Kentucky
Kentucky Debt Collection Laws: Garnishment Limits, the $1,000 Exemption Myth, and Debt Deadlines
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 12, 2026). · 9 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

No creditor in Kentucky can start taking money out of your paycheck simply because a bill is unpaid. Outside of support orders, tax debts, and federally administered student loan garnishment, a creditor must first sue you, win a judgment, and then get a garnishment order from the court. Most garnishments follow a default judgment entered because the person being sued never answered the lawsuit, which makes answering the summons the single most valuable step available to a Kentucky debtor. Kentucky's protections generally track federal law closely, with one notable exception worth knowing before you rely on it: the state's much-cited $1,000 exemption is not a general shield against garnishment at all.
How Wage Garnishment Works in Kentucky
Kentucky's wage garnishment cap in KRS 427.010(2) is a direct copy of the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act formula: the lesser of 25% of disposable earnings for the workweek, or the amount by which disposable earnings exceed 30 times the federal minimum hourly wage, currently $217.50 a week. Unlike a few other states, the statute gives courts no discretion to reduce that percentage further for hardship; instead, KRS 427.010(3) lists categorical exceptions where the cap does not apply at all, including support orders, orders under a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, and state or federal tax debts.
When more than one garnishment order targets the same employee, KRS 425.506 sets a clear priority rule: orders take effect in the order they were served on the employer, each later order starting only once an earlier one has run its course, and no creditor may cause two garnishment orders to be served on the same employer against the same employee within the same pay period.
Kentucky has no head-of-household wage exemption. Firing protection stays at the federal floor rather than exceeding it: KRS 427.140 bars discharging an employee because their earnings were subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness, the same one-debt limit federal law uses, unlike Iowa's or Kansas's broader state rules. State and federal tax debts are expressly excepted from the 25%/30x cap under 427.010(3)(c); Kentucky's Department of Revenue's own administrative wage-levy percentage was not confirmed this session, so no figure is stated here.
The $1,000 Exemption That Does Not Cover Garnishment
This is the Kentucky fact most worth getting right. KRS 427.160 grants an «additional general exemption» of $1,000, and it is frequently described online as a Kentucky wildcard exemption, the kind of general dollar shield several other states give debtors against ordinary creditors. It is not. The statute's own text limits it solely to «the purpose of applying the provisions of 11 U.S.C. sec. 522(b)(3)(A) in a federal bankruptcy proceeding», meaning it functions only inside a federal bankruptcy case, not against a state-court garnishment or execution outside of bankruptcy. Any source describing it as a general Kentucky exemption against garnishment is describing it incorrectly.

Kentucky's actual outside-of-bankruptcy exemptions live in KRS 427.010(1): household furnishings, jewelry, and clothing up to $3,000; farm tools and livestock up to $3,000; one motor vehicle up to $2,500; prescribed health aids; and HSA funds. One more limit to know: under 427.010(4), none of these exemptions applies against a lien you voluntarily granted, to the extent of the balance still due on it, which matters most for a car loan secured by the car itself.
How Long Can You Be Sued: Kentucky's Statute of Limitations
Kentucky's written-contract deadline runs on two tracks depending on when the contract was executed. Contracts executed on or before July 15, 2014 carry a 15-year period under KRS 413.090(2), while contracts executed after that date carry a 10-year period under KRS 413.160, following a 2014 reform (2014 Ky. Acts ch. 142, House Bill 369) that prospectively shortened the deadline. Both tracks remain live today because plenty of older written contracts predate the 2014 cutoff. Oral contracts carry 5 years under KRS 413.120(1), and open accounts between merchants, or for goods sold and delivered, also carry 5 years under 413.120(9) and (10).
Whether Kentucky treats credit card debt as an account subject to the 5-year period or a written contract subject to the 10- or 15-year period was not resolved against a controlling Kentucky opinion, so this is a genuine open question rather than a settled rule; get the specific dates and documentation checked before assuming either period applies.
