Colorado
Colorado Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 12, 2026). · 2 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

A collector cannot touch your paycheck in Colorado just because you fell behind. For ordinary consumer debt, the creditor must first sue you, win a judgment, and then get a court-issued writ of garnishment before your employer withholds anything. That sequence is where most garnishments are actually decided: they usually happen because the person being sued never answered the lawsuit and a default judgment followed automatically. If you take one action from this page, answer any summons you receive, even if you think the debt is too old or belongs to someone else.
Wage Garnishment in Colorado
Colorado's garnishment formula, C.R.S. 13-54-104(2)(a)(I), caps what a creditor can take at the lesser of three numbers: 20% of your disposable earnings for the week, the amount by which your disposable earnings exceed 40 times the federal minimum hourly wage, or the amount by which they exceed 40 times the Colorado minimum hourly wage. Because Colorado's minimum wage is well above the federal $7.25 floor, the state-wage version of the test is almost always the one that actually protects more of a paycheck. With Colorado's minimum wage at $15.16 an hour, the 40-times threshold works out to about $606.40 a week; wages at or below that are untouchable, and above it, no more than 20% can be taken.
Colorado's definition of disposable earnings is broader than the federal one in a reader's favor: it also excludes amounts withheld for health insurance, not just legally required deductions.
A separate Colorado statute, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code at C.R.S. 5-5-106, still states an older 25%-of-disposable-earnings/30-times-minimum-wage formula for consumer credit transactions. That figure has not been updated to match 13-54-104, and a creditor can only take what both statutes allow, so the newer and stricter 13-54-104 formula controls what is actually withheld. Colorado's judicial garnishment forms compute at the 20% figure.
There is no fixed head-of-household exemption in Colorado. Instead, a debtor can file a written objection under C.R.S. 13-54.5-108 and 13-54.5-109 asking the court to exempt whatever amount is actually necessary for living expenses; the court decides case by case rather than applying a set percentage.
Firing protection stronger than federal law
Federal law protects an employee from being fired over a garnishment for any one debt, but offers no protection once a second, different debt is garnished. Colorado goes further. Under C.R.S. 13-54.5-110, an employer may not discharge an employee because a creditor has subjected, or attempted to subject, unpaid earnings to any garnishment, with no limit on the number of debts involved. A worker who is fired in violation of this rule can bring a civil action within 91 days and recover lost wages for up to six weeks, reinstatement, and costs and attorney's fees.
Bank Account Protections
We did not find a Colorado statute creating an automatic, self-executing exemption for money sitting in a bank account, the way some states protect a fixed dollar amount without any filing. If you are facing a bank levy in Colorado, plan to file a claim of exemption promptly and consult the court's self-help resources on what property can be protected.

Federal benefits carry their own separate shield regardless of state law. Social Security, VA, and similar federal benefits that arrive by direct deposit are automatically protected for the trailing two months of deposits under 31 CFR Part 212, and the bank must apply that protection without you filing anything. Benefits paid by paper check and then deposited do not get this automatic treatment and must be claimed as exempt.
Statute of Limitations on Debt in Colorado
Colorado's general contract limitations period is 3 years under C.R.S. 13-80-101(1)(a), which by its own terms covers most contract actions including Uniform Commercial Code claims, except where another statute says otherwise. That exception matters: C.R.S. 13-80-103.5(1)(a) gives a 6-year period to actions to recover a liquidated debt, or an unliquidated but determinable amount of money, and to actions on an instrument that secures or evidences a debt.
