Connecticut
Connecticut AI Meeting Recording Laws (2026)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 16, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 16, 2026. · 6 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

Connecticut's civil recording statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-570d, covers an oral private telephonic communication and is satisfied by written all-party consent, a recorded verbal notification from the recording party, or an automatic fifteen-second tone. Whether it reaches an internet-based video meeting is untested in Connecticut courts, which is what makes AI meeting recorders like Otter.ai and Fireflies legally risky unless one of those three paths is followed. The criminal eavesdropping statute (§ 53a-189) sets a lower one-party threshold.
Connecticut's recording laws create an unusual trap for AI meeting recorder users. The state operates under two distinct legal standards depending on whether the claim is criminal or civil. Under the criminal eavesdropping statute, recording a conversation with one party's consent is generally lawful. But under the civil telephone recording statute, recording a private telephonic communication without satisfying one of three specific requirements exposes the recorder to a lawsuit for damages. For anyone using Otter.ai, Fireflies, or similar AI notetakers on meetings that carry a Connecticut participant, the civil statute is the one that creates exposure.
This dual framework means a recording can be perfectly legal from a criminal standpoint while simultaneously creating civil liability. That distinction matters enormously for businesses and individuals deploying AI tools that automatically join and transcribe meetings.
Connecticut's Split Consent Framework
Connecticut's recording laws are governed by two separate statutory schemes that set different thresholds.
Criminal Law: One-Party Consent (§ 53a-187 and § 53a-189)
Under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-187(a)(1), "wiretapping" means the intentional overhearing or recording of "a telephonic or telegraphic communication or a communication made by cellular radio telephone by a person other than a sender or receiver thereof, without the consent of either the sender or receiver," by means of any instrument, device or equipment. The statutory list is telephonic, telegraphic, and cellular radio telephone. The definition does not use the broader phrase "electronic communication," and it excludes a sender or receiver of the communication from the offense in the first place.
"Mechanical overhearing of a conversation" means the intentional overhearing or recording of a conversation or discussion, without the consent of at least one party to it, by a person not present at the conversation, using any instrument, device or equipment.
Section 53a-189 makes eavesdropping a class D felony. The key criminal threshold is one-party consent: if at least one participant in the conversation agrees to the recording, the conduct is not criminal eavesdropping.
Civil Law: Three Compliance Paths for Telephone Recordings (§ 52-570d)
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-570d creates a private right of action for anyone aggrieved by the recording of an oral private telephonic communication that does not meet the statute's requirements. Under § 52-570d(a), recording such a communication requires one of three forms of authorization:
- Written consent from all parties, obtained in writing or made part of and obtained at the start of the recording
- Verbal notification from the recording party, recorded at the beginning of and part of the communication (this is a unilateral notice, not consent from every party)
- Automatic tone warning device producing a distinct signal repeated at intervals of approximately fifteen seconds during the communication
Any one of the three independently satisfies the statute. Failing to meet any of them exposes the person who records to civil liability for damages, costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee. This is the statute that creates the most risk for AI meeting recorder users.
Section 52-570d(b) also carves out several categories entirely, including law enforcement recordings, emergency communications recorded by a public or private safety agency, and recordings made by the recipient of threatening or repeated calls.
Why the Distinction Matters
A person using an AI meeting recorder on a call with one other participant might not face criminal charges, because one party consented. But if none of § 52-570d's three paths was followed, that person can still be sued under the civil statute. Criminal exposure and civil exposure are decided separately in Connecticut, and the civil statute is the harder of the two to satisfy.

How Connecticut Law Applies to AI Meeting Recorders
AI meeting recording tools like Otter.ai, Fireflies.ai, Microsoft Copilot, and Zoom's built-in transcription operate by joining virtual meetings (or running in the background) to capture and transcribe audio. Under Connecticut law, these tools face specific legal challenges.
Do Virtual Meetings Count as Telephonic Communications?
This is the unresolved question the whole analysis turns on, and it is fair to say the answer is not settled.
