taken until weekly wages exceed roughly $736, and only 25% of the amount above that. If more is being withheld, the writ may be miscalculated.
- File a hardship motion if you need more protection. DC Code 16-572.01 lets you ask the court to exempt more wages for undue financial hardship, and receiving public assistance creates a presumption in your favor.
- Ask whether the debt is time-barred. For consumer debt the period is a short 3 years from accrual under D.C. Code 28-3814(o), no matter how the contract is labeled. If a debt collector sues after that period has run, D.C. Code 28-3814 may bar the suit outright, and no payment you made afterward revives it.
- Consider bankruptcy if the debt is unmanageable. Filing triggers an automatic stay that stops garnishment immediately.
Overwhelmed by debt? Get a free bankruptcy consultation
Bankruptcy can stop foreclosure, wage garnishment, and creditor calls, and which debts you can clear and what property you keep depend on your state's exemptions. Get a free, confidential consultation with a bankruptcy attorney to understand your options. There is no obligation.
Information last verified on 2026-09-02. This article has not yet been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.

Related Resources
- Debt Collection Laws by State
- How to Stop Wage Garnishment
- Statute of Limitations on Debt
- Can Social Security Be Garnished?
- District of Columbia Statute of Limitations
- District of Columbia Bankruptcy Laws
Last updated: 2026-09-02.
Frequently Asked Questions
How much of my paycheck can be garnished in DC?
Only 25% of the amount your weekly disposable wages exceed 40 times the DC minimum wage, D.C. Code 16-572(1), not 25% of all your earnings. At DC's current minimum wage, roughly the first $736 a week is fully protected.
Can I get more of my wages protected if garnishment causes hardship in DC?
Yes. D.C. Code 16-572.01 lets a debtor request a court hearing within 30 days to exempt additional wages for «undue financial hardship,» and someone receiving public assistance gets a presumption that the standard is met.
What is the statute of limitations on credit card debt in DC?
3 years. DC treats credit-card debt as a simple contract under D.C. Code 12-301(7), which does not distinguish written from oral agreements for this purpose, and D.C. Code 28-3814(o) independently caps any consumer debt suit filed on or after September 1, 2021 at 3 years from accrual.
Does a debt under seal or a promissory note get a longer statute of limitations in DC?
Not for consumer debt. D.C. Code 12-301(6) sets a 12-year period for instruments under seal and D.C. Code 28:3-118 sets 6 years for negotiable promissory notes, but D.C. Code 28-3814(o) caps any action to collect a consumer debt commenced on or after September 1, 2021 at 3 years from accrual, notwithstanding any other statute of limitations unless it is shorter, and says expressly that this period also applies to contracts under seal.
Does making a payment restart the statute of limitations in DC?
No, for consumer debt. D.C. Code 28-3814 says that once the limitations period has expired, a later payment or oral or written affirmation does not extend it.
Does DC's debt collection law apply to the original creditor or only to collection agencies?
It applies to both. D.C. Code 28-3814(b)(5) defines a debt collector to include an original creditor or debt buyer engaging directly or indirectly in debt collection. The narrow exception is subsection (m)(3), which exempts original creditors collecting their own debt from that subsection's documentation and notice requirements.
Do I get notice before my car is repossessed in DC?
Sources describe a pre-repossession notice and short cure window for missed-payment defaults under DC's consumer-protection and installment-sales rules, but we could not independently confirm the exact text this session. Verify the current regulation before relying on a specific number of days.
Can a collector sue me on an old DC debt if the statute of limitations has run?
No. D.C. Code 28-3814 prohibits a debt collector from initiating a lawsuit when it knows or reasonably should know the limitations period has already expired.
Updates
Corrected the statute of limitations section: for consumer debt, D.C. Code 28-3814(o) caps collection suits filed on or after September 1, 2021 at 3 years from accrual notwithstanding the longer 12-year sealed-instrument and 6-year promissory-note periods, and clarified that DC’s debt collection law reaches original creditors as well as third-party collectors.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 28: Commercial Instruments and Transactions. - Chapter 38: Consumer Protections. - Subchapter I: General.
