Stand Your Ground States: Rules in All 50 States and DC

Independently fact-checkedBy Recording Law Editorial TeamPublished September 11, 202621 min read

Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited September 11, 2026). · 108 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

Stand Your Ground States: Rules in All 50 States and DC

See the state comparison · Explore the cited laws

Stand your ground rules remove a retreat requirement in some self-defense situations, but the label hides major differences. As of September 11, 2026, this guide separates statutes, case law, duty-to-retreat jurisdictions, and conditional rules across all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

Information last verified on September 11, 2026. This article has not yet been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.

Jurisdiction scope: This article compares the self-defense retreat rules of all 50 states and the District of Columbia as of September 11, 2026. It does not decide whether force was justified in any individual incident. See the self-defense laws by state hub for state-level explanations.

What does stand your ground mean, and how were states classified?

A stand your ground rule generally means that a person who otherwise qualifies to use defensive force need not retreat solely because a safe avenue may exist. That proposition is narrower than a license to use force. Each jurisdiction still controls when force is necessary, whether deadly force is proportionate, how provocation or initial aggression affects the defense, and whether unlawful activity disqualifies the actor.

This guide uses no duty by statute when enacted text supplies the rule and no duty under case law when the controlling support comes from a court or official jury instruction. Duty means that the cited authority requires safe retreat subject to stated exceptions. Conditional identifies a rule that depends on fault, location, or how retreat evidence bears on necessity. Each label is limited by the conditions stated in its row.

Closed law book with a ribbon on a bench

The categories therefore answer a source and scope question, not a political one. A statute and a case-law rule can produce similar trial instructions while following different amendment paths. A home exception can coexist with a public retreat duty. A fact finder may also consider possible avoidance even where the jurisdiction does not impose retreat as a formal element.

No duty by statute (29): Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming.
No duty under case law (6): California, Colorado, Illinois, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington.
Duty to retreat with exceptions (12): Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont.
Conditional rule (4): District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin.

Retreat rule by jurisdiction

The table gives every state and the District of Columbia its own linked row, authority, and conditions. The 29 statutory no-duty jurisdictions and 6 case-law no-duty jurisdictions are kept separate because the legal source matters. The 12 duty jurisdictions each permit defensive force under their own necessity and proportionality rules and usually recognize one or more retreat exceptions. The 4 conditional jurisdictions also remain separate.

District of Columbia lets safe avoidance bear on imminent danger without imposing a categorical retreat duty. Pennsylvania's public no-duty rule depends on several statutory conditions, and Virginia distinguishes faultless from excusable self-defense. Wisconsin remains conditional here because retreat may bear on reasonable necessity outside the location-based rule in Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1m). Read the complete state row before relying on a short label.

Jurisdiction	Retreat rule	Conditions and limits	Authority
Alabama	No duty by statute	No duty in any place the person has a right to be. Force must otherwise be justified; person must not be engaged in unlawful activity; initial-aggressor and provocation limits apply.	Ala. Code Section 13A-3-23(b) (effective until Oct. 1, 2026)
Alaska	No duty by statute	No duty in any place where the person has a right to be. Deadly force must otherwise be justified under AS 11.81.335; the person must have a right to be at the location; statutory aggressor and mutual-combat restrictions remain relevant.	Alaska Stat. Section 11.81.335(b)(5)
Arizona	No duty by statute	No duty in a place where the person may legally be. Use or threat of deadly force must otherwise be justified; the person must not be engaged in an unlawful act; the person must be in a place where the person may legally be.	Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sections 13-405(B), 13-411(B), 13-418(B)
Arkansas	No duty by statute	No duty when lawfully present and statutory conditions are met. Reasonable belief of imminent death or serious physical injury for deadly force; not the initial aggressor or provocateur, subject to statutory exceptions; not committing the specified firearm-possession felony, subject to the dwelling or curtilage exception; not engaged in criminal activity giving rise to the need for force; not furthering a criminal gang, organization, or enterprise.	Ark. Code Ann. Sections 5-2-606(c), 5-2-607(b), as amended by 2021 Ark. Acts 250
California	No duty under case law	No duty to retreat under the state's court instructions. The defendant must reasonably believe force is needed against imminent danger; the force may not exceed what is reasonably necessary; separate withdrawal rules apply to an initial aggressor or mutual combatant; the no-retreat rule does not itself excuse unlawful firearm possession; CALCRIM 3470 separately identifies that issue.	Judicial Council of California, CALCRIM 2026, Nos. 505 and 3470
Colorado	No duty under case law	No duty for a non-aggressor asserting self-defense. Force must satisfy § 18-1-704 and H:12, including reasonable belief that lesser force is inadequate and a qualifying threat; initial aggression, intentional provocation and agreed combat restrict justification; effective withdrawal and communication can restore an aggressor’s defense.	Colorado Judicial Branch, COLJI-Crim 2025, H:12 (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704)
Connecticut	Duty to retreat, with exceptions	Deadly force requires safe retreat when the actor knows it is available. Retreat must avoid deadly force with complete safety; no retreat in the actor's dwelling or workplace if not the initial aggressor; specified officer exception; provocation, initial aggression and agreed combat remain subject to § 53a-19(c); withdrawal and communication can restore an aggressor’s justification.	Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 53a-19(b)
Delaware	Duty to retreat, with exceptions	Deadly force requires safe retreat when the defendant knows it is available. Retreat must avoid deadly force with complete safety; no retreat in or from the defendant's dwelling; no retreat in or from the workplace unless the defendant was the initial aggressor; specified public-officer exception; Section 464(e)(1) separately excludes a defendant who provoked force with the purpose of causing death or serious physical injury.	11 Del. C. Section 464(e)(2)
District of Columbia	Qualified or location-specific rule	No categorical retreat duty, but safe avoidance may bear on imminent danger. Fact finder may consider whether the defendant safely could have avoided the encounter; force still requires actual or apparent imminent bodily harm; rule is supplied by D.C. Court of Appeals case law.	In re Robertson, D.C. Ct. App. Nos. 00-FM-925 & 04-FM-1269, slip op. at 24-25 (Jan. 24, 2008), quoting Gillis v. United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979)
Florida	No duty by statute	No duty for justified deadly force with statutory conditions. Deadly force must otherwise satisfy Section 776.012(2); person must not be engaged in criminal activity; person must be in a place where the person has a right to be; Section 776.041 restricts forcible-felony participants and initial provocateurs, with specified escape or withdrawal exceptions.	Fla. Stat. Section 776.012(1)-(2) (2026)
Georgia	No duty by statute	No duty when force is justified under the listed defense statutes. Force must comply with Sections 16-3-21, 16-3-23, or 16-3-24; the specific justification section's limits remain applicable.	Ga. Code Section 16-3-23.1, enacted by 2006 Ga. Laws Act 599 (SB 396)
Hawaii	Duty to retreat, with exceptions	Deadly force requires safe retreat when the actor knows it is available. Duty applies only where retreat avoids deadly force with complete safety; no retreat from dwelling or workplace unless the actor was the initial aggressor; workplace exception narrows when attacked by a person whose workplace the actor knows it to be.	Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 703-304(5)(b)
Idaho	No duty by statute	No duty in any place the person has a right to be. Force must appear necessary to a reasonable person in the same situation and with the same knowledge; exception for incarcerated people interacting with jail or prison staff acting officially.	Idaho Code Section 19-202A(3)
Illinois	No duty under case law	A non-aggressor has no duty to try to escape before using force. Person must not have initially provoked the force; force must otherwise satisfy Section 7-1; initial-aggressor rules are separately governed by Section 7-4; Section 7-4(c) separately restores qualifying justification after exhausting reasonable escape means in specified deadly danger, or after good-faith withdrawal clearly communicated and renewed attack.	Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal 24-25.09X, Committee Note (citing People v. Hughes and People v. Miller)
Indiana	No duty by statute	No duty for justified deadly force against grave harm or a forcible felony. Reasonable belief that force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury or a forcible felony; statutory crime, provocation, and initial-aggressor limits apply.	Ind. Code Section 35-41-3-2(c)
Iowa	No duty by statute	No duty from any place where lawfully present. Person is not engaged in illegal activity; force must otherwise be justified under chapter 704.	Iowa Code Section 704.1(3)
Kansas	No duty by statute	No duty where attacked and lawfully present. Person is not engaged in unlawful activity; person is attacked; person has a right to be there; force must otherwise be justified.	Kan. Stat. Ann. Sections 21-5222(c), 21-5230
Kentucky	No duty by statute	No duty before using deadly physical force. Force must satisfy Kentucky justification law; the public-place stand-ground rule separately requires lawful presence, no unlawful activity, and an attack.	Ky. Rev. Stat. Sections 503.050(4), 503.055(3)
Louisiana	No duty by statute	No duty where lawfully present. Person is not engaged in unlawful activity; person has a right to be there; force must otherwise satisfy Section 14:19 or 14:20.	La. Rev. Stat. Sections 14:19(C)-(D), 14:20(C)-(D)
Maine	Duty to retreat, with exceptions	Deadly force requires retreat when complete safety is known. Rule applies to deadly force under Section 108(2)(A); no retreat in the person's dwelling if the person was not the initial aggressor.	17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Section 108(2)(C)(3)(a)
Maryland	Duty to retreat, with exceptions	Deadly force requires retreat when safely possible. Retreat applies when an avenue is within the defendant's power and consistent with safety; no retreat in the home; nondeadly force does not carry the same retreat duty.	Shae-Von Edwards v. State, No. 0799, Sept. Term 2023 (Md. App. Ct. Oct. 31, 2025)
Massachusetts	Duty to retreat, with exceptions	Deadly force requires retreat unless it cannot be done safely. All proper and reasonable means to avoid combat must be used; no retreat for a lawful resident facing an unlawful intruder under the castle statute; defense of another has a different retreat rule.	Massachusetts Model Jury Instructions on Homicide III, notes 81-84 (discussing G.L. c. 278, Section 8A)
Michigan	No duty by statute	No duty anywhere the person has a legal right to be. Person has not committed and is not committing a crime; deadly force requires an honest and reasonable belief of imminent death, great bodily harm, or sexual assault; nondeadly force requires an honest and reasonable belief it is needed against imminent unlawful force.	Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.972
Minnesota	Duty to retreat, with exceptions	Self-defense generally requires retreat when reasonably possible. No duty in one's own home; Blevins narrowly extends the duty to felony second-degree assault-fear by brandishing a weapon designed and capable of causing death or great bodily harm; the case did not decide every other assault-fear scenario.	State v. Blevins, 10 N.W.3d 29, 35-40 (Minn. 2024) (discussing State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 402 (Minn. 2001))
Mississippi	No duty by statute	No duty where a non-aggressor has a right to be. Person is not the initial aggressor; person is not engaged in unlawful activity; deadly force must fall under Section 97-3-15(1)(e) or (f).	Miss. Code Section 97-3-15(4)
Missouri	No duty by statute	No duty at any place one has a right to be. Initial-aggressor and forcible-felony limits; dwelling/residence/vehicle occupancy must not be unlawful; private-property branch applies to property owned or leased by the defender.	Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031.3
Montana	No duty by statute	No duty where lawfully present. Threatened with bodily injury or loss of life; aggressor and forcible-felony limits in 45-3-105; force must otherwise qualify under 45-3-102 through 45-3-104.	Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-110
Nebraska	Duty to retreat, with exceptions	Retreat required if completely safe. No retreat from dwelling or workplace unless initial aggressor; workplace exception does not apply against another person whose workplace the defender knows it to be; public-officer exception.	Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409(4)(b)
Nevada	No duty by statute	No duty where one has a right to be. Not the original aggressor; right to be at the location; not actively furthering criminal activity; deadly force must satisfy NRS 200.120(1).	Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.120(2)
New Hampshire	No duty by statute	No duty anywhere one has a right to be. Defender was not initial aggressor; deadly-force conditions in RSA 627:4 II; surrender-property and abstention rules remain.	N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:4 III(a)
New Jersey	Duty to retreat, with exceptions	Retreat required if completely safe. Dwelling exception; no dwelling exception for initial aggressor; total circumstances govern knowledge of a completely safe retreat.	N.J. Model Criminal Jury Charge, Justification - Self Defense (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4)
New Mexico	No duty under case law	No duty to retreat. Force may be no more than reasonably necessary; instruction applies when retreat is at issue.	UJI 14-5190 NMRA
New York	Duty to retreat, with exceptions	Retreat required if completely safe. No duty in one's dwelling if not initial aggressor; specified kidnapping, forcible-sex-offense, robbery, and burglary branches operate separately; police/peace-officer exception.	N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)
North Carolina	No duty by statute	No duty anywhere one has a lawful right to be. Reasonable belief of imminent death or great bodily harm, or circumstances under G.S. 14-51.2; felony and initial-aggressor limits in G.S. 14-51.4.	N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a)
North Dakota	No duty by statute	No duty anywhere legally allowed. Not engaged in unlawful activity giving rise to the need for deadly force; did not provoke the target; mutual-combat/initial-aggressor limits in 12.1-05-03(2)(b).	N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-07(2)(b)(2)
Ohio	No duty by statute	No duty anywhere one lawfully has a right to be. Force must otherwise qualify as self-defense, defense of another, or defense of residence; trier of fact may not consider possible retreat.	Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.09(B)-(C)
Oklahoma	No duty by statute	No duty anywhere one has a right to be when attacked. Not engaged in unlawful activity; reasonable belief force is needed to prevent death or great bodily harm or a forcible felony.	Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.25(D)
Oregon	No duty under case law	No duty to retreat before using self-defense. Force must satisfy ORS 161.209; deadly force must satisfy ORS 161.219; provocation, aggressor, agreed-combat, and bias-motive limits in ORS 161.215.	State v. James, 350 Or. App. 71, 80 (2026)
Pennsylvania	Qualified or location-specific rule	No duty to retreat under the statutory stand-your-ground conditions. Right to be in the place; not engaged in criminal activity; not illegally possessing a firearm; belief force immediately necessary against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping, or forcible sex; attacker displays or otherwise uses a firearm, replica, or other apparently lethal weapon; exception for an on-duty peace officer whom the actor knows or reasonably should know is a peace officer.	18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2.3)-(2.4)
Rhode Island	Duty to retreat, with exceptions	Retreat required before deadly force when an open, safe, available avenue is consciously known. Statutory exception for an owner, tenant, or occupier confronting offenses enumerated in §§ 11-8-2 through 11-8-6; ordinary self-defense also requires proportionate force and generally excludes the initial aggressor.	State v. Urena, No. 2004-199-C.A., slip op. at 8-9 & n.4 (R.I. June 16, 2006) (quoting State v. Quarles)
South Carolina	No duty by statute	No duty in another place one has a right to be when attacked. Not engaged in unlawful activity; reasonable belief force is needed against death or great bodily injury or to prevent a violent crime.	S.C. Code § 16-11-440(C)
South Dakota	No duty by statute	No duty anywhere one has a right to be. Not engaged in criminal activity; reasonable belief deadly force is necessary against imminent death, great bodily harm, or a forcible felony.	S.D. Codified Laws § 22-18-4.1
Tennessee	No duty by statute	No duty anywhere one has a right to be. Not engaged in unlawful activity; reasonable belief force is immediately necessary; deadly force requires reasonable grounds for an honest belief of imminent death or serious bodily injury.	Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(b), enacted by 2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 210
Texas	No duty by statute	No duty where one has a right to be present. Did not provoke the target; not engaged in criminal activity; force must otherwise be justified under §§ 9.31 or 9.32.	Tex. Penal Code §§ 9.31(e)-(f), 9.32(c)-(d)
Utah	No duty by statute	No duty where one has lawfully entered or remained. Force must otherwise satisfy § 76-2-402; initial-provocation, felony, aggressor, and combat-by-agreement limits; failure to retreat is not relevant to necessity or proportionality.	Utah Code § 76-2-402(4)
Vermont	Duty to retreat, with exceptions	No unqualified right to stand ground; sufficient and available means of avoiding the assault must be used. Retreat or avoidance must appear sufficient and available and actually be so; no retreat when deadly force is immediately necessary and no sufficient available alternative exists.	Vermont Office of Legislative Counsel, Meaning of ‘Necessary’ When Using Force in Self-Defense (Mar. 23, 2022) (discussing State v. Tubbs and State v. Hatcher)
Virginia	Qualified or location-specific rule	No retreat for faultless self-defense; retreat required for excusable self-defense by an at-fault actor. Faultless defendant may stand ground and use necessary reasonable force; at-fault defendant must abandon and retreat as far as safely possible before repelling the attack.	Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 0753-09-3, slip op. at 4 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2010)
Washington	No duty under case law	No duty where one has a right to be and reasonably believes an attack is occurring. Right to be at the place; reasonable grounds to believe one is being attacked; only lawful force.	State v. Courtney, No. 76108-1-I, slip op. at 22-25 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2018) (unpublished) (quoting WPIC 16.08)
West Virginia	No duty by statute	No duty in the home, and a conditional no-duty rule elsewhere. Outside the home, defender is not engaged in unlawful activity and has a legal right to be there; outside-home deadly force requires a reasonable belief of imminent death or serious bodily harm and that deadly force is the only means to save the defender or another.	W. Va. Code § 55-7-22(b)-(c)
Wisconsin	Qualified no-duty rule	No general duty to retreat, but a safe retreat may bear on necessity outside castle conditions. Force must otherwise satisfy Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1); outside § 939.48(1m), opportunity to retreat may be considered when deciding whether force was reasonably necessary.	State v. Wenger, No. 98-1739-CR, slip op. at 7 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1999)
Wyoming	No duty by statute	No duty anywhere lawfully present. Not the initial aggressor; not engaged in illegal activity; only reasonable defensive force under subsection (a).	Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-602(e)