Promissory notes have their own track, and there is a citation trap worth flagging directly. Kentucky's UCC negotiable-instruments statute, KRS 355.3-118(1), gives a note payable at a definite time 6 years from the due date or accelerated due date, and a demand note 6 years after demand or an outer 10-year bar with no payment and no demand. A different and much narrower statute, KRS 413.120(7), sets a 5-year period, but only for bills of exchange, checks, drafts, or a promissory note specifically «placed upon the footing of a bill of exchange», a narrow historical category. That section is not the general Kentucky note statute of limitations, and citing it as such would understate how long an ordinary written promissory note remains enforceable.
On revival, this article found no acknowledgment or new-promise statute anywhere in KRS chapter 413. Some secondary sources describe partial payment or written acknowledgment as restarting Kentucky's clock, but they cite no statute for that claim, and none was located in the chapter's section list. If Kentucky has a revival rule at all, it most likely comes from case law rather than a statute, and that case law was not verified this session. Treat any claim about reviving a time-barred Kentucky debt, in either direction, as unconfirmed until checked. For deadlines on other kinds of Kentucky claims, see the Kentucky statute of limitations guide.
Rules Debt Collectors Must Follow
Third-party collectors working Kentucky debts are bound by the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: no harassment, no false statements about what they can legally do, no contact at unreasonable hours, and validation information on first contact. Under Regulation F, 12 CFR 1006.26, a debt collector must not sue or threaten to sue on a time-barred debt, though asking for voluntary payment remains legal. Because Kentucky's own revival rule is unsettled, be cautious about both paying and signing anything on a debt that might already be past its deadline.
Car Repossession in Kentucky
Kentucky enacted the standard UCC self-help rule at KRS 355.9-609, effective July 1, 2001: after default, a secured party may take possession without judicial process as long as it proceeds without breach of the peace, with the content of that phrase left to Kentucky case law rather than defined in the statute.

Whether Kentucky has a general statutory right to cure before repossession was not confirmed this session. Kentucky's Motor Vehicle Installment Sales provisions, KRS 190.090 through 190.140, were not reviewed for notice or cure obligations, so this is an open question rather than a confirmed absence of protection. Do not assume a Kentucky lender can repossess with no warning at all without checking those sections, your loan contract, and your specific circumstances with a lawyer or legal aid first.
If You Are Being Garnished or Sued in Kentucky
Start with the paperwork. If you were served with a lawsuit, answer it before the deadline even with a simple denial, because a default judgment forfeits every defense, including an expired statute of limitations. If a garnishment has already started, check the math against the 25%/30x federal-copy formula, and if more than one garnishment order is outstanding, ask which one was served on your employer first, since Kentucky pays them out strictly by service date. Do not rely on the $1,000 KRS 427.160 exemption to protect property from an ordinary garnishment; it only applies inside a federal bankruptcy case. If the debt is old, get advice before paying or signing anything, since Kentucky's revival rule was not confirmed either way. When judgments and garnishments have stacked up faster than a budget can absorb, bankruptcy's automatic stay stops wage garnishment immediately, and the KRS 427.160 exemption becomes directly relevant in that process; a structured guide to stopping wage garnishment walks through the options in order.
Overwhelmed by debt? Get a free bankruptcy consultation
Bankruptcy can stop foreclosure, wage garnishment, and creditor calls, and which debts you can clear and what property you keep depend on your state's exemptions. Get a free, confidential consultation with a bankruptcy attorney to understand your options. There is no obligation.
Information last verified on 2026-08-12. This article has not yet been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.

Related Resources
- Debt Collection Laws by State
- Statute of Limitations on Debt
- How to Stop Wage Garnishment
- Car Repossession Laws
- Kentucky Statute of Limitations
- Kentucky Bankruptcy Laws
Last updated: 2026-08-12.
More Kentucky Laws
Frequently Asked Questions
How much of my paycheck can be garnished in Kentucky?
The lesser of 25% of disposable earnings or the amount exceeding 30 times the federal minimum wage ($217.50 a week), under KRS 427.010(2), a direct copy of the federal formula. Support, Chapter 13 bankruptcy orders, and tax debts are excepted from the cap.