§ 28-3814Debt collection.In force
(a) This section applies to conduct and practices in connection with the collection of obligations arising from any consumer debt (other than a loan directly secured on real estate or a direct motor vehicle installment loan covered by Chapter 36 of this title). (b) As used in this section, the term: (1) "Consumer" means any individual obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any consumer debt. (2) "Consumer debt" means money or its equivalent, or a loan or advance of money, which is, or is alleged to be, more than 30 days past due and owing, unless a different period is agreed to by the consumer, as a result of a purchase, lease, or loan of goods, services, or real or personal property for personal, family, medical, or household purposes. The term consumer debt does not include an extension of credit secured by a mortgage. (3) "Debt buyer" means a person that is engaged in the business of purchasing charged-off consumer debt or other delinquent consumer debt for collection purposes, whether it collects the consumer debt itself or hires a third party, including an attorney, in order to collect such consumer debt.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 23 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):The D.C. Court of Appeals has applied § 28-3814's pleading demands. Bell v. First Investors Servicing Corp. (2021) affirmed dismissal of a count that merely recited what the law prohibits; the 2025 amended opinion in Bell v. Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, PA let (f)(5) and (g)(4) claims proceed against a collection law firm.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Bell v. Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, PA (Amended opinion) (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2025)✓After a car repossession, a collection law firm sued for a deficiency that included an $850 retaking fee where the regulations cap ordinary retaking expenses at $100; the court held the consumer's complaint stated claims under D.C. Code 28-3814(f)(5) and (g)(4).
- Bell v. Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, PA (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2025)✓A consumer sued a collection law firm over a repossession deficiency claim; the court held the 2022 repeal of the Debt Collection Law's willfulness requirement was substantive and not retroactive, so damages for pre-2022 conduct still require proof of willfulness.
- Banks v. Hoffman (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2023)“…Council enacted amendments to the debt collection statute, D.C. Code § 28-3814, to provide inter alia that “[i]n a cau…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 16: Particular Actions, Proceedings and Matters. - Chapter 5: Attachment and Garnishment. - Subchapter III: Attachment and Garnishment of Wages, etc.
§ 16-572Attachment of wages; percentage limitations; priority of attachments.In force
Notwithstanding any other provision of subchapter II of this chapter: (A) Where an attachment is levied upon wages due a judgment debtor from an employer-garnishee, the attachment shall become a lien and a continuing levy upon the gross wages due or to become due to the judgment debtor for the amount specified in the attachment to the extent of 25% of the amount by which the judgment debtor's disposable wages for that week exceed 40 times the minimum hourly wage, as prescribed in [§ 32-1003] ("minimum hourly wage"), in effect at the time the wages are payable. (B) In the case of wages for any pay period other than a week, the Mayor shall, by regulation, prescribe a multiple of the minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph. (2) The levy shall be a continuing levy until the judgment, interest, and costs thereof are fully satisfied and paid, and in no event may moneys be withheld, by the employer-garnishee from the judgment debtor, in amounts greater than those prescribed by this section. (3) Only one attachment upon the wages of a judgment debtor may be satisfied at one time.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2011
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Rab v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1989, 556 A.2d 1072)“…he stay was lifted, Safeco’s writ had priority pursuant to D.C. Code § 16-572 since it was the first to be served. R…”
- In Re Mordkin (District Court, District of Columbia 2011, 452 B.R. 311)“…k to the debtor’s exemption pursuant *312 to D.C.Code § 16-572 of certain unpaid compensation. For the…”
- In Re Shorts (District Court, District of Columbia 1985, 63 B.R. 2)“…f Columbia does under local law constitute a judicial lien. D.C.Code § 16-572. Hence, subsection 522(f) may well be o…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 12: Right to Remedy. - Chapter 3: Limitation of Actions.