Watch out: “No duty to retreat” answers only one part of self-defense. The person must still satisfy the jurisdiction's rules on necessity, proportionality, imminence, provocation, and unlawful activity.

What conditions and exceptions limit a no-duty rule?

Most no-duty rules begin only after the actor satisfies the underlying self-defense statute or common-law test. Recurring conditions include lawful presence, no disqualifying criminal activity, a reasonable belief in imminent death or serious injury before deadly force, and limits for an initial aggressor or provocateur. Those themes do not create a single national test. Arkansas adds detailed restrictions involving specified firearm possession and criminal enterprises.

Quiet residential street at dusk

Pennsylvania requires the attacker to display or use a firearm, replica, or other apparently lethal weapon for its public stand-ground branch. West Virginia has one rule in the home and a conditional outside-home rule. California and Oregon derive no-retreat propositions from court authorities while retaining their statutory limits on justified force. The row-specific conditions in the table are part of the classification; omitting them would make a “yes” label misleading.

Location also changes the analysis. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and other duty jurisdictions recognize limited home or workplace exceptions. Those exceptions do not automatically extend to a sidewalk, vehicle, detached property, workplace shared with an attacker, or a person who began the confrontation. The linked state guide provides the relevant statutory definitions and authorities.

Does stand your ground create criminal or civil immunity?

No. A retreat rule, a justification defense, pretrial criminal immunity, civil immunity, and an arrest restriction are distinct legal mechanisms. A person may have a justification defense at trial without having a separate procedure that permits dismissal before trial. Likewise, a statute may restrict a civil lawsuit without changing the criminal procedure or the retreat analysis.

Closed records folder with a metal clip

The scope can also depend on the place and the precise justification provision. Colorado's criminal and civil protections in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704.5 apply to an occupant whose force satisfies that section's dwelling-intruder requirements. They should not be read as statewide public-place immunity merely because Colorado's separate self-defense law addresses retreat.

Florida's § 776.032 applies to force justified under specified provisions and separately addresses criminal prosecution, civil actions, and arrest. Kansas § 21-5231 and South Carolina § 16-11-450 also contain express immunity and arrest language, but their text and procedures differ. Alabama's current § 13A-3-23 provides a motion-triggered pretrial hearing and uses a preponderance standard; the cited official page identifies the version effective before October 1, 2026.

How does stand your ground differ from castle doctrine?

Stand your ground usually addresses retreat in a place where a person may lawfully be. Castle doctrine usually describes special self-defense treatment tied to a dwelling or another protected location. Depending on the jurisdiction, a castle rule may remove retreat, authorize force against specified unlawful entry, create a presumption about fear or necessity, or combine several of those effects.

These concepts overlap, but one does not prove the other. Oregon, for example, has a no-duty rule under case law and statutory rules for force against burglary in a dwelling, while those statutes do not contain an express reasonable-fear presumption. Wisconsin has a location-based presumption in § 939.48(1m), while its broader retreat classification remains conditional. The separate castle doctrine states comparison preserves those distinctions for every jurisdiction.

General legal information, not legal advice. Rules and effective dates vary by jurisdiction and facts. Confirm the current primary authority and consult a lawyer licensed in the relevant jurisdiction about a specific matter.

Last updated: September 11, 2026. Statutes and cases cited reflect the sources verified as of September 11, 2026.

Frequently Asked Questions

How many states have stand your ground laws?

This comparison identifies 29 jurisdictions with statutory no-duty rules and 6 with no-duty rules under case law as of September 11, 2026. It keeps those categories separate; compare Ala. Code § 13A-3-23(b) with California CALCRIM 2026 instructions Nos. 505 and 3470.

Which states require a person to retreat?

Twelve jurisdictions are classified as duty-to-retreat jurisdictions with exceptions. Their rows identify home, workplace, safety, and aggressor limits, such as Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-19(b).

Is Wisconsin a stand your ground state?

This comparison treats Wisconsin as conditional. Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1) governs justification, retreat may bear on reasonable necessity, and § 939.48(1m) supplies a separate location-based presumption under its stated conditions.

Does stand your ground mean force is automatically lawful?

No. A no-duty rule removes retreat from a defined part of the analysis; necessity, proportionality, imminence, lawful presence, provocation, and other conditions can still control under statutes such as Fla. Stat. § 776.012.

Does every stand your ground state provide immunity before trial?

No. A no-retreat rule does not itself create a pretrial dismissal procedure. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5231 contains express immunity language, while Colorado § 18-1-704.5 limits its protection to force meeting that section’s dwelling requirements.

Is castle doctrine the same as stand your ground?

No. Castle doctrine focuses on protected locations and may create a presumption or special force rule, as Fla. Stat. § 776.013 illustrates; stand your ground focuses on retreat.

Updates

September 11, 2026

Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources

The Law Behind This Article

This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.