Section 52-570d reaches an "oral private telephonic communication." The only scope annotation on the official statute page is a Superior Court holding that cordless telephone conversations are protected telephonic communications (45 CS 497). That is a cordless-handset case, not a videoconferencing one. No Connecticut appellate court has extended § 52-570d to Zoom, Google Meet, or Microsoft Teams, and none has held that the statute stops short of them either. The criminal definition in § 53a-187 is narrower still: it lists telephonic, telegraphic and cellular radio telephone communications, not internet-based ones.
The practical consequence is uncertainty, not clearance. A participant who dials into a meeting over a phone line is on a telephonic communication under any reading. A meeting carried entirely over internet audio is untested. Because the downside is a civil damages action that carries costs and attorney's fees, most Connecticut users and employers treat § 52-570d as if it applies to virtual meetings and follow one of its three compliance paths rather than litigate the question.
The Consent Gap Problem
Most AI meeting recorders obtain consent only from the account holder who activated the tool. The Otter.ai class action lawsuit (Brewer v. Otter.ai, Inc., N.D. Cal., No. 5:25-cv-06911, filed August 2025) alleges that Otter Notetaker joins meetings and transmits audio to company servers without obtaining affirmative consent from all participants. If § 52-570d applies to the meeting, that practice creates potential civil liability for both the tool provider and the individual user who deployed it.
Silent or Written-Only Notifications Are Not Enough
Some AI tools display a banner or send a chat message stating "this meeting is being recorded." Under Connecticut law, a spoken verbal notification announcing that the call is being recorded, made by the recording party and captured at the start of the call, independently satisfies § 52-570d without needing consent from the other participants. But a silent visual banner or written chat message is not "verbal," so it does not clearly satisfy any of the statute's three prongs: written consent, an audible verbal notification recorded at the start, or the fifteen-second automatic tone.
Connecticut courts have not directly ruled on whether a virtual meeting notification constitutes adequate compliance under § 52-570d. Until case law clarifies this question, relying solely on automated notifications carries legal risk.
Popular AI Meeting Tools and Connecticut Compliance
Understanding how specific tools handle consent helps illustrate the compliance challenges under Connecticut law.
Otter.ai / OtterPilot
Otter's AI notetaker can join meetings automatically when integrated with a user's calendar. The tool may enter a meeting without the host's explicit approval for each session. Under § 52-570d, automated joining and recording without written all-party consent, a recorded verbal notification from the recording party, or the fifteen-second tone creates potential civil liability.
Zoom Native Recording and AI Companion
Zoom displays a recording notification and requires participants to acknowledge it before continuing. This approach comes closer to Connecticut's requirements than tools that record silently, but it does not produce written or verbally recorded consent at the start of the call. Whether Zoom's notification system satisfies § 52-570d remains untested in Connecticut courts.
Microsoft Teams / Copilot
Microsoft Teams shows a recording indicator in the meeting interface. Teams also announces when Copilot is active. These notifications provide some transparency but face the same legal ambiguity as Zoom's notifications under Connecticut's specific requirements.
Fireflies.ai
Fireflies joins meetings as a named participant ("Fireflies.ai Notetaker") and may send a notification. The tool's visibility varies depending on the meeting platform and host settings. Connecticut users face the same compliance questions as with other AI recorders.
Best Practices for Compliance
To reduce legal risk when using AI meeting tools in Connecticut:
- Obtain verbal consent on the record at the start of every meeting by stating the meeting will be recorded and asking all participants to confirm agreement
- Send written consent requests via email or meeting invitation before the call begins
- Document consent by keeping records of when and how each participant agreed
- Disable automatic recording features that join meetings without per-meeting authorization
- Offer opt-out options allowing participants to decline recording or leave the meeting

Penalties for Violating Connecticut Recording Laws
Connecticut imposes both criminal and civil penalties for unauthorized recording.