Is Kentucky's $1,000 exemption a general wildcard against garnishment?
No. KRS 427.160's $1,000 «additional general exemption» applies only inside a federal bankruptcy proceeding, under 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(3)(A). It does not shield property from an ordinary state-court garnishment outside of bankruptcy.
What is the statute of limitations on a written contract in Kentucky?
It depends on when the contract was signed. Contracts executed on or before July 15, 2014 carry 15 years (KRS 413.090); contracts executed after that date carry 10 years (KRS 413.160), following a 2014 reform. Oral contracts and open accounts carry 5 years.
Does making a payment restart the clock on old debt in Kentucky?
This is unresolved. No statute addressing revival by payment or acknowledgment was found in KRS chapter 413. If Kentucky has a revival rule, it likely comes from case law rather than a statute, so get advice before assuming any payment or signed writing restarts the clock.
Does Kentucky require notice before repossessing a car?
This could not be confirmed either way. No general Kentucky right-to-cure statute for repossession was verified, and the state's motor vehicle installment sales provisions were not reviewed for notice requirements, so check your specific contract and get advice before assuming there is no warning period.
Can I be fired for having my wages garnished in Kentucky?
Not for a single debt. KRS 427.140 bars discharge over garnishment for any one indebtedness, matching the federal one-debt protection under 15 U.S.C. 1674. Kentucky does not extend that protection to a second, separate garnishment.
Updates
Corrected the written-contract statute of limitations cutoff so the 10-year period applies to contracts executed after July 15, 2014 (a contract executed on that date remains on the 15-year track), and clarified that Kentucky bars a single creditor, not all creditors combined, from serving two garnishment orders on the same employer against the same employee in one pay period.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Kentucky Revised Statutes, Chapter 427: EXEMPTIONS
§ 427.010Exempt personal property, health savings funds, and disposable earnings of individual debtorsIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
(1) The following personal property of an individual debtor resident in this state is exempt from execution, attachment, garnishment, distress or fee-bill: All household furnishings, jewelry, personal clothing and ornaments not to exceed three thousand dollars ($3,000) in value; tools, equipment and livestock, including poultry, of a person engaged in farming, not exceeding three thousand dollars ($3,000) in value; one (1) motor vehicle and its necessary accessories, including one (1) spare tire, not exceeding in the aggregate two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) in value; professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor, or a dependent of the debtor; and funds deposited in a health savings account as described in Section 223 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov
Cited in 27 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2015
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Kentucky courts read KRS 427.010 narrowly. Shafizadeh v. Shafizadeh (2012) held subsection (2) caps how much of a paycheck may be garnished but does not shield wages once deposited in the debtor's bank account; Rice, Seiller, Cantor, Anderson & Bordy v. Fitzgerald (1992) held a dairy farmer's milk proceeds are not exempt earnings.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Shafizadeh v. Shafizadeh (Court of Appeals of Kentucky 2012, 444 S.W.3d 437)✓A former wife garnished her ex-husband's bank account to collect an attorney-fee award; he argued the account held only his salary, but the court held KRS 427.010(2) caps what may be garnished from an employer and does not protect wages once deposited in the debtor's account.