Alaska Statutes, Title 11. Criminal Law, Chapter 81. General Provisions

§ 11.81.335Justification: Use of deadly force in defense of selfIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

(a) Except as provided in (b) of this section, a person who is justified in using nondeadly force in self-defense under AS 11.81.330 may use deadly force in self-defense upon another person when and to the extent the person reasonably believes the use of deadly force is necessary for self-defense against (1) death; (2) serious physical injury; (3) kidnapping, except for what is described as custodial interference in the first degree in AS 11.41.320; (4) sexual assault in the first degree; (5) sexual assault in the second degree; (6) sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree; or (7) robbery in any degree.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at akleg.gov

Cited in 33 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2022

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):AS 11.81.335 requires an actual and reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary. Weston v. State (1984) held the trial court erred in refusing a self-defense instruction supported by some evidence; Marquinn Jones-Nelson v. State of Alaska (2022) held an instruction directing retroactive assessment of the force used was incorrect.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Weston v. State (Alaska Supreme Court 1984, 682 P.2d 1119)✓Weston cut the throat of a man who had charged him with a knife and whom he then pinned down; applying AS 11.81.335, the court held he offered some evidence of both a reasonable and an actual belief that deadly force was needed, so refusing a self-defense instruction was error.
Folger v. State (Court of Appeals of Alaska 1982, 648 P.2d 111)✓Folger stabbed in the stomach a larger man he said was advancing to beat him and take his beer; the court held that even an extremely weak self-defense claim under AS 11.81.335 met the some-evidence standard, so the refused instruction required reversal.
Brown v. State (Court of Appeals of Alaska 1985, 698 P.2d 671)✓Brown took a rifle to a club to confront a man he said had earlier threatened him with a .44, then shot him; the court held that arming oneself and seeking a talk does not alone make a person an initial aggressor under AS 11.81.335(a)(1), so the defense had to go to the jury.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Alaska Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026), Castle Doctrine States: Rules in All 50 States and DC

Alaska Statutes, Title 9. Code of Civil Procedure, Chapter 65. Actions, Immunities, Defenses, and Duties

§ 09.65.330Immunity: Use of defensive forceIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

(a) A person who uses force in defense of self, other persons, or property as permitted in AS 11.81 is not liable for the death of or injury to the person against whom the force was intended to be used, unless the person against whom force was used was (1) a peace officer, whether on or off duty, who was engaged in the performance of official duties; (2) a firefighter, emergency medical technician, or paramedic engaged in the performance of official duties; or (3) medical personnel, a health care provider, or a first responder in an emergency situation. (b) The court shall award reasonable attorney fees, court costs, compensation for loss of income, and all expenses incurred by the defendant in defense of a civil action brought by a plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant is not liable under (a) of this section.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at akleg.gov

Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 13 (Criminal Code), Chapter 4 (JUSTIFICATION)

§ 13-405Justification; use of deadly physical forceIn forcecited in 6 of our articles

A. A person is justified in threatening or using deadly physical force against another: 1. If such person would be justified in threatening or using physical force against the other under section 13-404, and 2. When and to the degree a reasonable person would believe that deadly physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly physical force. B. A person has no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force pursuant to this section if the person is in a place where the person may legally be and is not engaged in an unlawful act.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at azleg.gov

Cited in 37 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Jessen (1981) held ARS 13-405 does not make retreat a legal predicate to self-defense, though a known unused chance to retreat bears on whether deadly force was immediately necessary. State v. Grannis (1995) held an instruction implying only actual deadly force can justify a deadly response misstated the standard.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Jessen (Arizona Supreme Court 1981, 130 Ariz. 1)✓Jessen shot his branch manager dead during a pay dispute and claimed self-defense. The court held section 13-405 does not make retreat a legal predicate to self-defense, though a known and unused chance to retreat bears on whether deadly force was immediately necessary.
State of Arizona v. Ronald Vassell (Court of Appeals of Arizona 2015, 238 Ariz. 281)“…s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly physical force.” A.R.S. § 13-405(A)(2). But the threat or use of physica…”
State v. Grannis (Arizona Supreme Court 1995, 183 Ariz. 52)✓Webster was convicted of murdering a man who picked him and his co-defendant up hitchhiking; he claimed a reasonable belief in the need for deadly force. The court held the deadly-force instruction was error: section 13-405 turns on reasonably apparent, not actual, deadly force.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Self-Defense Laws by State: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026), Arizona Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 13-411Justification; use of force in crime prevention; applicabilityIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

A. A person is justified in threatening or using both physical force and deadly physical force against another if and to the extent the person reasonably believes that physical force or deadly physical force is immediately necessary to prevent the other's commission of arson of an occupied structure under section 13-1704, burglary in the second or first degree under section 13-1507 or 13-1508, kidnapping under section 13-1304, manslaughter under section 13-1103, second or first degree murder under section 13-1104 or 13-1105, sexual conduct with a minor under section 13-1405, sexual assault under section 13-1406, child molestation under section 13-1410, armed robbery under section 13-1904 or aggravated assault under section 13-1204, subsection A, paragraphs 1 and 2. B. There is no duty to retreat before threatening or using physical force or deadly physical force justified by subsection A of this section. C. A person is presumed to be acting reasonably for the purposes of this section if the person is acting to prevent what the person reasonably believes is the imminent or actual commission of any of the offenses listed in subsection A of this section. D.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-04 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at azleg.gov

Cited in 42 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Korzep (Arizona Supreme Court 1990, 165 Ariz. 490)“…ury on, among other things, the justification defense under A.R.S. § 13-411. We granted review on one of defendant’…”
State v. Taylor (Arizona Supreme Court 1991, 169 Ariz. 121)“…by refusing to give a justification instruction pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-411, and (2) whether the trial court erred…”
State v. Hussain (Court of Appeals of Arizona 1997, 189 Ariz. 336)“…ion of a first- or second-degree burglary, see A.R.S. § 13-411(A); (3) in defense of premises,…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

§ 13-418Justification; use of force in defense of residential structure or occupied vehicles; definitionsIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

A. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a person is justified in threatening to use or using physical force or deadly physical force against another person if the person reasonably believes himself or another person to be in imminent peril of death or serious physical injury and the person against whom the physical force or deadly physical force is threatened or used was in the process of unlawfully or forcefully entering, or had unlawfully or forcefully entered, a residential structure or occupied vehicle, or had removed or was attempting to remove another person against the other person's will from the residential structure or occupied vehicle. B. A person has no duty to retreat before threatening or using physical force or deadly physical force pursuant to this section. C. For the purposes of this section: 1. "Residential structure" has the same meaning prescribed in section 13-1501. 2. "Vehicle" means a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, that is designed to transport persons or property.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-04 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at azleg.gov

Cited in 8 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Jones (Court of Appeals of Arizona 2024, 559 P.3d 1112)“…ses an imminent threat of serious physical injury or death. A.R.S. § 13-418. Here, Defendant David Jones appeals hi…”
State v. Sulu-Kerr (Court of Appeals of Arizona 2024)“…ruct the jurors on the defense of an occupied vehicle under A.R.S. § 13-418.…”
State of Arizona v. George Anthony Dominguez Jr. (Court of Appeals of Arizona 2014, 236 Ariz. 226)“…also is similar to that found in our justification statute A.R.S. § 13-418(A), which allows the use of deadly forc…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

§ 13-419Presumptions; defense of a residential structure or occupied vehicle; exceptions; definitionsIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

A. A person is presumed to reasonably believe that the threat or use of physical force or deadly force is immediately necessary for the purposes of sections 13-404 through 13-408, section 13-418 and section 13-421 if the person knows or has reason to believe that the person against whom physical force or deadly force is threatened or used is unlawfully or forcefully entering or has unlawfully or forcefully entered and is present in the person's residential structure or occupied vehicle. B. For the purposes of sections 13-404 through 13-408, section 13-418 and section 13-421, a person who is unlawfully or forcefully entering or who has unlawfully or forcefully entered and is present in a residential structure or occupied vehicle is presumed to pose an imminent threat of unlawful deadly harm to any person who is in the residential structure or occupied vehicle. C. The presumptions in subsections A and B of this section do not apply if: 1.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-04 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at azleg.gov

§ 13-413No civil liability for justified conductIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

No person in this state shall be subject to civil liability for engaging in conduct otherwise justified pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-04 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at azleg.gov

Cited in 26 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Pfeil v. Smith (Court of Appeals of Arizona 1995, 183 Ariz. 63)“…ased on a justification defense and, therefore, pursuant to A.R.S. section 13-413, she could not be held civilly liable f…”
McMurtry v. Weatherford Hotel, Inc. (Court of Appeals of Arizona 2013, 231 Ariz. 244)“…183 Ariz. 63, 65 , 900 P.2d 12, 14 (1995) (noting that A.R.S. § 13-413, a criminal statute, contains express l…”
Susan Ryan v. napier/klein (Arizona Supreme Court 2018, 425 P.3d 230)“…r § 13-409, the officer is immune from civil liability. See A.R.S. § 13-413. Importantly, although the use of force…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 13 (Criminal Code), Chapter 2 (GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY)

§ 13-205Affirmative defenses; justification; burden of proofIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

A. Except as otherwise provided by law, a defendant shall prove any affirmative defense raised by a preponderance of the evidence. Justification defenses under chapter 4 of this title are not affirmative defenses. Justification defenses describe conduct that, if not justified, would constitute an offense but, if justified, does not constitute criminal or wrongful conduct. If evidence of justification pursuant to chapter 4 of this title is presented by the defendant, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act with justification. B. This section does not affect the presumption contained in section 13-411, subsection C and section 13-503.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-04 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at azleg.gov

Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated

§ 5-2-606Use of physical force in defense of a person.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

(a)(1) A person is justified in using physical force upon another person to defend himself or herself or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and the person may use a degree of physical force that he o

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-06 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at arkleg.state.ar.us

Cited in 10 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2023

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

T.R. v. State (Court of Appeals of Arkansas 2018, 552 S.W.3d 452)“…appellant moved to dismiss, arguing justification under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-606 , which provides in part: (a)(1) A p…”
Thacker v. State (Supreme Court of Arkansas 2016, 500 S.W.3d 736)“…force that he or she reasonably believes to be necessary. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-606 (a)(l) (Repl. 2013); see Ark. Code Ann…”
McKeever v. State (Supreme Court of Arkansas 2006, 367 Ark. 374)“…force that he or she reasonably believes to be necessary. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-606 (Repl.1997). McKeever argues that, unde…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Arkansas Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 5-2-607Use of deadly physical force in defense of a person.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

(a) A person is justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if the person reasonably believes that the other person is: (1) Committing or about to commit a felony involving physical force or violence; (2) Using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force; or (3) Imminently

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at arkleg.state.ar.us

Cited in 62 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Arkansas courts require a sufficiency challenge to be tied to a specific element of Ark. Code Ann. 5-2-607. Kinsey v. State (2016) held a general directed verdict motion saying the State failed to negate self-defense preserved nothing, and Jason Rouse v. State of Arkansas (2023) applied Kinsey to reach the same result.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Kinsey v. State (Supreme Court of Arkansas 2016, 503 S.W.3d 772)✓Kinsey killed two men with a machete after they confronted him in an alley and challenged the model self-defense instruction under section 5-2-607; the court held it was a complete statement of the law and that his general directed-verdict motion preserved no justification claim.
Sipe v. State (Court of Appeals of Arkansas 2012, 2012 Ark. App. 261)✓Sipe shot a man he found riding his ATV outside his house at night and claimed defense of person and property; the court held the victim's violent history and drug use were properly excluded, since Sipe admitted firing without knowing who the rider was.
Sharp v. State (Court of Appeals of Arkansas 2005, 90 Ark. App. 81)✓Sharp, a babysitter, shot her employer's estranged husband moments after he punched the mother unconscious; the court held there was any evidence supporting a section 5-2-607 justification, so refusing the deadly-force instruction was error, and reversed for a new trial.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