Criminal Penalties (§ 53a-189)
Eavesdropping under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-189 is a class D felony. Penalties include:
| Penalty | Amount |
|---|---|
| Imprisonment | Not more than 5 years (no mandatory minimum) |
| Fine | Up to $5,000 |
| Combined | Both imprisonment and fine |
The imprisonment figure comes from Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-35a(8), which sets the authorized term for a class D felony at "a term not more than five years." Unlike the class B and class C subdivisions immediately above it, the class D subdivision carries no one-year floor. The maximum fine comes from § 53a-41(4).
Criminal liability requires proving that the recording occurred without the consent of at least one party. For AI meeting recorders where the account holder has consented to their own recording, criminal prosecution is unlikely unless the tool records conversations the account holder does not participate in.
Civil Penalties (§ 52-570d)
The civil statute provides broader grounds for liability. Under § 52-570d(c), any person aggrieved by a recording made without one of the three authorizations in subsection (a) may bring a civil action in the Superior Court to recover:
- Damages suffered as a result of the unauthorized recording
- Costs of the action
- A reasonable attorney's fee
There is no statutory cap on civil damages. Even good-faith use of an AI meeting recorder that satisfies none of the three statutory paths could trigger liability.
Evidence and Admissibility
Connecticut's eavesdropping statutes do not create a suppression remedy for privately made recordings. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-187(b) provides that those sections "do not affect the admissibility of evidence in any proceedings other than a prosecution for eavesdropping or tampering with private communications."
The statutory motion to suppress is Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-41m, not § 54-41g (which governs extensions of a wiretap order). Section 54-41m lets an aggrieved person move to suppress the contents of an intercepted wire communication, or evidence derived from it, on the ground that the interception did not conform to chapter 959a. That chapter governs court-authorized interceptions by investigative officers, so § 54-41m does not reach a recording made by a private party with an AI notetaker.
Admissibility of an AI-generated recording or transcript in an ordinary Connecticut proceeding is therefore decided under the general rules of evidence, not under the recording statutes.
Employer and Workplace Considerations
Connecticut workplaces present particular challenges for AI meeting recording compliance.
Employer Monitoring Laws
Connecticut has a separate employee monitoring statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-48d, which requires employers to give prior written notice to employees before engaging in electronic monitoring. Section 31-48d(a)(3) defines electronic monitoring as "the collection of information on an employer's premises concerning employees' activities or communications by any means other than direct observation," including through computer, telephone, wire, radio, camera, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo-optical systems. The on-premises limitation is part of the definition, so the statute does not plainly reach monitoring of an employee working from home.
Section 31-48d is a notice statute, not a consent statute. A notice posted in a conspicuous place readily available for viewing by employees, describing the types of monitoring the employer may engage in, satisfies the prior written notice requirement. Section 31-48d(b)(2) allows monitoring without prior notice where the employer has reasonable grounds to believe employees are engaged in conduct that violates the law, violates legal rights, or creates a hostile workplace environment, and monitoring may produce evidence of it. Enforcement runs through the Labor Commissioner, who may levy a civil penalty of up to $500 for a first offense, $1,000 for a second, and $3,000 for a third and each subsequent offense. The statute creates no employee consent right and no private right of action.
Employers deploying AI meeting recorders should therefore treat these as two separate obligations: posted or written notice under the Connecticut employee monitoring statute, and § 52-570d's own written consent, recorded verbal notification, or fifteen-second tone for the calls themselves.
Remote and Hybrid Work
Connecticut's recording laws follow the location of the parties, not the employer's headquarters. If a Connecticut-based employee participates in a recorded call, § 52-570d's civil requirement applies to that recording. Employers based in one-party consent states cannot avoid Connecticut's requirements simply because their office is elsewhere. Section 31-48d is the narrower of the two here, because its definition of electronic monitoring is tied to the employer's premises.
Connecticut Data Privacy Act Implications
Public Act 25-113, signed by the Governor on June 24, 2025, amended the Connecticut Data Privacy Act (CTDPA) to require businesses that use personal data to train AI systems (including large language models) to make public disclosures. The amended provisions take effect July 1, 2026.