§ 12-301Limitation of time for bringing actions.In forcecited in 11 of our articles
[(a)] Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, actions for the following purposes may not be brought after the expiration of the period specified below from the time the right to maintain the action accrues: (1) for the recovery of lands, tenements, or hereditaments— 15 years; (2) for the recovery of personal property or damages for its unlawful detention— 3 years; (3) for the recovery of damages for an injury to real or personal property— 3 years; (4) for libel, slander, assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution, false arrest or false imprisonment— 1 year; (5) for a statutory penalty or forfeiture— 1 year; (6) on an executor’s or administrator’s bond— 5 years; on any other bond or single bill, covenant, or other instrument under seal— 12 years; (7) on a simple contract, express or implied— 3 years; (8) for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed— 3 years; (9) for a violation of § 7-1201.01(11)— 1 year; (10) for the recovery of damages for an injury to real property from toxic substances including products containing asbestos— 5 years from the date the injury is discovered or with reasonable diligence should have been…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-08 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 492 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Bussineau v. President of Georgetown College (1986) held that under 12-301 a discovery-rule claim accrues only when plaintiff knows or should know of the injury, its cause in fact, and some evidence of wrongdoing. Greenpeace, Inc. v. The Dow Chemical Company (2014) applied 12-301(4)'s one-year period to intrusion upon seclusion.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Bussineau v. President of Georgetown College (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1986, 518 A.2d 423)✓A dental patient, reassured her treatment was proper, sued years later. Reversing summary judgment, the court held that where the discovery rule applies, a D.C. Code 12-301(8) claim accrues only on knowledge of the injury, its cause in fact, and some evidence of wrongdoing.
- District of Columbia v. OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATION (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1990, 572 A.2d 394)✓The District sued asbestos makers over removal costs in roughly 2,400 public buildings, and most claims were held time barred. The court held the District is immune from D.C. Code 12-301 when it sues to vindicate public rights in performing a public function, and reversed.
- Greenpeace, Inc. v. The Dow Chemical Company (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2014, 97 A.3d 1053)✓Greenpeace alleged corporate espionage, including rummaging through its trash for confidential documents. The court held an intrusion upon seclusion claim is governed by the one-year period in D.C. Code 12-301(4), not a three-year period, so the claim was time barred.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: District of Columbia Recording Laws (2026): One-Party Consent Rules, District of Columbia Hit and Run Laws: Penalties & Guide, DC Defamation Laws: Libel, Slander & Suing (2026)
Code of Federal Regulations Title 12
§ 1006.26Collection of time-barred debts.In forcecited in 37 of our articles
(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section: (1) Statute of limitations means the period prescribed by applicable law for bringing a legal action against the consumer to collect a debt. (2) Time-barred debt means a debt for which the applicable statute of limitations has expired. (b) Legal actions and threats of legal actions prohibited. A debt collector must not bring or threaten to bring a legal action against a consumer to collect a time-barred debt. This paragraph (b) does not apply to proofs of claim filed in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ecfr.gov
Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Hanover v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (2024) dismissed FDCPA claims built on 12 CFR 1006.26(b), reasoning it bars only collection of time-barred debts and the loans at issue were not time barred. Raja v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (2025) dismissed a Regulation F claim because nonjudicial foreclosure is not covered by the FDCPA.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Hanover v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (District Court, S.D. Ohio 2024)✓A borrower claimed a servicer's letter and billing statement lacked language required by 12 CFR 1006.26(b); the court granted the servicer summary judgment, since the rule only bars collecting time-barred debts and it had already found her HELOC and mortgage enforceable.