- Brown v. Commonwealth (Court of Appeals of Kentucky 1999, 40 S.W.3d 873)“…statutory exemptions: one protecting his wages pursuant to KRS 427.010, and one protecting his wife’s wages pu…”
- Lichtenstein v. Barbanel (Kentucky Supreme Court 2010, 322 S.W.3d 27)“…er herein to those orders as such. 2 . KRS 427.010(2) and its federal companion, 15 U.S.C…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Bankruptcy in Kentucky (2026): Exemptions & Means Test
§ 427.160Additional general exemptionIn force
Solely for the purpose of applying the provisions of 11 U.S.C. sec. 522(b)(3)(A) in a federal bankruptcy proceeding, in addition to other exemptions provided in this chapter and only to the extent otherwise allowed by applicable federal law, every debtor shall have a general exemption not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) in value to be applied toward any property, real or personal, tangible or intangible in his estate when he or she has filed for bankruptcy under the provisions of The Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), Public Law 95-598, as amended.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov
Cited in 11 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2009
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- MPM Financial Group, Inc. v. Morton (Kentucky Supreme Court 2009, 289 S.W.3d 193)“…elationship to federal bankruptcy proceedings. KRS 427.150, KRS 427.160 and KRS 427.170, were enacted in 1980,…”
- In Re Griffin (United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Kentucky 2006, 339 B.R. 900)“…s also attempt to exempt $1780 of the refund as provided by KRS § 427.160. The court disagrees with both approach…”
- In re T L G Computing Services, Inc. (District Court, W.D. Kentucky 1982, 20 B.R. 568)“…ground that corporations are not entitled to exemptions. KRS 427.160, enacted in 1980 when Kentucky opted ou…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 427.140Employee may not be discharged for garnishment for one (1) indebtednessIn force
No employer may discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one (1) indebtedness.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov
Cited in 1 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 1990
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Dole v. Hopple Plastics, Inc. (Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 1990, 902 F.2d 33)“…ry language identical to that of 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1674 (see Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 427.140 (Baldwin 1987)), but has not expressly…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Kentucky Revised Statutes, Chapter 425: PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
§ 425.506Attachment or garnishment of earnings -- Priority -- OrderIn force
(1) An order of garnishment of earnings, as defined in KRS 427.005, shall create a lien on all nonexempt earnings earned during the pay period in which the order is served on the employer and during those succeeding pay periods which may be designated by the order. (2) Orders of attachment or garnishment of earnings shall have priority according to the date of service on the employer, each inferior order taking effect as if served at the commencement of the next succeeding pay period not subject to a prior order; provided that no creditor shall cause two (2) orders to be served on the employer against the same employee in the same pay period. (3) The order shall be served on the employer in triplicate and shall have printed thereon an explanation of subsections (1) and (2) of this section, the percentage of the disposable earnings, as defined in KRS 427.005, exempted from the order by subsection (2) of KRS 427.010, and the percentage to be forwarded to the court.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov
Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 1998
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- In Re Fagan (United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky 1982, 26 B.R. 212)“…interest in property. . .. ” 11 U.S.C. § 101 (40). KRS 425.506 provides in pertinent part: “(1) An ord…”
- Wilkey v. Community Methodist Hospital (In re Edwards) (United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky 1998, 219 B.R. 970)“…ds which may be designated by the order, (emphasis added) KRS 425.506(1). According to KRS 425.506(1), the da…”
- In Re John Galt Energy, Inc. (United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. New York 1987, 75 B.R. 658)“…however, was decided in the context of a wage garnishment. KRS § 425.506(1), the Kentucky wage garnishment statu…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Kentucky Revised Statutes, Chapter 413: LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