For AI meeting recording tools that use transcription data to train their models, this creates an additional compliance layer in Connecticut. Businesses deploying these tools may need to conduct data protection impact assessments and disclose their AI training practices.

Union and Collective Bargaining Considerations
Unionized workplaces in Connecticut may have collective bargaining agreement provisions addressing recording and surveillance. Employers considering AI meeting recorders in unionized settings should review applicable CBAs and potentially bargain over the introduction of new monitoring technology.
Federal Law Intersection
Connecticut's recording laws interact with federal wiretapping law in important ways.
Federal One-Party Consent (18 U.S.C. § 2511)
Federal law under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 permits recording with one-party consent. However, when state law is more restrictive than federal law, the stricter standard applies. Connecticut's civil requirement under § 52-570d is more protective than federal law, so it controls for recordings of private telephonic communications involving Connecticut participants.
Interstate Calls
When a Connecticut participant is on a call with someone in a one-party consent state, § 52-570d still reaches the recording of that call. The recording party must comply with the most restrictive applicable law. AI meeting tools that record multi-state calls involving Connecticut participants should satisfy one of § 52-570d's three paths to avoid exposure.
The "Capability Test" and AI Tools
In Ambriz v. Google, a California court examined whether an AI system's capability to intercept communications could itself constitute a violation, even without proof of actual interception. While this case arose under California law, it raises questions relevant to Connecticut. If an AI meeting tool has the technical capability to record Connecticut participants' communications without consent, the mere deployment of that capability in a meeting with Connecticut participants could carry legal risk.
This article provides general legal information about Connecticut recording laws as they apply to AI meeting tools. Recording laws and their application to AI technology are evolving rapidly. Consult a Connecticut-licensed attorney for advice specific to your situation.
More Connecticut Laws
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Connecticut a one-party or two-party consent state for recording?
Connecticut uses a split framework. For criminal law purposes, it is a one-party consent state under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-187, meaning recording with one participant's consent avoids criminal charges. Separately, § 52-570d governs recording an oral private telephonic communication and is satisfied by written all-party consent, a verbal notification recorded at the start by the recording party, or the fifteen-second automatic tone -- any one of the three independently satisfies the statute, so calling Connecticut a flat two-party consent state is not accurate.
Can I use Otter.ai or similar AI notetakers in Connecticut meetings?
You can use AI notetakers. Connecticut's § 52-570d is satisfied by any one of three paths: written consent from all parties, a spoken verbal notification from the recording party announcing the recording and captured at the start of the call, or the fifteen-second automatic tone. A silent visual banner or chat message is not a 'verbal' notification, so the safest approach is to obtain verbal consent on the record at the start of the meeting or written consent beforehand.
What are the penalties for recording a meeting without consent in Connecticut?
Criminal eavesdropping under § 53a-189 is a class D felony. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-35a(8) authorizes a term of not more than five years for a class D felony, with no mandatory minimum, and § 53a-41(4) caps the fine at $5,000. Civil liability under § 52-570d allows the aggrieved party to bring a Superior Court action for damages, costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee, with no statutory cap.
Does my employer need my consent before using AI meeting recorders in Connecticut?
Connecticut's workplace monitoring statute does not give employees a consent right. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-48d requires prior written notice before electronic monitoring, and a notice posted in a conspicuous place satisfies that requirement; it is enforced by Labor Commissioner civil penalties of $500, $1,000 and $3,000 for successive offenses, with no private right of action, and its definition of electronic monitoring covers information collected on the employer's premises. Consent is a separate question governed by the recording statutes: § 52-570d requires written all-party consent, a recorded verbal notification from the recording party, or the fifteen-second tone for a private telephonic communication.
Do Connecticut recording laws apply to remote workers in other states?