§ 5-2-620Use of force to defend persons and property within home.In forcecited in 4 of our articles

(a) The right of an individual to defend himself or herself and the life of a person or property in the individual's home against harm, injury, or loss by a person unlawfully entering or attempting to enter or intrude into the home is reaffirmed as a fundamental right to be preserved and promoted…

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2020-11-06 · Read the full text in our law library

California Penal Code

§ 198.5In forcecited in 6 of our articles

Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leginfo.legislature.ca.gov

Cited in 14 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2023

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

People v. Brown (California Court of Appeal 1992, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1489)“…front porch may be “forcibly entered” within the meaning of Penal Code section 198.5. It arises out of an altercation in whi…”
People v. Gleghorn (California Court of Appeal 1987, 193 Cal. App. 3d 196)“…He asserts that CALJIC No. 5.42 is inconsistent with Penal Code section 198.5 which states: “Any person using force i…”
People v. Silvey (California Court of Appeal 1997, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1320)“…easonable." He contends such an instruction is supported by Penal Code section 198.5, and should have been given even though…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: California Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 847In forcecited in 4 of our articles

(a) A private person who has arrested another for the commission of a public offense must, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a magistrate, or deliver him or her to a peace officer. (b) There shall be no civil liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise against, any peace officer or federal criminal investigator or law enforcement officer described in subdivision (a) or (d) of Section 830.8, acting within the scope of his or her authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of any arrest under any of the following circumstances: (1) The arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful. (2) The arrest was made pursuant to a charge made, upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the person to be arrested. (3) The arrest was made pursuant to the requirements of Section 142, 837, 838, or 839.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leginfo.legislature.ca.gov

California Civil Code

§ 50In forcecited in 4 of our articles

Any necessary force may be used to protect from wrongful injury the person or property of oneself, or of a spouse, child, parent, or other relative, or member of one’s family, or of a ward, servant, master, or guest.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leginfo.legislature.ca.gov

§ 847In forcecited in 4 of our articles

(a) An owner, including, but not limited to, a public entity, as defined in Section 811.2 of the Government Code, of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory, shall not be liable to any person for any injury or death that occurs upon that property during the course of or after the commission of any of the felonies set forth in subdivision (b) by the injured or deceased person. (b) The felonies to which the provisions of this section apply are the following: (1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter; (2) mayhem; (3) rape; (4) sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; (5) oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; (6) lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 years; (7) any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life; (8) any other felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice, or any felony in which the defendant uses a firearm; (9) attempted murder; (10) assault with intent to commit rape or robbery; (11) assault with a deadly weapon or instrument on a peace officer; (12) assault by a…

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leginfo.legislature.ca.gov

Colorado Revised Statutes, Title 18: Criminal Code

§ 18-1-704Use of physical force in defense of a person - definitionsIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: (a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or (b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1,…

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at olls.info

Cited in 15 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Martinez v. Valdez (District Court, D. Colorado 2015, 125 F. Supp. 3d 1190)“…by a police officer by responding with force of their own. C.R.S. § 18-1-704. Although the Court did not instruct th…”
United States v. Dan Wallen (Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 2017, 874 F.3d 620)“…13- 404(A) (same); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-606(a)(1) (same); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704(1) (same); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-19(a)…”
United States v. Rico (Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 2021, 3 F.4th 1236)✓Rico fired the first shots across a busy Denver street during a gang exchange in which a rival and a bystander were hit; without deciding whether state or federal law applied, the court used C.R.S. 18-1-704 and upheld the finding that his provocation barred self-defense.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Colorado Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Make My Day (2026)

§ 18-1-704.5Use of deadly physical force against an intruderIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

(1) The general assembly hereby recognizes that the citizens of Colorado have a right to expect absolute safety within their own homes. (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 18-1-704, any occupant of a dwelling is justified in using any degree of physical force, including deadly physical force, against another person when that other person has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, and when the occupant has a reasonable belief that such other person has committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry, or is committing or intends to commit a crime against a person or property in addition to the uninvited entry, and when the occupant reasonably believes that such other person might use any physical force, no matter how slight, against any occupant. (3) Any occupant of a dwelling using physical force, including deadly physical force, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall be immune from criminal prosecution for the use of such force.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at olls.info

Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2019

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Grenier v. Hartley (Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 2011, 435 F. App'x 712)“…from prosecution under Colorado’s “Make My Day” law, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704.5, as there was evidence the victi…”
Ulrey v. Zavaras (Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 2012, 483 F. App'x 536)“…minal prosecution for the use of such force. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704.5. 1. Attempted-Assault Case…”
Estate of James Strong Jr., The v. Schlenker (District Court, D. Colorado 2019)“…hat person has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704.5. The parties do not dispute that…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Connecticut General Statutes, Title 53a (Penal Code), Chapter 951

§ 53a-19Use of physical force in defense of person.In forcecited in 6 of our articles

(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force, and he may use such degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose; except that deadly physical force may not be used unless the actor reasonably believes that such other person is (1) using or about to use deadly physical force, or (2) inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov

Cited in 227 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Corchado (1982) held it reversible error to charge that a defendant must be without fault, because section 53a-19 imposes no such requirement and turns on what he reasonably believed, subject to the exceptions in subsection (c). State v. Miller (1982) upheld a charge tracking subsection (b) on retreat.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Miller (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1982, 186 Conn. 654)✓Miller shot an unarmed man in the head outside a mall after being asked to step outside; the court held that defining deadly physical force as force liable or certain to cause death favored him, and a stray feasible retreat remark did not dilute the 53a-19(b) charge.
State v. Corchado (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1982, 188 Conn. 653)✓Corchado slapped a man through his car window, was met with a drawn gun, and shot him several times; the court ordered a new trial, holding common law aggressor and without fault instructions displaced 53a-19 and took his intent and reasonable belief from the jury.
State v. Cruz (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2004, 269 Conn. 97)“…artinez and, therefore, his use of force was justified. See General Statutes § 53a-19. 4 The defendant testified that he *1…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Connecticut Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 53a-20Use of physical force in defense of premises.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

A person in possession or control of premises, or a person who is licensed or privileged to be in or upon such premises, is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises; but he may use deadly physical force under such circumstances only (1) in defense of a person as prescribed in section 53a-19, or (2) when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent an attempt by the trespasser to commit arson or any crime of violence, or (3) to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry by force into his dwelling as defined in section 53a-100, or place of work, and for the sole purpose of such prevention or termination.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov

Cited in 25 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Amado (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2000, 254 Conn. 184)“…to use reasonable force in defense of premises pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-20, 6 and the defendant’s duty to retreat…”
State v. Erickson (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2010, 297 Conn. 164)“…to resist unlawful entry, 9 (3) defense of premises under General Statutes § 53a-20, 10 and (4) Orr’s failure to serve the…”
Burke v. Mesniaeff (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2019, 334 Conn. 100)“…d the jury on criminal trespass, we turn first to General Statutes § 53a-20, which governs the use of phy…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Delaware Code, Title 11 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure), Chapter 004 (DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY)

§ 464Justification — Use of force in self-protection.In forcecited in 6 of our articles

(a) The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the defendant reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting the defendant against the use of unlawful force by the other person on the present occasion. (b) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this section, a person employing protective force may estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as the person reasonably believes them to be when the force is used, without retreating, surrendering possession, doing any other act which the person has no legal duty to do or abstaining from any lawful action. (c) The use of deadly force is justifiable under this section if the defendant reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect the defendant against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat. (d) The use of force is not justifiable under this section to resist an arrest which the defendant knows or should know is being made by a peace officer, whether or not the arrest is lawful.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at delcode.delaware.gov

Cited in 49 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Taylor (2021) held that the June 2021 amendment to 11 Del. C. § 464, which requires a defendant's belief in the need for force to be reasonable, is substantive and does not reach earlier conduct. Spence v. State (2015) applied section 464(e)(2) where the defendant's own testimony showed he could have retreated in complete safety.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Probst v. State (Supreme Court of Delaware 1988, 547 A.2d 114)“…direction of Walla in self-defense or in defense of others. 11 Del.C. §§ 464-465. In essence, Probst’s attorney argu…”
Spence v. State (Supreme Court of Delaware 2015, 129 A.3d 212)✓Spence approached two men with a shotgun at a Wilmington party and killed one; applying 11 Del. C. 464(e)(2), the court found his own testimony showed safe chances to retreat, so his justification defense failed and improper closing slides were not reversible.
Moor v. Licciardello (Supreme Court of Delaware 1983, 463 A.2d 268)✓A saloon owner shot an unarmed musician in the leg after a scuffle and pleaded self-defense in a civil suit; the court held the subjective test of 11 Del. C. 464 governs any self-defense claim, so the reasonable man charge was error and the verdict was reversed.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Delaware Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)

Florida Statutes

§ 776.012Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.In forcecited in 8 of our articles

(1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. (2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leg.state.fl.us

Cited in 101 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Little v. State (2013) read section 776.012, as then numbered, as an independent basis for Stand Your Ground immunity, so a felon unlawfully armed could still claim it; the court certified conflict. Ivester v. State (1981) read section 776.012 with section 776.051 to allow self-defense against excessive force by an officer.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Smiley v. State (Supreme Court of Florida 2007, 966 So. 2d 330)“…reasoned that section 776.013 made a substantive change to section 776.012, Florida Statutes (2004), and it therefore would be a vio…”
Hill v. State (Supreme Court of Florida 1996, 688 So. 2d 901)✓Hill shot and killed an abortion provider and an escort outside a Pensacola clinic, then sought to justify it under section 776.012; the court held legal abortion is not a cognizable harm under the statute and upheld barring that defense.
Ivester v. State (District Court of Appeal of Florida 1981, 398 So. 2d 926)✓Ivester was convicted of resisting arrest with violence after a struggle with an officer witnesses said had kicked and threatened him; reading section 776.012 together with section 776.051, the court held self-defense against excessive force is relevant to that charge.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Florida Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026), Oregon Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026), Washington Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 776.013Home protection; use or threatened use of deadly force; presumption of fear of death or great bodily harm.In forcecited in 7 of our articles

(1) A person who is in a dwelling or residence in which the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and use or threaten to use:(a) Nondeadly force against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force; or (b) Deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leg.state.fl.us

Cited in 37 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

In Re: Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report 2017-07. (Supreme Court of Florida 2018, 257 So. 3d 908)“…w enforcement officer” from § 943.10(14), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(4), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(5), Fla. Stat.…”
In Re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—report No. 2014-06 (Supreme Court of Florida 2016, 191 So. 3d 411)“…of “law enforcement officer” from § 943.10(14), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(4), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(5), Fla. Stat.…”
In Re: Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases - Report 2019-01 (Supreme Court of Florida 2019)“…enforcement officer” from § 943.10(14), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(4), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(5), Fla. Stat.…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Maryland Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 776.032Immunity from criminal prosecution and civil action for justifiable use or threatened use of force.In forcecited in 8 of our articles

(1) A person who uses or threatens to use force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is justified in such conduct and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use or threatened use of such force by the person, personal representative, or heirs of the person against whom the force was used or threatened, unless the person against whom force was used or threatened is a law enforcement officer, as defined in s. 943.10(14), who was acting in the performance of his or her official duties and the officer identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law or the person using or threatening to use force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement officer. As used in this subsection, the term “criminal prosecution” includes arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leg.state.fl.us