| Debt type | Limitations period | Statute |
|---|---|---|
| General contract action | 3 years | C.R.S. 13-80-101(1)(a) |
| Liquidated debt or determinable amount owed | 6 years | C.R.S. 13-80-103.5(1)(a) |
| Promissory note or instrument evidencing debt | 6 years | C.R.S. 13-80-103.5(1)(a) |
Which bucket a given debt lands in decides everything, and this is where Colorado differs from a simple written-versus-oral split. The Colorado Supreme Court's Portercare Adventist Health System v. Lego decision (2012 CO 58) held that an unpaid hospital bill was a «liquidated debt» under 13-80-103.5 because the amount was computable from the hospital's predetermined billing rates, not from a signed contract. Portercare is a hospital-billing case; it does not address credit cards, and no Colorado appellate decision squarely holding that a credit-card balance falls in the 6-year liquidated/determinable bucket was found. The 6-year characterization for credit-card debt is the consensus reading among Colorado consumer-law practitioners, extending Portercare's reasoning by analogy (a card balance is also computable from account records rather than a single signed instrument), and most Colorado collection lawsuits are pleaded and defended on that assumption. But treat it as the well-supported practitioner reading rather than settled case law: do not assume an old card balance is time-barred at the 3-year mark, and do not cite Portercare itself as though it decides the credit-card question, because it does not.
We did not locate a Colorado statute addressing whether a partial payment or written acknowledgment revives an already-expired debt. Colorado's revival practice, if any, appears to rest on common law rather than a codified rule, so treat any claim about payment restarting Colorado's clock with caution, and do not rely on it as a defense strategy without checking current case law.
Time-barred does not mean the debt disappears. A collector can still contact you about an old debt, but under federal Regulation F, 12 CFR 1006.26, a debt collector must not sue or threaten to sue on a debt once the statute of limitations has expired. Credit reporting runs on its own separate clock, roughly seven years, regardless of when the limitations period expires.
What Debt Collectors Can and Cannot Do
The federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act governs third-party collectors operating in Colorado. They cannot use false, deceptive, or misleading statements, including misrepresenting the amount or legal status of a debt, and cannot threaten to take action they cannot legally take or do not intend to take, 15 U.S.C. 1692e. Regulation F layers on specific call-frequency limits and debt-validation requirements. Colorado has its own Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, C.R.S. 5-16-101 et seq., administered by the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Administrator, whose office sits in the Department of Law under the Attorney General. It reaches collection agencies, solicitors, and debt collectors, and it expressly treats debt buyers and collection attorneys as collection agencies, C.R.S. 5-16-103(3)(e)(I) and (8.5). It does not reach an original creditor collecting its own debts in its own name: C.R.S. 5-16-103(3)(b)(I) excludes an officer or employee of a creditor collecting in the creditor's name, and 5-16-103(3)(b)(VI)(B) excludes activity concerning a debt the collector itself extended, essentially the same carve-out the federal FDCPA has. The narrow exception is a creditor that collects its own debts under another name suggesting a third party is doing the collecting, which the statute does treat as a collection agency, C.R.S. 5-16-103(3)(c).
Car Repossession Rules
Colorado enacted the Uniform Commercial Code's self-help repossession rule at C.R.S. 4-9-609: after default, a secured party may take possession of collateral without judicial process, as long as it can do so without a breach of the peace, a standard the statute does not define and leaves to case law.

Colorado adds a meaningful protection most states do not have. Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, C.R.S. 5-5-110 and 5-5-111, when a consumer defaults only by missing payments on a consumer credit transaction, the creditor generally cannot accelerate the debt or repossess the collateral until giving the consumer a notice of the right to cure and waiting 20 days. Curing means paying all the unpaid amounts actually due, without the acceleration, plus any delinquency charges, which restores the consumer's rights as though no default had happened. A creditor only has to give one such cure notice per obligation in any 12-month period, and mobile-home-secured obligations get broader cure rights still.
Colorado also protects occupied manufactured housing specifically: under C.R.S. 4-9-609(d), a secured party cannot use self-help repossession against a manufactured home or trailer coach used as a residence unless there is clear and convincing evidence the resident has vacated, abandoned it, or voluntarily surrendered it.
Servicemembers get an additional federal layer. For an installment contract entered into before military service, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. 3952, requires a court order before the property can be repossessed for a pre-service breach.