§ 413.090Action upon judgment, contract, or bond -- Fifteen-year limitation -- Action for child support arrearages -- Time to commence action tolled until obligations cease as to last child on orderIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Except as provided in KRS 396.205, 413.110, 413.220, 413.230 and 413.240, the following actions shall be commenced within fifteen (15) years after the cause of action first accrued: (1) An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of this state or of the United States, or of any state or territory thereof, the period to be computed from the date of the last execution thereon; (2) An action upon a recognizance, bond, or written contract, except that actions upon written contracts executed after July 15, 2014, shall be governed by KRS 413.160; (3) An action upon the official bond of a sheriff, marshal, clerk, constable, or any other public officer, or any commissioner, receiver, curator, personal representative, guardian, conservator, or trustee appointed by a court or authority of law; (4) An action upon an appeal bond or bond given on a supersedeas, attachment, injunction, order of arrest or for the delivery of property or for the forthcoming of property, or to obey or perform an order or judgment of court in an action, or upon a bond for costs, or any other bond taken by a court or judge or by an officer pursuant to the directions of a court or judge, in an action or…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov
Cited in 168 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Metro Louisville/Jefferson County Government v. Abma (Court of Appeals of Kentucky 2009, 326 S.W.3d 1)“…tions on a contract claim is fifteen (15) years pursuant to KRS 413.090, this contract entitlement applies to a…”
- Conner v. George W. Whitesides Co. (Kentucky Supreme Court 1992, 834 S.W.2d 652)“…ides: Action by or against personal representative under KRS 413.090 to 413.160 "(1) If a person entitled…”
- Ragland v. Estate of Digiuro (Court of Appeals of Kentucky 2010, 352 S.W.3d 908)“…(1) If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160 dies before the expiration o…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Kentucky Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type
§ 413.160Actions upon written contract or not provided for by statute -- Ten-year limitationIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
An action upon a written contract executed after July 15, 2014, unless otherwise provided by statute, and an action for relief not provided for by statute can only be commenced within ten (10) years after the cause of action accrued.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov
Cited in 22 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Wood v. Wingfield (Kentucky Supreme Court 1991, 816 S.W.2d 899)“…dent and that the "catch all" ten-year limitation period of KRS 413.160 applies to that claim. It should be not…”
- National Gypsum Co. v. Corns (Kentucky Supreme Court 1987, 736 S.W.2d 325)“…y order of the Franklin Circuit Court which determined that KRS 413.160, a statute imposing a ten-year period o…”
- Ellis v. Ellis (Kentucky Supreme Court 1988, 752 S.W.2d 781)“…y KRS 413.-120(2), a five-year statute of limitation, or by KRS 413.160, a ten-year statute of limitation. Appe…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 413.120Actions to be brought within five yearsIn forcecited in 5 of our articles
The following actions shall be commenced within five (5) years after the cause of action accrued: (1) An action upon a contract not in writing, express or implied. (2) An action upon a liability created by statute, when no other time is fixed by the statute creating the liability. (3) An action for a penalty or forfeiture when no time is fixed by the statute prescribing it. (4) An action for trespass on real or personal property. (5) An action for the profits of or damages for withholding real or personal property. (6) An action for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated. (7) An action upon a bill of exchange, check, draft or order, or any endorsement thereof, or upon a promissory note, placed upon the footing of a bill of exchange. (8) An action to enforce the liability of a steamboat or other vessel. (9) An action upon a merchant's account for goods sold and delivered, or any article charged in such store account. (10) An action upon an account concerning the trade of merchandise, between merchant and merchant or their agents. (11) An action for relief or damages on the ground of fraud or mistake.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov
Cited in 386 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Craft v. Rice (Kentucky Supreme Court 1984, 671 S.W.2d 247)“…by the one-year limitation. The crucial issue is whether KRS 413.120(7), the five-year statute of limitation…”
- Saylor v. Hall (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) 1973, 497 S.W.2d 218)“…der, was barred by limitations because of the provisions of KRS 413.120(14) and KRS 413.135. From this order of…”
- Metro Louisville/Jefferson County Government v. Abma (Court of Appeals of Kentucky 2009, 326 S.W.3d 1)“…y applied the five-year statute of limitations mentioned in KRS 413.120(2) to the wage and hour law violation b…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Kentucky Dog Bite Laws: Liability and Victim Rights, Kentucky Hit and Run Laws: Penalties and What to Do, Kentucky Whistleblower Laws: Protections and How to Report
Kentucky Revised Statutes, Chapter 355: UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 355.3-118Statute of limitationsIn force