Cited in 104 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Dennis v. State (Supreme Court of Florida 2010, 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 731)“…ss asserting immunity from criminal prosecution pursuant to section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2006), commonly known as the “Stand Yo…”
Velasquez v. State (District Court of Appeal of Florida 2009, 9 So. 3d 22)“…he trial court’s failure to find the defendant immune under section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2008), the “Stand Your Ground” law. Th…”
Finkelstein v. State (District Court of Appeal of Florida 2015, 157 So. 3d 1085)“…fied to defend himself. See §§ 776.012, 776.013, 776.031, Fla. Stat. Section 776.032 provides that if a defendant establishe…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: New Mexico Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

Official Code of Georgia Annotated

§ 16-3-23Use of force in defense of habitation.In forcecited in 6 of our articles

A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation;…

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2021-08-17 · Read the full text in our law library

Cited in 104 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Coleman v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 2009, 286 Ga. 291)“…tion on the use of force in defense of habitation, found in OCGA § 16-3-23. 2 “Unlike the defense of…”
Fair v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 2008, 284 Ga. 165)“…16-3-24 shall be immune from criminal prosecution...." OCGA § 16-3-23 governs the use of force in defense of…”
Benham v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 2004, 277 Ga. 516)“…on the use of force in defense of habitation as provided in OCGA § 16-3-23. To the extent that the Court of Appeal…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Georgia Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 16-3-23.1No duty to retreat prior to use of force in self-defense.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

A person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-21, relating to the use of force in defense of self or others, Code Section 16-3-23, relating to the use of force in defense of a habitation, or Code Section 16-3-24, relating to the use of force in defense of property other…

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2021-08-17 · Read the full text in our law library

Cited in 22 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Hughes v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 2021, 312 Ga. 149)“…as provided in [OCGA § 16-3-21], including deadly force.” OCGA § 16-3-23.1. If his use of force falls within these…”
Priester v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 2023, 317 Ga. 477)“…to defend himself or herself or a third person. . . .”);14 OCGA § 16-3-23.1 (providing that a person who used force…”
Arnold v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 2017)“…her he ought to have retreated before shooting Osborne. But OCGA § 16-3-23.1 clearly provides that a person who is a…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

§ 16-3-24.2Immunity from prosecution; exception.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

A person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-20, 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-23.1, 16-3-24, or 17-4-20 shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor unless in the use of deadly force, such person utilizes a weapon the carrying or possession of which is unlawful by such

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-04 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legis.ga.gov

Cited in 103 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Fair v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 2008, 284 Ga. 165)“…hether they are entitled to immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2; (2) whether the trial court erred in d…”
Anthony v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 2016, 298 Ga. 827)“…2. Before trial, the appellant filed a motion under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 for immunity from prosecution. Followi…”
Bunn v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 2008, 284 Ga. 410)“…court erred by denying his motion for immunity pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-24.2. 2 To date, it does not ap…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Hawaii Revised Statutes, Chapter 703: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTIFICATION

§ 703-304Use of force in self-protectionIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 703-308, the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by the other person on the present occasion. (2) The use of deadly force is justifiable under this section if the actor believes that deadly force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping, rape, or forcible sodomy. (3) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (4) and (5) of this section, a person employing protective force may estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as he believes them to be when the force is used without retreating, surrendering possession, doing any other act which he has no legal duty to do, or abstaining from any lawful action.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at capitol.hawaii.gov

Cited in 68 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Hawaii courts read HRS 703-304 as a two part test: the defendant's own belief that deadly force was necessary, then whether a reasonable person would have held it. State v. Culkin (2001) held the prosecution must disprove that justification, and State v. Deleon (2014) held the instruction need not track subsection (3) verbatim.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Culkin (Hawaii Supreme Court 2001, 97 Haw. 206)✓Culkin stabbed his brother during a fight in his house and claimed self-protection; the court held the instructions were plain error because the reckless manslaughter count omitted the element that the prosecution disprove justified deadly force under HRS 703-304(2).
State v. Bell (Hawaii Supreme Court 1978, 60 Haw. 241)✓In consolidated appeals, Hisaw stabbed a man who cornered him in a restaurant and said the grand jury needed a self-defense instruction; the court held one is required only if the evidence clearly establishes justification under HRS 703-304(2), and reinstated the indictment.
State v. Deleon. (Hawaii Supreme Court 2014, 131 Haw. 463)✓DeLeon fatally shot a man after a nightclub altercation and argued the self-defense instruction was incomplete because it omitted the estimate-the-necessity language of HRS 703-304(3); the court held the instruction accurately stated the law without that subsection's exact words.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Hawaii Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 703-301Justification a defense; civil remedies unaffectedIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

(1) In any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 703-302 through 703-309, is a defense. (2) The fact that conduct is justifiable under this chapter does not abolish or impair any remedy for such conduct which is available in any civil action. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at capitol.hawaii.gov

Idaho Code

§ 6-808Civil immunity for self-defenseIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

6-808. Civil immunity for self-defense. (1) A person who uses force as justified in section 18-4009, Idaho Code, or as otherwise permitted in sections 19-201 through 19-205, Idaho Code, is immune from any civil liability for the use of such force except when the person knew or reasonably should…

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.idaho.gov

Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp. (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1995, 61 F.3d 1113)“…cariously liable). See Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-21-111.5; Idaho Code § 6-808 (5); N.D.Cent. Code § 32-03.2-02. As…”
Brandon Velez, Plaintiff v. Rachael Eutzy, Erik Slocum, Casey Seigle, and The City of Manchester, N.H., Defendants (District Court, D. New Hampshire 2025, 2025 DNH 061)“…that have been enacted in several other states. See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 6-808(1); La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.19(A); Mich…”
Velez v. Eutzy (District Court, D. New Hampshire 2025)“…enacted in several other states. See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 6-808(1); La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.19(A); Mich…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Idaho Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

Illinois Compiled Statutes Chapter 720, Act 5 (Criminal Code of 2012)

§ 2-6"Dwelling"In forcecited in 4 of our articles

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Section, "dwelling" means a building or portion thereof, a tent, a vehicle, or other enclosed space which is used or intended for use as a human habitation, home or residence. (b) For the purposes of Section 19-3 of this Code, "dwelling" means a house, apartment, mobile home, trailer, or other living quarters in which at the time of the alleged offense the owners or occupants actually reside or in their absence intend within a reasonable period of time to reside.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov

§ 7-2Use of force in defense of dwellingIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

(a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a dwelling. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if: (1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent, riotous, or tumultuous manner, and he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent an assault upon, or offer of personal violence to, him or another then in the dwelling, or (2) He reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of a felony in the dwelling. (b) In no case shall any act involving the use of force justified under this Section give rise to any claim or liability brought by or on behalf of any person acting within the definition of "aggressor" set forth in Section 7-4 of this Article, or the estate, spouse, or other family member of such a person, against the person or estate of the person using such justified force, unless the use of force involves willful or wanton misconduct.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov

§ 7-1Use of force in defense of personIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

(a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another, or the commission of a forcible felony. (b) In no case shall any act involving the use of force justified under this Section give rise to any claim or liability brought by or on behalf of any person acting within the definition of "aggressor" set forth in Section 7-4 of this Article, or the estate, spouse, or other family member of such a person, against the person or estate of the person using such justified force, unless the use of force involves willful or wanton misconduct.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov

Also relied on in: Illinois Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 7-3Use of force in defense of other propertyIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

(a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's trespass on or other tortious or criminal interference with either real property (other than a dwelling) or personal property, lawfully in his possession or in the possession of another who is a member of his immediate family or household or of a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. (b) In no case shall any act involving the use of force justified under this Section give rise to any claim or liability brought by or on behalf of any person acting within the definition of "aggressor" set forth in Section 7-4 of this Article, or the estate, spouse, or other family member of such a person, against the person or estate of the person using such justified force, unless the use of force involves willful or wanton misconduct.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov

Indiana Code, TITLE 35. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

§ 35-41-3-2Use of force to protect person or propertyIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

Sec. 2. (a) In enacting this section, the general assembly finds and declares that it is the policy of this state to recognize the unique character of a citizen's home and to ensure that a citizen feels secure in his or her own home against unlawful intrusion by another individual or a public servant. By reaffirming the long standing right of a citizen to protect his or her home against unlawful intrusion, however, the general assembly does not intend to diminish in any way the other robust self-defense rights that citizens of this state have always enjoyed. Accordingly, the general assembly also finds and declares that it is the policy of this state that people have a right to defend themselves and third parties from physical harm and crime. The purpose of this section is to provide the citizens of this state with a lawful means of carrying out this policy. Provisions concerning civil immunity for the justified use of force as defined in this section are codified under IC 34-30-31. (b) As used in this section, "public servant" means a person described in IC 35-31.5-2-129 or IC 35-31.5-2-185.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at iga.in.gov

Cited in 262 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Harrison v. State (1998) applied the statute: a defendant must show a reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary, after which the State must disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Huls (2012) applied subsection (g)(3) to an initial aggressor who kept shooting after the others withdrew, and found the claim negated.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Harrison v. State (Indiana Supreme Court 1998, 699 N.E.2d 645)✓Harrison shot an unarmed man over $20 in change, chased him, and shot him again as he lay wounded; the court held that evidence let the jury find the State rebutted justification under IC 35-41-3-2 beyond a reasonable doubt.
Barnes v. State (Indiana Supreme Court 2011, 953 N.E.2d 473)✓Barnes got physical with an officer who sought entry to his home on his wife's domestic violence call; on rehearing the court held the castle doctrine is no defense to battery on a police officer, noting the statutory version at 35-41-3-2(b) was cited by amicus, not by Barnes.
Donald Gregory Huls v. State of Indiana (Indiana Court of Appeals 2012, 971 N.E.2d 739)✓Huls fired repeatedly into dark woods by his property at teenagers walking to a store, wounding one and shooting on after they yelled they were leaving; the court held the State negated his claim under 35-41-3-2 because he instigated the violence and never withdrew.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Indiana Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

Indiana Code, TITLE 34. CIVIL LAW AND PROCEDURE

§ 34-30-31-1"Forcible felony"; justified use of force; immunity; rebuttable presumptionIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

Sec. 1. (a) As used in this section, "forcible felony" means: (1) any offense described under IC 35-31.5-2-138; (2) residential entry (as defined under IC 35-43-2-1.5); or (3) burglary (as defined under IC 35-43-2-1). (b) The justified use of force described under IC 35-41-3-2 provides a complete immunity against any claim or action initiated by a person: (1) who alleges to have been injured or damaged by any such use of force; and (2) whose conduct justified the use of force. (c) In no case shall any use of force justified under IC 35-41-3-2 give rise to any claim or action for damages or compensation against a person, employer, or estate of a person using such force by or on behalf of any person who: (1) was attempting to commit or committing a forcible felony at the time such force was used; or (2) was attempting to cause or causing unlawful serious bodily injury to any other person at the time such force was used. This prohibition shall apply to any claim or action brought by the estate, personal representative, spouse, or family member of a person described in subdivision (1) or (2).