Connecticut's laws apply when a Connecticut participant is on the call. If you are located in Connecticut during a recorded call, § 52-570d's civil requirement applies regardless of where other participants or the employer are located. AI meeting tools should satisfy one of the statute's three paths to comply with the most restrictive applicable state law.
Updates
Corrected the criminal penalty (a class D felony carries up to five years with no mandatory minimum), replaced a misattributed suppression statute and a misquoted definition of wiretapping with the official statutory text, restored the on-premises limit and notice-not-consent character of the employee monitoring law, and reframed the application of the civil recording statute to video meetings as an open question rather than settled law.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Corrected the description of Connecticut's § 52-570d recording-consent statute: its second compliance path is a unilateral verbal notification by the recording party (not consent obtained from every participant), and that notification independently satisfies the statute rather than being insufficient on its own.
Corrected three remaining restatements of an overstated 'all-party consent required' framing for Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-570d (intro paragraph, KeyTakeaways item 2, FAQ answer 1) so they match the page's already-corrected description of the statute's three independently sufficient compliance paths: written all-party consent, unilateral verbal notification, or the automatic tone.
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Connecticut General Statutes, Title 52 (Civil Actions), Chapter 925
§ 52-570dAction for illegal recording of private telephonic communications.In forcecited in 21 of our articles
(a) No person shall use any instrument, device or equipment to record an oral private telephonic communication unless the use of such instrument, device or equipment (1) is preceded by consent of all parties to the communication and such prior consent either is obtained in writing or is part of, and obtained at the start of, the recording, or (2) is preceded by verbal notification which is recorded at the beginning and is part of the communication by the recording party, or (3) is accompanied by an automatic tone warning device which automatically produces a distinct signal that is repeated at intervals of approximately fifteen seconds during the communication while such instrument, device or equipment is in use.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov
Cited in 22 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Holler v. Buckley Broadcasting Corp. (1998) held section 52-570d creates a cause of action unknown at common law that is strictly construed, and does not reach a third party's rerecording of an already illegal tape. Jezouit v. Malloy (2019) held the statute does not waive the state's sovereign immunity from suit.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Holler v. Buckley Broadcasting Corp. (Connecticut Appellate Court 1998, 47 Conn. App. 764)✓A girlfriend secretly taped a radio employee's call, and a coworker re-recorded that tape and used it to get him fired. The court held section 52-570d, strictly construed, bars taping a private call but not a third party's re-recording of an already illegal tape.
- Jezouit v. Malloy (Connecticut Appellate Court 2019, 193 Conn. App. 576)“…his complaint because (1) he brought his claim pursuant to General Statutes § 52-570d, which he contends waives sovereign imm…”
- State v. Skok (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2015)“…on without the consent of all parties to the communication. General Statutes § 52-570d (a) prohibits the use of ‘‘any instrume…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Can I Sue Someone for Recording Me on Private or Public Property?, Connecticut Audio Recording Laws: Mixed Consent Rules and Penalties (2026), Connecticut Dashcam Laws: Mounting Rules, Audio Recording, and Evidence (2026)
Connecticut General Statutes, Title 53a (Penal Code), Chapter 952
§ 53a-189Eavesdropping: Class D felony.In forcecited in 16 of our articles
(a) A person is guilty of eavesdropping when he unlawfully engages in wiretapping or mechanical overhearing of a conversation. (b) Eavesdropping is a class D felony.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov
Cited in 14 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2020
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Washington v. Meachum (1996) held the eavesdropping statutes, section 53a-189 among them, are violated only when neither party to a call knows it is being monitored. State v. McLoughlin (1998), a trial court ruling on a scanner intercept, read 53a-189 to cover cordless calls, a question no Connecticut appellate court had decided.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. McLoughlin (Connecticut Superior Court 1998, 45 Conn. Super. Ct. 497)“…on. Subsequently, the defendant was charged in violation of General Statutes § 53a-189, eavesdropping, which is a class D felo…”
- Rado v. Board of Education of the Borough of Naugatuck (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1990, 216 Conn. 541)✓A tenured teacher acquitted of eavesdropping was fired after a panel found he tampered with the school phone system to overhear staff calls; the court treated that conduct as proscribed by section 53a-189 and upheld the moral-misconduct finding.