If You Are Being Garnished or Sued in Colorado
Work the problem in this order:
- Answer the lawsuit. A default judgment is how most Colorado garnishments start. Filing an answer, even one that simply disputes the amount owed, forces the creditor to prove its case and often opens the door to a payment arrangement.
- If you get a repossession notice, use your cure window. For a payment-only default on a consumer credit transaction, you generally have 20 days after notice to catch up and stop the repossession entirely.
- Check the garnishment math. Compare what is being withheld against the 20%/40-times-minimum-wage formula. If your employer is taking more, ask the court to correct the writ.
- File a hardship objection if you need it. Colorado has no automatic head-of-household exemption, but you can ask the court to protect more of your income for actual living expenses.
- Ask whether the debt is time-barred, carefully. Colorado's 3-year and 6-year buckets both apply depending on the type of claim, and many debts collectors treat as ordinary end up in the longer 6-year category. Raise the statute of limitations as a defense in your answer; the court will not raise it for you.
- Consider bankruptcy if the debt is unmanageable. Filing triggers an automatic stay that stops garnishment immediately, and Colorado's exemptions apply inside bankruptcy too.
Overwhelmed by debt? Get a free bankruptcy consultation
Bankruptcy can stop foreclosure, wage garnishment, and creditor calls, and which debts you can clear and what property you keep depend on your state's exemptions. Get a free, confidential consultation with a bankruptcy attorney to understand your options. There is no obligation.
Information last verified on 2026-08-12. This article has not yet been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.

Related Resources
- Debt Collection Laws by State
- How to Stop Wage Garnishment
- Statute of Limitations on Debt
- Can Social Security Be Garnished?
- Colorado Statute of Limitations
- Colorado Bankruptcy Laws
Last updated: 2026-08-12.
More Colorado Laws
Frequently Asked Questions
How much of my paycheck can be garnished in Colorado?
The lesser of 20% of your disposable earnings for the week, or the amount your disposable earnings exceed 40 times the higher of the federal or Colorado minimum wage, under C.R.S. 13-54-104. With Colorado's current minimum wage, wages up to roughly $606.40 a week are fully protected.
Can I be fired for a wage garnishment in Colorado?
No. Colorado law, C.R.S. 13-54.5-110, bars an employer from discharging an employee over «any garnishment», not just a first one, which is broader than the federal protection that only covers one debt.
What is the statute of limitations on credit card debt in Colorado?
No Colorado appellate case squarely decides this, but the practitioner consensus, extending the Colorado Supreme Court's Portercare hospital-billing decision by analogy, treats a credit-card balance as a «liquidated debt or unliquidated, determinable amount of money» under C.R.S. 13-80-103.5, which carries a 6-year period rather than the general 3-year contract period. Do not assume an old card debt is time-barred at 3 years without checking which category applies, but also do not treat the 6-year figure as settled case law.
Does making a payment restart the statute of limitations in Colorado?
We could not locate a Colorado statute addressing this directly. Colorado's revival practice appears to rest on common law rather than a codified rule, so treat this as an open question rather than a settled fact.
Do I get advance notice before my car is repossessed in Colorado?
If the default is only missed payments on a consumer credit transaction, generally yes: C.R.S. 5-5-111 requires a notice of the right to cure and a 20-day window to catch up before the creditor can accelerate the debt or repossess.
Can a repo company take my manufactured home in Colorado?
Not through ordinary self-help if you are living in it. C.R.S. 4-9-609(d) bars self-help repossession of an occupied manufactured home or trailer coach unless there is clear and convincing evidence you abandoned it or voluntarily surrendered it.