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at iga.in.gov

Iowa Code, Chapter 704: FORCE

§ 704.1Reasonable force.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

1. “Reasonable force” means that force and no more which a reasonable person, in like circumstances, would judge to be necessary to prevent an injury or loss and can include deadly force if it is reasonable to believe that such force is necessary to avoid injury or risk to one’s life or safety or the life or safety of another, or it is reasonable to believe that such force is necessary to resist a like force or threat. 2. A person may be wrong in the estimation of the danger or the force necessary to repel the danger as long as there is a reasonable basis for the belief of the person and the person acts reasonably in the response to that belief. 3. A person who is not engaged in illegal activity has no duty to retreat from any place where the person is lawfully present before using force as specified in this chapter.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legis.iowa.gov

Cited in 52 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State of Iowa v. Antoine Tyree Williams (Supreme Court of Iowa 2019)“…argues the district court erred when it held that amended Iowa Code section 704.1, which became effective on July 1, 2017…”
State of Iowa v. Shane Michael Teslik (Court of Appeals of Iowa 2025)“…orce is necessary to resist a like force or threat. Iowa Code § 704.1(1). Importantly, section 704.1(3)…”
State of Iowa v. Lasondra A. Johnson (Supreme Court of Iowa 2024)“…retreat, if possible, before resorting to the use of force. Iowa Code § 704.1(3) (2020). Under this law, people need…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Iowa Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 704.13Immunity.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

A person who is justified in using reasonable force against an aggressor in defense of oneself, another person, or property pursuant to section 704.4 is immune from criminal or civil liability for all damages incurred by the aggressor pursuant to the application of reasonable force.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legis.iowa.gov

Cited in 7 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State of Iowa v. Scott Allen Thompson (Court of Appeals of Iowa 2025)“…to a pretrial determination of his claim to immunity under Iowa Code section 704.13 (Supp. 2017). AFFIRMED. Jack…”
State of Iowa v. Lamar Cheyeene Wilson (Supreme Court of Iowa 2020)“…should have conducted a pretrial hearing on immunity under Iowa Code section 704.13 and also raising other issues. AFFIRMED…”
State of Iowa v. Trapp Leroy Trotter, Jr. (Court of Appeals of Iowa 2021)“…Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Iowa Code section 704.13 (2018) states, “A person who is justifi…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

§ 704.2AJustifiable use of deadly force.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

1. For purposes of this chapter, a person is presumed to reasonably believe that deadly force is necessary to avoid injury or risk to one’s life or safety or the life or safety of another in either of the following circumstances: a. The person against whom force is used, at the time the force is used, is doing any of the following: (1) Unlawfully entering by force or stealth the dwelling, place of business or employment, or occupied vehicle of the person using force, or has unlawfully entered by force or stealth and remains within the dwelling, place of business or employment, or occupied vehicle of the person using force. (2) Unlawfully removing or is attempting to unlawfully remove another person against the other person’s will from the dwelling, place of business or employment, or occupied vehicle of the person using force. b. The person using force knows or has reason to believe that any of the conditions set forth in paragraph “a” are occurring. 2. The presumption set forth in subsection 1 does not apply if, at the time force is used, any of the following circumstances are present: a.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legis.iowa.gov

Cited in 4 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State of Iowa v. Lasondra A. Johnson (Supreme Court of Iowa 2024)“…Turning to Instruction 58, the first paragraph restates Iowa Code § 704.2A(1)(a)(1), which provides that “a person…”
State of Iowa v. Michael Lang (Court of Appeals of Iowa 2024)“…sider.” At a pretrial hearing, the State pointed to Iowa Code section 704.2A, the “stand your ground” statute enact…”
State of Iowa v. Quarzone Erikey Martin (Court of Appeals of Iowa 2020)“…against the person against whom the force is used. Iowa Code § 704.2A. Martin elected not to assert a…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Kansas Statutes Annotated, Chapter 21: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS

§ 21-5222Defense of a person; no duty to retreat.In forcecited in 6 of our articles

(a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent it appears to such person and such person reasonably believes that such use of force is necessary to defend such person or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. (b) A person is justified in the use of deadly force under circumstances described in subsection (a) if such person reasonably believes that such use of deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to such person or a third person. (c) Nothing in this section shall require a person to retreat if such person is using force to protect such person or a third person.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ksrevisor.gov

Cited in 37 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Macomber (2019) applied the subjective and objective prongs of KSA 21-5222 and upheld a probable cause finding that the defendant's deadly force was not statutorily justified. State v. Fisher (2016) described imperfect self-defense as an honest but objectively unreasonable belief that 21-5222 justified force.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Fisher (Supreme Court of Kansas 2016, 304 Kan. 242)✓Fisher gravely injured a housemate in a fight and testified he feared she would kill him. The court held an imperfect self-defense instruction, resting on an honest but unreasonable belief that 21-5222 justified force, was appropriate but its omission not clear error.
State v. Macomber (Supreme Court of Kansas 2019)✓Macomber shot and killed an unarmed man during a confrontation in the man's driveway. The court upheld denial of self-defense immunity because the State showed probable cause the force was not justified under 21-5222, and held the omitted presumption instruction harmless.
State v. Montgomery (Supreme Court of Kansas 2026)✓Montgomery crossed a street and shot an unarmed man five times after the man raised his hands. The court held a 21-5222 self-defense instruction was not factually appropriate because no reasonable person could have perceived an imminent threat of death.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Kansas Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 21-5230No duty to retreat.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in a place where such person has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand such person's ground and use any force which such person would be justified in using under article 32 of chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, prior to their repeal, or K.S.A. 21-5202 through 21-5208, 21-5210 through 21-5212, and 21-5220 through 21-5231, and amendments thereto.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ksrevisor.gov

§ 21-5223Defense of dwelling, place of work or occupied vehicle; no duty to retreat.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

(a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that it appears to such person and such person reasonably believes that such use of force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon such person's dwelling, place of work or occupied vehicle. (b) A person is justified in the use of deadly force to prevent or terminate unlawful entry into or attack upon any dwelling, place of work or occupied vehicle if such person reasonably believes that such use of deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to such person or another. (c) Nothing in this section shall require a person to retreat if such person is using force to protect such person's dwelling, place of work or occupied vehicle.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ksrevisor.gov

Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Kline v. Bergstrom (Court of Appeals of Kansas 2024)“…contends that the district court erred because it relied on K.S.A. 21-5223 when it denied his…”
State v. Ross (Court of Appeals of Kansas 2025)“…s property under certain circumstances. See K.S.A. 21-5222; K.S.A. 21-5223; K.S.A. 21-5225. We do not have a simil…”
State v. Jameson (Court of Appeals of Kansas 2022)“…s of law because nothing in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5222's and K.S.A. 21-5223's plain language states that a person u…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

§ 21-5224Presumptions.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

(a) For the purposes of K.S.A. 21-3211 and 21-3212, prior to their repeal, or K.S.A. 21-5222 and 21-5223, and amendments thereto, a person is presumed to have a reasonable belief that deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to such person or another person if: (1) The person against whom the force is used, at the time the force is used: (A) Is unlawfully or forcefully entering, or has unlawfully or forcefully entered, and is present within, the dwelling, place of work or occupied vehicle of the person using force; or (B) has removed or is attempting to remove another person against such other person's will from the dwelling, place of work or occupied vehicle of the person using force; and (2) the person using force knows or has reason to believe that any of the conditions set forth in paragraph (1) is occurring or has occurred. (b) The presumption set forth in subsection (a) does not apply if, at the time the force is used: (1) The person against whom the force is used has a right to be in, or is a lawful resident of, the dwelling, place of work or occupied vehicle of the person using force, and is not subject to any order listed in K.S.A.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ksrevisor.gov

Cited in 6 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Kelly (Supreme Court of Kansas 2026)“…horization." Based on this, the court concluded that, under K.S.A. 21-5224, Jay had legal authorization to use for…”
State v. Jones (Court of Appeals of Kansas 2026)“…uction was clearly erroneous because it did not include the K.S.A. 21-5224(a) presumption of reasonableness of the…”
State v. Thomas (Court of Appeals of Kansas 2026)“…g its ruling, the court first found that the presumption in K.S.A. 21-5224(a) did not apply. This statute states,…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

§ 21-5231Immunity from prosecution or liability; investigation.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

(a) A person who uses force which, subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 21-5226, and amendments thereto, is justified pursuant to K.S.A. 21-5222, 21-5223 or 21-5225, and amendments thereto, is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force, unless the person against whom force was used is a law enforcement officer who was acting in the performance of such officer's official duties and the officer identified the officer's self in accordance with any applicable law or the person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement officer. As used in this subsection, "criminal prosecution" includes arrest, detention in custody and charging or prosecution of the defendant. (b) A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for investigating the use of force as described in subsection (a), but the agency shall not arrest the person for using force unless it determines that there is probable cause for the arrest. (c) A prosecutor may commence a criminal prosecution upon a determination of probable cause.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ksrevisor.gov

Cited in 27 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Riggins (Court of Appeals of Kansas 2025)“…used was necessary. 4. A motion for immunity under K.S.A. 21-5231(a) is timely if it is raised before the…”
State v. J.L.J. (Supreme Court of Kansas 2024, 547 P.3d 501)“…y from prosecution under our self-defense immunity statute, K.S.A. 21-5231, for reckless conduct injuring an innoc…”
State v. Nunez (Supreme Court of Kansas 2021, 486 P.3d 606)“…[T]here has been a motion for immunity filed pursuant to K.S.A. 21-5231. And in consideration of the tot…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Kentucky Revised Statutes, Chapter 503: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTIFICATION

§ 503.050Use of physical force in self-protection -- Admissibility of evidence of prior acts of domestic violence and abuseIn forcecited in 6 of our articles

(1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by the other person. (2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable under subsection (1) only when the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping, sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat, felony involving the use of force, or under those circumstances permitted pursuant to KRS 503.055. (3) Any evidence presented by the defendant to establish the existence of a prior act or acts of domestic violence and abuse as defined in KRS 403.720 by the person against whom the defendant is charged with employing physical force shall be admissible under this section. (4) A person does not have a duty to retreat prior to the use of deadly physical force.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov

Cited in 135 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Springer v. Commonwealth (Kentucky Supreme Court 1999, 998 S.W.2d 439)“…ing her with the "imminent use of unlawful physical force." KRS 503.050(1). Prior to the adoption of the pena…”
Rodgers v. Commonwealth (Kentucky Supreme Court 2009, 285 S.W.3d 740)“…vent the commission of a felony involving the use of force. KRS 503.050(2). The bill expressly provided that th…”
Elliott v. Commonwealth (Kentucky Supreme Court 1998, 976 S.W.2d 416)“…2d 959 (1931). The penal code takes a different approach. KRS 503.050 provides as follows: (1) The use…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Kentucky Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 503.055Use of defensive force regarding dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle -- ExceptionsIn forcecited in 6 of our articles

(1) A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if: (a) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person's will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and (b) The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov

Cited in 53 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Kentucky courts have applied KRS 503.055 mainly through its 2006 enactment. Rodgers v. Commonwealth (2009) held the provision is substantive and does not apply retroactively to conduct before July 12, 2006. Commonwealth v. Hasch (2013) held that where the statute applies, the court must give a requested no duty to retreat instruction.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Rodgers v. Commonwealth (Kentucky Supreme Court 2009, 285 S.W.3d 740)✓Rodgers shot a man during a backyard argument in 2004 and sought the benefit of Kentucky's 2006 self-defense amendments at his later trial; the court held KRS 503.055 is a wholly new substantive statute that does not apply retroactively to his conduct.
Hannah v. Commonwealth (Kentucky Supreme Court 2010, 306 S.W.3d 509)✓Hannah shot a man who kept fighting after being disarmed in 2004; the court held KRS 503.055(3) and the rest of the 2006 no duty to retreat amendments are not retroactive, so no such instruction was required, but reversed because he was barred from arguing retreat to the jury.
Commonwealth v. Hasch (Kentucky Supreme Court 2013, 421 S.W.3d 349)✓Hasch shot her husband between the eyes during a struggle over a handgun at home; the court held KRS 503.055(3) bars using evidence of an available escape to show defensive force was unnecessary, but found the error harmless and reinstated her reckless homicide conviction.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