(1) Except as provided in subsection (5) of this section, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six (6) years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six (6) years after the accelerated due date. (2) Except as provided in subsection (4) or (5) of this section, if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six (6) years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of ten (10) years. (3) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to an unaccepted draft to pay the draft must be commenced within three (3) years after dishonor of the draft or ten (10) years after the date of the draft, whichever period expires first.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov
§ 355.9-609Secured party's right to take possession after defaultIn force
(1) After default, a secured party: (a) May take possession of the collateral; and (b) Without removal, may render equipment unusable and dispose of collateral on a debtor's premises under KRS 355.9-610. (2) A secured party may proceed under subsection (1) of this section: (a) Pursuant to judicial process; or (b) Without judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of the peace. (3) If so agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both parties.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov
Kentucky Revised Statutes, Chapter 190: MOTOR VEHICLE SALES -- RECYCLERS
§ 190.090Definitions for KRS 190.090 to 190.140In force
As used in KRS 190.090 to 190.140, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires: (1) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, and any other group however organized; (2) "Retail installment sale" means any sale for other than agricultural, business, or commercial use evidenced by a retail installment contract wherein retail buyer agrees to buy and retail seller agrees to sell a motor vehicle at a time sale price payable in two (2) or more installments. The cash sale price of the motor vehicle, the amount, if any, included for insurance and other benefits, official fees and the finance charge, shall together constitute the time sale price; (3) "Retail installment contract" means any agreement, entered into in this state, evidencing a retail installment sale of a motor vehicle, other than for the purpose of resale, pursuant to which title to, or a lien upon the motor vehicle is retained by the retail seller as security for the retail buyer's obligation.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov
Cited in 5 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2021
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Service Financial Co. v. Ware (Court of Appeals of Kentucky 2015, 473 S.W.3d 98)“…that Appellee agreed to pay a finance charge as defined by KRS 190.090(10) and not interest, can a seller neve…”
- Dupin v. Adkins (Court of Appeals of Kentucky 2000, 17 S.W.3d 538)“…clude farm tractors” for the motor vehicle sales statutes); KRS 190.090(4) (stating that a motor vehicle “doe…”
- Barnes v. Community Trust Bank (Court of Appeals of Kentucky 2003, 121 S.W.3d 520)“…ucky Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act codified at KRS 190.090 et seq. The Motor Vehicle…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
United States Code Title 11
§ 522ExemptionsIn forcecited in 53 of our articles
In this section— “dependent” includes spouse, whether or not actually dependent; and “value” means fair market value as of the date of the filing of the petition or, with respect to property that becomes property of the estate after such date, as of the date such property becomes property of the estate. Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph (2) or, in the alternative, paragraph (3) of this subsection. In joint cases filed under section 302 of this title and individual cases filed under section 301 or 303 of this title by or against debtors who are husband and wife, and whose estates are ordered to be jointly administered under Rule 1015(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, one debtor may not elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (2) and the other debtor elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (3) of this subsection. If the parties cannot agree on the alternative to be elected, they shall be deemed to elect paragraph (2), where such election is permitted under the law of the jurisdiction where the case is filed.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 7,574 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz (1992) held that a trustee who does not object within the 30-day period cannot later challenge an exemption claimed under 522(l), even one with no statutory basis. Owen v. Owen (1991) held that 522(f) lien avoidance is not defeated by a state exemption written to exclude lien-encumbered property.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz (Supreme Court of the United States 1992, 503 U.S. 638)✓A Chapter 7 debtor listed the entire proceeds of her TWA discrimination suit as exempt and the trustee let the 30-day objection window lapse; the Court held that under § 522(l) the property is exempt once no one objects, even absent a colorable statutory basis.
- Patterson v. Shumate (Supreme Court of the United States 1992, 504 U.S. 753)✓A debtor's $250,000 ERISA pension interest was excluded from his estate under § 541(c)(2); answering a surplusage argument, the Court read § 522(d)(10)(E) as exempting a broader set of plans, and expressly declined to decide whether § 522(b)(2)(A) also applied.