- Raja v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (District Court, E.D. Virginia 2025)✓Pro se homeowners alleged a servicer and foreclosure attorneys pursued a time-barred, discharged second mortgage in violation of 12 CFR 1006.26(b); the court dismissed that claim, holding parties carrying out a nonjudicial foreclosure are not FDCPA debt collectors.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Idaho Debt Collection Laws: Garnishment Limits, Debt Deadlines, and Repossession, Maine Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession, Michigan Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
United States Code Title 15
§ 1692eFalse or misleading representationsIn forcecited in 10 of our articles
A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: The false representation or implication that the debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any State, including the use of any badge, uniform, or facsimile thereof. The false representation of— the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt. The false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney. The representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages of any person unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action. The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 3,533 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Courts read Section 1692e through the least sophisticated consumer test. Christ Clomon v. Philip D. Jackson (1993) held that mass-mailed letters bearing an attorney signature, sent without file review, violated subsections (3) and (10); Gonzalez v. Kay (2009) held a back-page disclaimer did not defeat the claim on a motion to dismiss.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. (Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2003, 321 F.3d 292)✓Debt letters went out on law firm letterhead after an attorney reviewed only a file showing the debt was outstanding; the Second Circuit held that merely being told by a client that a debt is overdue is not enough attorney involvement, and vacated summary judgment.
- William C. Lewis v. Acb Business Services, Inc., (96-3093/3498), American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. James P. Connors, (96-3498) (Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 1998, 135 F.3d 389)✓A collection letter told the debtor to contact 'M. Hall,' a name no employee at the agency actually used; the Sixth Circuit held the alias was not a false or deceptive means under 1692e(10) because the account had been assigned to a real representative and no harm was shown.
- Gonzalez v. Kay (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2009, 577 F.3d 600)✓A law firm collecting a $448.97 phone debt sent an unsigned letter on its letterhead with the disclaimer of attorney review only on the back; the Fifth Circuit held the least sophisticated consumer might think a lawyer was involved and reversed dismissal of the 1692e claim.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Statute of Limitations on Debt: The 50-State Payment-Revival Table, Alabama Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession, Alaska Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 28: Commercial Instruments and Transactions. - Subtitle I: Uniform Commercial Code. - Article 9: Secured Transactions. - Part VI: Default. - Subpart 1: Default and Enforcement of Security Interest.
§ 28:9-609Secured party’s right to take possession after default.In force
(a) After default, a secured party: (1) May take possession of the collateral; and (2) Without removal, may render equipment unusable and dispose of collateral on a debtor’s premises under § 28:9-610. (b) A secured party may proceed under subsection (a): (1) Pursuant to judicial process; or (2) Without judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of the peace. (c) If so agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both parties.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
United States Code Title 50
§ 3952Protection under installment contracts for purchase or leaseIn forcecited in 17 of our articles
After a servicemember enters military service, a contract by the servicemember for— the purchase of real or personal property (including a motor vehicle); or the lease or bailment of such property, may not be rescinded or terminated for a breach of terms of the contract occurring before or during that person’s military service, nor may the property be repossessed for such breach without a court order. This section applies only to a contract for which a deposit or installment has been paid by the servicemember before the servicemember enters military service. A person who knowingly resumes possession of property in violation of subsection (a), or in violation of section 3918 of this title, or who knowingly attempts to do so, shall be fined as provided in title 18, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 1 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Ditech Holding Corporation (United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York 2025)“…d on, or sold during or within a year after active service. 50 U.S.C. §§ 3952, 3953. Claimant states that he re…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Louisiana Debt Collection Laws: Prescription, Garnishment, and Repossession, Maryland Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession, Massachusetts Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
Search our full record of US law — 2.1 million sections, every state + federal →
Sources and References
- D.C. Code 16-572, Amount subject to attachment (garnishment formula)(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 12-301, Limitation of actions (three years for simple contracts)(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 16-572.01, Hardship Exemption from Attachment (30-day hearing; public-assistance presumption)(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 28-3814, Consumer debt collection: time-barred suit bar and anti-revival(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 28:9-609, Secured party's right to take possession after default(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- 15 U.S.C. 1673, Federal restriction on garnishment (25%/30-times test)(govinfo.gov).gov
- 12 CFR 1006.26, Regulation F prohibition on suits and threats of suit on time-barred debt(ecfr.gov).gov