§ 503.085Justification and criminal and civil immunity for use of permitted force -- ExceptionsIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

(1) A person who uses force as permitted in KRS 503.050, 503.055, 503.070, and 503.080 is justified in using such force and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force, unless the person against whom the force was used is a peace officer, as defined in KRS 446.010, who was acting in the performance of his or her official duties and the officer identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law, or the person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a peace officer. As used in this subsection, the term "criminal prosecution" includes arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant. (2) A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for investigating the use of force as described in subsection (1) of this section, but the agency may not arrest the person for using force unless it determines that there is probable cause that the force that was used was unlawful.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov

Cited in 48 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Rodgers v. Commonwealth (Kentucky Supreme Court 2009, 285 S.W.3d 740)“…t, detention, charge, or prosecution in the ordinary sense. KRS 503.085(1). Pursuant to this latter provision…”
Commonwealth v. Hasch (Kentucky Supreme Court 2013, 421 S.W.3d 349)“…l Court’s Failure to Conduct a Probable Cause Hearing under KRS 503.085 Does Not Require Reversal of the Reckle…”
Commonwealth v. Lemons (Kentucky Supreme Court 2014, 437 S.W.3d 708)“…court found that Lemons was not entitled to immunity under KRS 503.085 and denied his motion to dismiss, Lemon…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Louisiana Revised Statutes

§ 14:19Use of force or violence in defenseIn forcecited in 6 of our articles

A.(1) The use of force or violence upon the person of another is justifiable under either of the following circumstances: (a) When committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the person or a forcible offense or trespass against property in a person's lawful possession, provided that the force or violence used must be reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent such offense. (b)(i) When committed by a person lawfully inside a dwelling, a place of business, or a motor vehicle as defined in R.S. 32:1(40) when the conflict began, against a person who is attempting to make an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, or who has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, and the person using the force or violence reasonably believes that the use of force or violence is necessary to prevent the entry or to compel the intruder to leave the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legis.la.gov

Cited in 137 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Freeman (Supreme Court of Louisiana 1983, 427 So. 2d 1161)“…e defendant was legally justified in her use of force under La.R.S. 14:19 [2] and thereby absolved from culpabil…”
State v. Glover (Louisiana Court of Appeal 2012, 106 So. 3d 129)“…or violence upon the person of another is justifiable under La. R.S. 14:19 when committed for the purpose of preve…”
State v. Jefferson (Louisiana Court of Appeal 2005, 922 So. 2d 577)“…hen he shot him. Addressing first the self-defense issue, La. R.S. 14:19 provides that "[t]he use of force or vi…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Louisiana Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 14:20Justifiable homicideIn forcecited in 6 of our articles

A. A homicide is justifiable: (1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger. (2) When committed for the purpose of preventing a violent or forcible felony involving danger to life or of great bodily harm by one who reasonably believes that such an offense is about to be committed and that such action is necessary for its prevention. The circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fear of a reasonable person that there would be serious danger to his own life or person if he attempted to prevent the felony without the killing. (3) When committed against a person whom one reasonably believes to be likely to use any unlawful force against a person present in a dwelling or a place of business, or when committed against a person whom one reasonably believes is attempting to use any unlawful force against a person present in a motor vehicle as defined in R.S. 32:1(40), while committing or attempting to commit a burglary or robbery of such dwelling, business, or motor vehicle.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legis.la.gov

Cited in 364 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Louisiana courts apply R.S. 14:20(1) as requiring a reasonable belief of imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the killing was necessary. State v. Collins (1975) and State v. Quiambao (2002) both applied it with the state bearing the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not in self-defense.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Freeman (Supreme Court of Louisiana 1983, 427 So. 2d 1161)“…y where the force or violence results in a homicide. [3] La.R.S. 14:20(1) notes that a homicide is justifiable…”
State v. Quiambao (Louisiana Court of Appeal 2002, 833 So. 2d 1103)✓Quiambao stabbed her drunken ex-husband during an argument at her parents' home; the court held the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt she had no rational belief of danger of death or great bodily harm under R.S. 14:20(1), and that subsections (3) and (4) did not apply.
State v. Collins (Supreme Court of Louisiana 1975, 306 So. 2d 662)✓Collins, slapped and struck on a porch, ran to a car for a pistol and fired five shots at his unarmed attacker, hitting him four times; the court found some evidence of no justification under R.S. 14:20(1), retreat being a jury question, and affirmed the manslaughter conviction.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

§ 9:2800.19Limitation of liability for use of force in defense of certain crimesIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

A. A person who uses reasonable and apparently necessary or deadly force or violence for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the person or his property in accordance with R.S. 14:19 or 20 is immune from civil action for the use of reasonable and apparently necessary or deadly force or violence. B. The court shall award reasonable attorney fees, court costs, compensation for loss of income, and all expenses to the defendant in any civil action if the court finds that the defendant is immune from suit in accordance with Subsection A of this Section.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legis.la.gov

Maine Revised Statutes, Title 17-A: MAINE CRIMINAL CODE, Part 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES, Chapter 5: DEFENSES AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES; JUSTIFICATION

§ 108Physical force in defense of a personIn forcecited in 6 of our articles

1. A person is justified in using a reasonable degree of nondeadly force upon another person in order to defend the person or a 3rd person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful, nondeadly force by such other person, and the person may use a degree of such force that the person reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose. However, such force is not justifiable if: A. With a purpose to cause physical harm to another person, the person provoked the use of unlawful, nondeadly force by such other person; or [PL 2007, c. 173, §24 (AMD).] B. The person was the initial aggressor, unless after such aggression the person withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person the intent to do so, but the other person notwithstanding continues the use or threat of unlawful, nondeadly force; or [PL 2007, c. 173, §24 (AMD).] C. The force involved was the product of a combat by agreement not authorized by law. [PL 1975, c. 499, §1 (NEW).] 1-A.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.maine.gov

Cited in 93 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Ouellette (2012) held a section 108 self-defense instruction is available for any charge with an intentional, knowing, or reckless element. State v. Pabon (2011) held omitting section 108's dwelling-place exception to the duty to retreat was not obvious error where the defendant was the initial aggressor.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Pabon (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 2011, 28 A.3d 1147)✓Pabon stabbed his girlfriend and housemate in their apartment; the trial court left section 108's dwelling-place exception to the duty to retreat out of the self-defense instruction, and the court held that omission was not obvious error given the evidence he was the aggressor.
State v. Ouellette (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 2012, 37 A.3d 921)✓Ouellette left his vehicle with a baseball bat and hit a man who had threatened and tailed him; the court held a section 108 self-defense justification is available for any charge carrying a reckless state of mind, and vacated his reckless conduct conviction.
State v. Philbrick (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 1984, 481 A.2d 488)✓Philbrick shot and killed a man in Saco and asked for instructions on self-defense and sexual self-defense under section 108(2)(A); the court held his own contradictory accounts generated neither justification, and affirmed the refusal to instruct.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Maine Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)

Michigan Compiled Laws

§ 780.972Use of deadly force by individual not engaged in commission of crime; conditionsIn forcecited in 7 of our articles

(1) An individual who has not or is not engaged in the commission of a crime at the time he or she uses deadly force may use deadly force against another individual anywhere he or she has the legal right to be with no duty to retreat if either of the following applies: (a) The individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to himself or herself or to another individual. (b) The individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the imminent sexual assault of himself or herself or of another individual. (2) An individual who has not or is not engaged in the commission of a crime at the time he or she uses force other than deadly force may use force other than deadly force against another individual anywhere he or she has the legal right to be with no duty to retreat if he or she honestly and reasonably believes that the use of that force is necessary to defend himself or herself or another individual from the imminent unlawful use of force by another individual.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.mi.gov

Cited in 263 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):People v. Guajardo (2013) held that a felon unlawfully possessing a firearm is not barred from raising self-defense under MCL 780.972, because the Self-Defense Act preserves common-law defenses. People v. Stevens (2014) applied section 780.972(1) to a defendant who entered a home uninvited and attacked the occupant.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

People v. Stevens (Michigan Court of Appeals 2014, 306 Mich. App. 620)✓Stevens went to a man's house with a knife, entered uninvited, started a fight and stabbed him four times; the court held the evidence excluded self-defense under MCL 780.972(1) because he had no legal right to be in the home and was committing a crime when he used force.
People v. Guajardo (Michigan Court of Appeals 2013, 300 Mich. App. 26)✓Guajardo, a felon barred from guns, retrieved a rifle, waited minutes, then shot a tenant who had retreated into his room; the court held the Self-Defense Act does not bar a felon in possession from claiming self-defense, but that no evidence supported the instruction here.
People v. Moreno (Michigan Supreme Court 2012, 491 Mich. 38)“…islature changed the common-law duty to retreat by enacting MCL 780.972, which specifically explains that there…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Michigan Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 780.951Individual using deadly force or force other than deadly force; presumption; definitionsIn forcecited in 8 of our articles

(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), it is a rebuttable presumption in a civil or criminal case that an individual who uses deadly force or force other than deadly force under section 2 of the self-defense act has an honest and reasonable belief that imminent death of, sexual assault of, or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another individual will occur if both of the following apply: (a) The individual against whom deadly force or force other than deadly force is used is in the process of breaking and entering a dwelling or business premises or committing home invasion or has broken and entered a dwelling or business premises or committed home invasion and is still present in the dwelling or business premises, or is unlawfully attempting to remove another individual from a dwelling, business premises, or occupied vehicle against his or her will. (b) The individual using deadly force or force other than deadly force honestly and reasonably believes that the individual is engaging in conduct described in subdivision (a).