- Washington v. Meachum (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1996, 238 Conn. 692)✓Inmates challenged prison rules allowing officials to monitor and record their nonprivileged phone calls; the Connecticut Supreme Court held the eavesdropping statutes are violated only when neither party knows the call is being monitored, so the noticed recording was lawful.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Connecticut Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid Consent Rules Explained, Connecticut Phone Call Recording Laws: All-Party Consent Rules and Penalties (2026), Connecticut Ring Doorbell Laws: What You Need to Know in 2026
§ 53a-187Definitions. Applicability.In forcecited in 18 of our articles
(a) The following definitions are applicable to sections 53a-188 and 53a-189: (1) “Wiretapping” means the intentional overhearing or recording of a telephonic or telegraphic communication or a communication made by cellular radio telephone by a person other than a sender or receiver thereof, without the consent of either the sender or receiver, by means of any instrument, device or equipment. The normal operation of a telephone or telegraph corporation and the normal use of the services and facilities furnished by such corporation pursuant to its tariffs shall not be deemed “wiretapping”. (2) “Mechanical overhearing of a conversation” means the intentional overhearing or recording of a conversation or discussion, without the consent of at least one party thereto, by a person not present thereat, by means of any instrument, device or equipment. (3) “Unlawfully” means not specifically authorized by law. For purposes of this section, “cellular radio telephone” means a wireless telephone authorized by the Federal Communications Commission to operate in the frequency bandwidth reserved for cellular radio telephones.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov
Cited in 12 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2021
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Connecticut courts read section 53a-187's definitions to reach only surreptitious, nonconsensual monitoring. State v. Grullon (1989) applied it to place one-party-consent recordings outside the eavesdropping statutes, and Washington v. Meachum (1996) held those statutes are violated only when neither party knows the call is monitored.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Grullon (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1989, 212 Conn. 195)✓Police recorded the defendant's calls with his brother, who consented; the court held that replacing the older wiretap penal statute with section 53a-187, which reaches recording only when no party consents, gave no reason to exclude the transcripts.
- Washington v. Meachum (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1996, 238 Conn. 692)✓Inmates challenged prison rules allowing nonprivileged collect calls to be monitored after posted signs, signed forms and a recurring tone; reading section 53a-187's consent-based definitions, the court held the eavesdropping statutes are violated only when neither party knows.
- State v. McVeigh (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1993, 224 Conn. 593)✓Police used a scanner in a neighbor's apartment to record a couple's cordless phone calls; the court rejected the State's argument that a 1989 amendment adding cellular phones to section 53a-187's wiretapping definition left cordless calls unprotected, and ordered suppression.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Connecticut Landlord-Tenant Recording and Surveillance Laws (2026), Connecticut Medical Recording Laws: Patients, Doctors, and HIPAA Rules (2026), Connecticut Laws on Recording Police: Your Rights and Limits (2026)
Connecticut General Statutes, Title 31 (Labor), Chapter 557
§ 31-48dEmployers engaged in electronic monitoring required to give prior notice to employees. Exceptions. Civil penalty.In forcecited in 22 of our articles
(a) As used in this section: (1) “Employer” means any person, firm or corporation, including the state and any political subdivision of the state which has employees; (2) “Employee” means any person who performs services for an employer in a business of the employer, if the employer has the right to control and direct the person as to (A) the result to be accomplished by the services, and (B) the details and means by which such result is accomplished; and (3) “Electronic monitoring” means the collection of information on an employer's premises concerning employees' activities or communications by any means other than direct observation, including the use of a computer, telephone, wire, radio, camera, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo-optical systems, but not including the collection of information (A) for security purposes in common areas of the employer's premises which are held out for use by the public, or (B) which is prohibited under state or federal law.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov
Cited in 4 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2021
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Gerardi v. City of Bridgeport (2010) held that section 31-48d creates no private right of action, reading subsection (c) to delegate all enforcement of the electronic monitoring notice duty to the labor commissioner. J.P. Alexandre, LLC v. Egbuna (2012) cited that reading when rejecting an implied right of action under a tax statute.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Gerardi v. City of Bridgeport (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2010, 294 Conn. 461)✓Bridgeport put GPS units in fire inspectors' city vehicles without telling them, then disciplined them; the Connecticut Supreme Court held section 31-48d creates no private right of action because subsection (c) leaves enforcement to the labor commissioner.