Updates
Corrected the description of the Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: it regulates collection agencies, debt buyers, and collection attorneys, and does not reach an original creditor collecting its own debts in its own name.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Colorado Revised Statutes, Title 13: Courts and Court Procedure
§ 13-54-104Restrictions on garnishment and levy under execution or attachment - definitionsIn force
(1) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) Disposable earnings means that part of the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld and after the deduction of the cost of any health insurance provided by the individual pursuant to section 14-14-112 and the cost of any health insurance for the individual or members of the individual's household that is provided by the individual's employer and withheld from the individual's earnings. In the case of an order for the support of a spouse, former spouse, or dependent child, disposable earnings includes money voluntarily deposited in tax-deferred compensation funds. (b) (I) Earnings means: (A) Compensation paid or payable to an individual employee or independent contractor for personal labor or services; (B) Funds held in or payable from any health, accident, or disability insurance.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at olls.info
Cited in 29 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2020
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Morrison v. Kobernusz (In Re Kobernusz) (1993) applied Section 13-54-104 to hold that earnings keep their exempt character once deposited in a bank account. In Re Mata (1990) held former subsection (1.1), a bankruptcy-only exemption the legislature repealed in 1991, invalid as an intrusion on federal bankruptcy power.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- No. (Colorado Attorney General Reports 1975)“…the court considered the effect of C.R.S. 77-2-4 (1963) (C.R.S. 13-54-104 (1973)) which provides an exemption for…”
- In Re Alagna (United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado 1989, 107 B.R. 301)✓A Chapter 7 debtor claimed roughly $473,000 in pension plans and an IRA exempt under 13-54-104; the court held subsection (1.1) preempted by ERISA as to ERISA-qualified plans, and that the statute exempts only 75 percent of the interest earned, not the corpus.
- In Re Mata (United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado 1990, 115 B.R. 288)✓Debtors claimed a $1,402.68 IRA exempt under section 13-54-104(1.1); the court held that subsection created a bankruptcy-only exemption the state had no power to enact, denied the claim, and ordered the funds turned over to the trustee.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 13-54.5-110No discharge from employment for any garnishment - general prohibitionIn force
(1) No employer shall discharge an employee for the reason that a creditor of the employee has subjected or attempted to subject unpaid earnings of the employee to any garnishment or like proceeding directed to the employer for the purpose of paying any judgment. (2) If an employer discharges an employee in violation of the provisions of this section, the employee may, within ninety-one days, bring a civil action for the recovery of wages lost as a result of the violation and for an order requiring the reinstatement of the employee. Damages recoverable shall be lost wages not to exceed six weeks, costs, and reasonable attorney fees.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at olls.info
§ 13-80-103.5General limitation of actions - six yearsIn force
(1) The following actions shall be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues and not thereafter: (a) All actions to recover a liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of money due to the person bringing the action, all actions for the enforcement of rights set forth in any instrument securing the payment of or evidencing any debt, and all actions of replevin to recover the possession of personal property encumbered under any instrument securing any debt; except that actions to recover pursuant to section 38-35-124.5 (3), C.R.S., shall be commenced within one year; (b) All actions for arrears of rent; (c) All actions brought under section 13-21-109, except actions brought under section 13-21-109 (2); (d) All actions by the public employees' retirement association to collect unpaid contributions from employers for persons who are not members or inactive members at the time the association first notifies an employer of its claim for unpaid contributions. This paragraph (d) shall apply to causes of action as provided in section 24-51-402 (2), C.R.S. (e) Repealed.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at olls.info
Cited in 28 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Sobolewski v. Boselli & Sons, LLC (District Court, D. Colorado 2018, 342 F. Supp. 3d 1178)“…refore, Colorado's general six-year statute of limitations, C.R.S. § 13-80-103.5(1)(a), should apply to any meal and res…”
- Grynberg v. Total S.A. (Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 2008, 538 F.3d 1336)“…y the six-year statute-of- limitations period set forth in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-103.5(1)(a). The argument was raised for the…”
- Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Production, LLC (District Court, D. New Mexico 2014, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1188)“…in Colorado,” Response Supp. at 4, apparently referring to Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-80-103.5 (providing a six-year limitations perio…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 13-80-101General limitation of actions - three yearsIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