- Owen v. Owen (Supreme Court of the United States 1991, 500 U.S. 305)✓An ex-wife's judgment lien attached to a Florida condo before state law made it a homestead; the Court held § 522(f) measures impairment against the exemption the debtor would have had but for the lien, so Florida's carve-out for prior liens did not defeat avoidance.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Bankruptcy Laws by State (2026): Exemptions & Means Test, Bankruptcy in Alaska (2026): Exemptions & Means Test, Bankruptcy in Arkansas (2026): Exemptions & Means Test
United States Code Title 15
§ 1674Restriction on discharge from employment by reason of garnishmentIn forcecited in 15 of our articles
No employer may discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness. Whoever willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 48 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2022
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Federal appeals courts have held that 15 U.S.C. 1674 gives no private right of action to an employee fired over a garnishment. Smith v. Cotton Brothers Baking Co., Inc. (1980) found no implied civil remedy, and Le Vick v. Skaggs Companies, Inc. (1983) agreed, leaving enforcement to the Secretary of Labor under Section 1676.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- James E. Le Vick v. Skaggs Companies, Inc. (Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 1983, 701 F.2d 777)✓An employee fired after his wages were garnished sued his employer under 15 U.S.C. 1674(a); the Ninth Circuit declined to follow its own Stewart precedent and held Congress created no private right of action, leaving enforcement to the Secretary of Labor.
- Hodgson v. Cleveland Municipal Court (District Court, N.D. Ohio 1971, 326 F. Supp. 419)✓The Secretary of Labor argued federal garnishment law preempted Ohio's narrower anti-discharge provision; the court found no showing that 15 U.S.C. 1674, a self-enforcing criminal section, was frustrated by the Ohio statute, and no justiciable controversy under it.
- Reginald O. Wallace v. Debron Corporation (Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 1974, 494 F.2d 674)✓A Black welder was fired under a rule barring two garnishments in a year; reversing summary judgment on his Title VII disparate-impact claim, the Eighth Circuit read 15 U.S.C. 1674 as preventing discharge for one indebtedness, not authorizing it for others.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Arkansas Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession, Georgia Debt Collection Laws: Garnishment Caps, the 10-Day Repo Notice, and Debt Time Limits, Alabama Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
Code of Federal Regulations Title 12
§ 1006.26Collection of time-barred debts.In forcecited in 37 of our articles
(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section: (1) Statute of limitations means the period prescribed by applicable law for bringing a legal action against the consumer to collect a debt. (2) Time-barred debt means a debt for which the applicable statute of limitations has expired. (b) Legal actions and threats of legal actions prohibited. A debt collector must not bring or threaten to bring a legal action against a consumer to collect a time-barred debt. This paragraph (b) does not apply to proofs of claim filed in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ecfr.gov
Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Hanover v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (2024) dismissed FDCPA claims built on 12 CFR 1006.26(b), reasoning it bars only collection of time-barred debts and the loans at issue were not time barred. Raja v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (2025) dismissed a Regulation F claim because nonjudicial foreclosure is not covered by the FDCPA.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Hanover v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (District Court, S.D. Ohio 2024)✓A borrower claimed a servicer's letter and billing statement lacked language required by 12 CFR 1006.26(b); the court granted the servicer summary judgment, since the rule only bars collecting time-barred debts and it had already found her HELOC and mortgage enforceable.
- Raja v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (District Court, E.D. Virginia 2025)✓Pro se homeowners alleged a servicer and foreclosure attorneys pursued a time-barred, discharged second mortgage in violation of 12 CFR 1006.26(b); the court dismissed that claim, holding parties carrying out a nonjudicial foreclosure are not FDCPA debt collectors.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Idaho Debt Collection Laws: Garnishment Limits, Debt Deadlines, and Repossession, Maine Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession, Michigan Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
Search our full record of US law — 2.1 million sections, every state + federal →
Sources and References
- KRS 427.010, Property Exempt from Execution, Attachment, and Garnishment(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- KRS 427.160, Additional General Exemption for Purposes of Federal Bankruptcy Law(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- KRS 425.506, Priority of Garnishment Orders(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- KRS 413.090, Fifteen Year Limitation(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- KRS 413.160, Ten Year Limitation(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- KRS 413.120, Five Year Limitation(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- KRS 355.3-118, Statute of Limitations on Negotiable Instruments(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- KRS 355.9-609, Secured Party's Right to Take Possession After Default(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- 12 CFR 1006.26, Collection of Time-Barred Debts (Regulation F)(ecfr.gov).gov