- Borelli v. Renaldi (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2020, 336 Conn. 1)“…(2010) (comparing electronic monitoring statute, General Statutes § 31-48d, to other employment statutes…”
- J.P. Alexandre, LLC v. Egbuna (Connecticut Appellate Court 2012, 137 Conn. App. 340)“…idgeport, supra, 294 Conn. 472 (rejecting claim that General Statutes § 31-48d [c] provided private right of action wh…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Employer Guide to Wearable Recording Device Policies (2026), Connecticut Security Camera Laws: Home, Business, and Workplace Rules (2026), Connecticut Video Recording Laws: Consent, Surveillance, and Privacy Rules (2026)
United States Code Title 18
§ 2511Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibitedIn forcecited in 422 of our articles
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who— intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication; intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when— such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication; or such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,045 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Griggs-Ryan v. Smith (1990) applied the Section 2511(2)(d) prior-consent exception, treating a tenant repeatedly told that all incoming calls were taped as having impliedly consented. United States v. United States District Court (1972) read the then-current Section 2511(3) as conferring no presidential surveillance power.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Mitchell v. Forsyth (Supreme Court of the United States 1985, 472 U.S. 511)✓The Attorney General authorized a warrantless 1970 national security wiretap that caught the plaintiff's calls; the Court held the since-repealed Section 2511(3) disclaimer left the tap lawful under Title III, and that Mitchell had qualified immunity.
- United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Supreme Court of the United States 1972, 407 U.S. 297)✓The Attorney General approved warrantless wiretaps on members of a domestic group accused of bombing a CIA office; the Court read Section 2511(3) as a congressional disclaimer conferring no surveillance power, then held the Fourth Amendment required prior judicial approval.
- Forsyth v. Barr (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1994, 19 F.3d 1527)✓Dallas police used, in an internal affairs probe of an officer, calls private parties allegedly intercepted illegally; assuming that was unlawful, the Fifth Circuit held Section 2517(1) and (2) allowed the disclosure and use, defeating the Section 2511(1)(c) and (d) claims.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Oregon Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid One-Party and All-Party Rules, US Recording Laws by State (2026): All 50 States Explained, Hawaii Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid Consent State Rules
Search our full record of US law — 2.1 million sections, every state + federal →
Sources and References
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-187 - Definitions for eavesdropping and wiretapping(cga.ct.gov).gov
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-189 - Eavesdropping: Class D felony(cga.ct.gov).gov
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-570d - Action for illegal recording of private telephonic communications(cga.ct.gov).gov
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-48d - Employer monitoring of employees(cga.ct.gov).gov
- Connecticut Attorney General - Updated Report on Connecticut Data Privacy Act(portal.ct.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. § 2511 - Federal Wiretap Act(uscode.house.gov).gov
- Connecticut Data Privacy Act AI Amendments (Public Act 25-113)(carmodylaw.com)
- Brewer v. Otter.ai - Class Action Complaint (N.D. Cal., No. 5:25-cv-06911)(npr.org)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-35a(8) - Authorized term of imprisonment for a class D felony(cga.ct.gov)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-41(4) - Fines for felonies, class D maximum(cga.ct.gov)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-41m - Motion to suppress under chapter 959a(cga.ct.gov)
- Connecticut General Assembly - SB 1295 (2025) bill history, Public Act 25-113(cga.ct.gov)