(1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter: (a) All contract actions, including personal contracts and actions under the Uniform Commercial Code, except as otherwise provided in section 13-80-103.5; (b) Repealed. (c) All actions for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or deceit except those in section 13-80-102 (1)(j); (d) and (e) Repealed.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at olls.info
Cited in 77 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Jones v. Cox (Supreme Court of Colorado 1992, 16 Brief Times Rptr. 555)“…Accident Reparations Act", part 7 of article 4 of title 10, C.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(j), 6 C.R.S. (1986 Supp.). Jones arg…”
- Grynberg v. Total S.A. (Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 2008, 538 F.3d 1336)“…uciary duty is three years from when the claim accrues. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-101(1)(f). To establish a claim under Color…”
- Ebrahimi v. E.F. Hutton & Co. (Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 1988, 852 F.2d 516)“…three-year limitations period for general fraud pursuant to Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-101(l)(c) (1987), 3 rather than the antifr…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Colorado Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type, Colorado Car Accident Laws: Fault, Insurance, and Your Claim
Colorado Revised Statutes, Title 5: Consumer Credit Code
§ 5-5-111Cure of defaultIn force
(1) With respect to a consumer credit transaction, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, after a default consisting only of the consumer's failure to make a required payment, a creditor, because of that default, may neither accelerate maturity of the unpaid balance of the obligation nor take possession of or otherwise enforce a security interest in the goods or the mobile home that are collateral until twenty days after giving the consumer a notice of right to cure described in section 5-5-110. Until the expiration of the minimum applicable period after the notice is given, all defaults consisting of a failure to make the required payment may be cured by tendering to the creditor the amount of all unpaid sums due at the time of the tender, without acceleration, plus any unpaid delinquency or deferral charges. Cure restores the consumer to his or her rights under the agreement as though the defaults had not occurred.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at olls.info
Colorado Revised Statutes, Title 4: Uniform Commercial Code
§ 4-9-609Secured party's right to take possession after defaultIn force
(a) After default, a secured party: (1) May take possession of the collateral; and (2) Without removal, may render equipment unusable and dispose of collateral on a debtor's premises under section 4-9-610. (b) A secured party may proceed under subsection (a) of this section: (1) Pursuant to judicial process; or (2) Without judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of the peace. (c) If so agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. (d) If the collateral is a manufactured home, as defined in section 42-1-102 (48.8), or a trailer coach, as defined in section 42-1-102 (106), and is used and occupied by the debtor as a place of residence, the secured party may take possession of the collateral pursuant to this section without judicial process only if there is clear and convincing evidence that the debtor has vacated or abandoned the collateral or the debtor voluntarily surrenders the collateral to the secured party.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at olls.info
Cited in 1 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2004
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Bombardier Capital, Inc. v. Tinkler (In Re Tinkler) (United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado 2004, 311 B.R. 869)“…n it began its normal Spring sales of the rental machines. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-9-609 gives a secured party the right of imm…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Code of Federal Regulations Title 12
§ 1006.26Collection of time-barred debts.In forcecited in 37 of our articles
(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section: (1) Statute of limitations means the period prescribed by applicable law for bringing a legal action against the consumer to collect a debt. (2) Time-barred debt means a debt for which the applicable statute of limitations has expired. (b) Legal actions and threats of legal actions prohibited. A debt collector must not bring or threaten to bring a legal action against a consumer to collect a time-barred debt. This paragraph (b) does not apply to proofs of claim filed in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ecfr.gov
Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Hanover v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (2024) dismissed FDCPA claims built on 12 CFR 1006.26(b), reasoning it bars only collection of time-barred debts and the loans at issue were not time barred. Raja v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (2025) dismissed a Regulation F claim because nonjudicial foreclosure is not covered by the FDCPA.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Hanover v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (District Court, S.D. Ohio 2024)✓A borrower claimed a servicer's letter and billing statement lacked language required by 12 CFR 1006.26(b); the court granted the servicer summary judgment, since the rule only bars collecting time-barred debts and it had already found her HELOC and mortgage enforceable.
- Raja v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (District Court, E.D. Virginia 2025)✓Pro se homeowners alleged a servicer and foreclosure attorneys pursued a time-barred, discharged second mortgage in violation of 12 CFR 1006.26(b); the court dismissed that claim, holding parties carrying out a nonjudicial foreclosure are not FDCPA debt collectors.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Idaho Debt Collection Laws: Garnishment Limits, Debt Deadlines, and Repossession, Maine Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession, Michigan Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
United States Code Title 15
§ 1692eFalse or misleading representationsIn forcecited in 10 of our articles
A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: The false representation or implication that the debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any State, including the use of any badge, uniform, or facsimile thereof. The false representation of— the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt. The false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney. The representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages of any person unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action. The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 3,533 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Courts read Section 1692e through the least sophisticated consumer test. Christ Clomon v. Philip D. Jackson (1993) held that mass-mailed letters bearing an attorney signature, sent without file review, violated subsections (3) and (10); Gonzalez v. Kay (2009) held a back-page disclaimer did not defeat the claim on a motion to dismiss.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. (Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2003, 321 F.3d 292)✓Debt letters went out on law firm letterhead after an attorney reviewed only a file showing the debt was outstanding; the Second Circuit held that merely being told by a client that a debt is overdue is not enough attorney involvement, and vacated summary judgment.
- William C. Lewis v. Acb Business Services, Inc., (96-3093/3498), American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. James P. Connors, (96-3498) (Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 1998, 135 F.3d 389)✓A collection letter told the debtor to contact 'M. Hall,' a name no employee at the agency actually used; the Sixth Circuit held the alias was not a false or deceptive means under 1692e(10) because the account had been assigned to a real representative and no harm was shown.
- Gonzalez v. Kay (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2009, 577 F.3d 600)✓A law firm collecting a $448.97 phone debt sent an unsigned letter on its letterhead with the disclaimer of attorney review only on the back; the Fifth Circuit held the least sophisticated consumer might think a lawyer was involved and reversed dismissal of the 1692e claim.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Statute of Limitations on Debt: The 50-State Payment-Revival Table, Alabama Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession, Alaska Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
United States Code Title 50
§ 3952Protection under installment contracts for purchase or leaseIn forcecited in 17 of our articles
After a servicemember enters military service, a contract by the servicemember for— the purchase of real or personal property (including a motor vehicle); or the lease or bailment of such property, may not be rescinded or terminated for a breach of terms of the contract occurring before or during that person’s military service, nor may the property be repossessed for such breach without a court order. This section applies only to a contract for which a deposit or installment has been paid by the servicemember before the servicemember enters military service. A person who knowingly resumes possession of property in violation of subsection (a), or in violation of section 3918 of this title, or who knowingly attempts to do so, shall be fined as provided in title 18, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 1 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Ditech Holding Corporation (United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York 2025)“…d on, or sold during or within a year after active service. 50 U.S.C. §§ 3952, 3953. Claimant states that he re…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Louisiana Debt Collection Laws: Prescription, Garnishment, and Repossession, Maryland Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession, Massachusetts Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
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Sources and References
- C.R.S. 13-54-104, Amount of earnings exempt from levy and garnishment(colorado.public.law)
- C.R.S. 13-54.5-110, Wrongful discharge from employment prohibited(colorado.public.law)
- C.R.S. 13-80-101, General limitation of actions - three years(colorado.public.law)
- C.R.S. 13-80-103.5, Actions for liquidated debt or determinable amount of money - six years(colorado.public.law)
- C.R.S. 4-9-609, Secured party's right to take possession after default(colorado.public.law)
- C.R.S. 5-5-111, Notice of consumer's right to cure default(colorado.public.law)
- 15 U.S.C. 1673, Federal restriction on garnishment (25%/30-times test)(govinfo.gov).gov
- 12 CFR 1006.26, Regulation F prohibition on suits and threats of suit on time-barred debt(ecfr.gov).gov
- C.R.S. 5-16-102 and 5-16-103, Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, scope and definitions (Office of Legislative Legal Services, CRS Title 5)(olls.info)