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.mi.gov

Cited in 16 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

People of Michigan v. Michael Anthony Thigpen (Michigan Court of Appeals 2023)“…n October 1, 2006, id., and with it the Legislature enacted MCL 780.951(1), see 2006 PA 311, which forms the ba…”
People of Michigan v. Theodore Paul Wafer (Michigan Supreme Court 2018)“…asonable belief of imminent death or great bodily harm. See MCL 780.951(1). The trial court reasoned that CJI2d…”
People v. Conyer (Michigan Court of Appeals 2008, 281 Mich. App. 526)“…3 These acts were codified at MCL 780.961, MCL 780.951, MCL 600.2922c, MCL 768.21c, and MCL 60…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

§ 780.961Use of deadly force or force other than deadly force; establishing evidence that individual's actions not justifiedIn forcecited in 6 of our articles

(1) An individual who uses deadly force or force other than deadly force in compliance with section 2 of the self-defense act and who has not or is not engaged in the commission of a crime at the time he or she uses that deadly force or force other than deadly force commits no crime in using that deadly force or force other than deadly force. (2) If a prosecutor believes that an individual used deadly force or force other than deadly force that is unjustified under section 2 of the self-defense act, the prosecutor may charge the individual with a crime arising from that use of deadly force or force other than deadly force and shall present evidence to the judge or magistrate at the time of warrant issuance, at the time of any preliminary examination, and at the time of any trial establishing that the individual's actions were not justified under section 2 of the self-defense act.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.mi.gov

Cited in 6 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

People v. Conyer (Michigan Court of Appeals 2008, 281 Mich. App. 526)“…defense. 3 These acts were codified at MCL 780.961, MCL 780.951, MCL 600.2922c, MCL 768.21…”
People of Michigan v. Christopher Paul Schurr (Michigan Court of Appeals 2024)“…matter of law that he was justified in killing the victim); MCL 780.961(2) (requiring the prosecution to presen…”
People of Michigan v. James Hosey Johnson (Michigan Court of Appeals 2016)“…the preliminary examination to fulfill the requirements of MCL 780.961(2). The trial court denied that motion,…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

§ 600.2922bUse of deadly force or other than deadly force by individual in self-defense; immunity from civil liabilityIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

An individual who uses deadly force or force other than deadly force in self-defense or in defense of another individual in compliance with section 2 of the self-defense act is immune from civil liability for damages caused to either of the following by the use of that deadly force or force other than deadly force: (a) The individual against whom the use of deadly force or force other than deadly force is authorized. (b) Any individual claiming damages arising out of injury to or the death of the individual described in subdivision (a), based upon his or her relationship to that individual.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.mi.gov

Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 609: CRIMINAL CODE

§ 609.065JUSTIFIABLE TAKING OF LIFEIn forcecited in 6 of our articles

The intentional taking of the life of another is not authorized by section 609.06, except when necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the actor reasonably believes exposes the actor or another to great bodily harm or death, or preventing the commission of a felony in the actor's place of abode.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at revisor.mn.gov

Cited in 30 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Minnesota courts have applied Minn. Stat. 609.065 to self-defense and defense of dwelling. State v. Pendleton (1997) held fear of great bodily harm or death is not an element of the defense-of-dwelling clause; State v. Dodis (1982) held improper an instruction allowing deadly force against a non-life-threatening felony.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Dodis (Supreme Court of Minnesota 1982, 314 N.W.2d 233)✓Dodis shot a drinking companion twice in the head and said the man had forced him into a sex act; the court held the instruction he wanted, approving deadly force to prevent a felony that was not life-threatening, misstated Minn. Stat. 609.065 and was properly refused.
State v. Pendleton (Supreme Court of Minnesota 1997, 567 N.W.2d 265)✓Pendleton shot a guest who refused to leave his apartment and rushed him; the court held that under Minn. Stat. 609.065 a defendant preventing a felony in his own home need not fear death or great bodily harm, so the standard instruction adding that element required a new trial.
State v. Hare (Supreme Court of Minnesota 1998, 575 N.W.2d 828)✓Hare stabbed his niece's boyfriend, with whom he shared an apartment, during a fight; the court held the defense-of-dwelling clause of Minn. Stat. 609.065 presupposes an intruder, so one resident cannot invoke it against a co-resident, making the instruction error harmless.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Minnesota Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 609.066AUTHORIZED USE OF DEADLY FORCE BY PEACE OFFICERSIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

Subdivision 1. Deadly force defined. For the purposes of this section, "deadly force" means force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing, or which the actor should reasonably know creates a substantial risk of causing, death or great bodily harm. The intentional discharge of a firearm, other than a firearm loaded with less lethal munitions and used by a peace officer within the scope of official duties, in the direction of another person, or at a vehicle in which another person is believed to be, constitutes deadly force. "Less lethal munitions" means projectiles which are designed to stun, temporarily incapacitate, or cause temporary discomfort to a person. "Peace officer" has the meaning given in section 626.84, subdivision 1. Subd. 1a. Legislative intent. The legislature hereby finds and declares the following: (1) that the authority to use deadly force, conferred on peace officers by this section, is a critical responsibility that shall be exercised judiciously and with respect for human rights and dignity and for the sanctity of every human life.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at revisor.mn.gov

Mississippi Code of 1972 Annotated

§ 97-3-15Homicide; justifiable homicide; use of defensive force; duty to retreat.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

(1) The killing of a human being by the act, procurement or omission of another shall be justifiable in the following cases: (a) When committed by public officers, or those acting by their aid and assistance, in obedience to any judgment of a competent court; (b) When necessarily committed by…

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at billstatus.ls.state.ms.us

Cited in 93 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Newell v. State (2010) construed section 97-3-15's Castle Doctrine, holding subsection (4) removes the duty to retreat and that subsection (3)'s presumption of reasonable fear can reach a driver who had stepped out of his vehicle. Thomas Glynn Flynt v. State of Mississippi (2015) applied both prongs and left disputed facts to the jury.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Newell v. State (Mississippi Supreme Court 2010, 49 So. 3d 66)✓Newell shot a man who had slammed a truck door on his leg and was banging on the truck; the court read section 97-3-15(3) to allow the Castle Doctrine presumption where the aggression began while he occupied the vehicle, and ordered a new trial.
Thomas Glynn Flynt v. State of Mississippi (Mississippi Supreme Court 2015, 183 So. 3d 1)✓Flynt shot a family friend in his auto shop office; applying section 97-3-15(3) and (4), the court found he had no duty to retreat but held that whether she entered unlawfully or forcibly was a disputed fact for the jury, and it left the verdict standing.
Maye v. State (Mississippi Supreme Court 2010, 49 So. 3d 1124)✓Maye shot an officer entering his apartment during a nighttime search warrant raid while his fourteen-month-old daughter slept on the bed; the court held section 97-3-15(1)(f) entitled him to a defense-of-others instruction and reversed his conviction.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Mississippi Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

Revised Statutes of Missouri, Title XXXVIII (CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT; PEACE OFFICERS AND PUBLIC DEFENDERS), Chapter 563

§ 563.031Use of force in defense of persons.In forcecited in 6 of our articles

1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subsection 2 of this section, use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such force to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful force by such other person, unless: (1) The actor was the initial aggressor; except that in such case his or her use of force is nevertheless justifiable provided: (a) He or she has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other person but the latter persists in continuing the incident by the use or threatened use of unlawful force; or (b) He or she is a law enforcement officer and as such is an aggressor pursuant to section 563.046; or (c) The aggressor is justified under some other provision of this chapter or other provision of law; (2) Under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the person whom he or she seeks to protect would not be justified in using such protective force; (3) The actor was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of a forcible felony.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at revisor.mo.gov

Cited in 49 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Missouri courts treat section 563.031 as the governing self-defense test. State v. Bruner (2018) held the statutory elements, not the older common law formulation, control whether a defendant has injected the defense. State v. Clinch (2011) held the 2007 amendment did not remove the imminence requirement.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Bruner (Supreme Court of Missouri 2018, 541 S.W.3d 529)✓Bruner shot his wife's companion six times outside a movie theater after the man threatened him verbally; the court held he did not inject self-defense under section 563.031, since fear of being grabbed or punched cannot justify deadly force.
State v. Clinch (Missouri Court of Appeals 2011, 335 S.W.3d 579)✓Clinch waited in a parking lot and shot the father of his nieces and nephew, saying he was defending the children from abuse; the court held section 563.031, as amended in 2007, still requires a reasonable belief that unlawful force is occurring or imminent.
State of Missouri v. Richard John Whipple (Missouri Court of Appeals 2016, 501 S.W.3d 507)“…defense still must meet the reasonableness requirements of section 563.031 RSMo Supp. 2011 4 in order for him to be en…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Missouri Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 563.074Justification as an absolute defense, when.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 563.016, a person who uses force as described in sections 563.031, 563.041, 563.046, 563.051, 563.056, and 563.061 is justified in using such force and such fact shall be an absolute defense to criminal prosecution or civil liability. 2. The court shall award attorney's fees, court costs, and all reasonable expenses incurred by the defendant in defense of any civil action brought by a plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant has an absolute defense as provided in subsection 1 of this section.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at revisor.mo.gov

Montana Code Annotated, Title 45

§ 45-3-110No Duty To Summon Help Or FleeIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

45-3-110. No duty to summon help or flee. Except as provided in 45-3-105, a person who is lawfully in a place or location and who is threatened with bodily injury or loss of life has no duty to retreat from a threat or summon law enforcement assistance prior to using force. The provisions of this section apply to a person offering evidence of justifiable use of force under 45-3-102, 45-3-103, or 45-3-104.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at mca.legmt.gov

Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2020

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. S. Trujillo (Montana Supreme Court 2020, 400 Mont. 124)“…strict Court committed plain error in violation of § 45-3-110, MCA, by allowing the State’s closing argume…”
State v. Bobby Cooksey (Montana Supreme Court 2012, 366 Mont. 346)“…elf-defense,” the officer may have a duty 2 Section 45-3-110, MCA, concerns the duty to retreat or summon…”
State v. King (Montana Supreme Court 2016, 385 Mont. 483)“…of force. The former instruction reflects the language of § 45-3-110, MCA, and addresses a person’s duty to retre…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Montana Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 45-2-101General DefinitionsIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

45-2-101. General definitions. Unless otherwise specified in the statute, all words must be taken in the objective standard rather than in the subjective, and unless a different meaning plainly is required, the following definitions apply in this title: (1) "Acts" has its usual and ordinary meaning and includes any bodily movement, any form of communication, and when relevant, a failure or omission to take action. (2) "Administrative proceeding" means a proceeding the outcome of which is required to be based on a record or documentation prescribed by law or in which a law or a regulation is particularized in its application to an individual. (3) "Another" means a person or persons other than the offender. (4) (a) "Benefit" means gain or advantage or anything regarded by the beneficiary as gain or advantage, including benefit to another person or entity in whose welfare the beneficiary is interested. (b) Benefit does not include an advantage promised generally to a group or class of voters as a consequence of public measures that a candidate engages to support or oppose.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at mca.legmt.gov

Cited in 54 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Smith (Montana Supreme Court 2004, 322 Mont. 206)“…n the intended victim of the serious bodily injury. ¶34 Section 45-2-101, MCA, defines “another” as, simply, “a perso…”
State v. Haser (Montana Supreme Court 2001, 304 Mont. 63)“…other person." Under the general definitions provided under § 45-2-101, MCA, "sexual intercourse" includes "penetra…”
State v. Stevens (Montana Supreme Court 2002, 311 Mont. 52)“…ingness to act, pursuant to §§ 45-5-501(1)(b)(ii) and 45-2-101, MCA, which defines “physically helpless.” H…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

§ 45-3-103Use Of Force In Defense Of Occupied StructureIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

45-3-103. Use of force in defense of occupied structure. (1) A person is justified in the use of force or threat to use force against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the use of force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other person's unlawful entry into or attack upon an occupied structure. (2) A person justified in the use of force pursuant to subsection (1) is justified in the use of force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm only if: (a) the entry is made or attempted and the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent an assault upon the person or another then in the occupied structure; or (b) the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent the commission of a forcible felony in the occupied structure.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at mca.legmt.gov

Cited in 13 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Daniels (Montana Supreme Court 2011, 362 Mont. 426)“…tion concerning the defense of an occupied structure under § 45-3-103, MCA (2009). Daniels argues that this refus…”
State v. Barrack (Montana Supreme Court 1994, 267 Mont. 154)“…in defense of an occupied structure, which is set forth at § 45-3-103, MCA. That statute provides that: A person…”
State v. Hagen (Montana Supreme Court 1995, 273 Mont. 432)“…efense of an occupied structure is set forth at s 45-3-103, MCA, which states: A person is justif…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

§ 45-3-112Investigation Of Alleged Offense Involving Claim Of Justifiable Use Of ForceIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

45-3-112. Investigation of alleged offense involving claim of justifiable use of force. When an investigation is conducted by a peace officer of an incident that appears to have or is alleged to have involved justifiable use of force, the investigation must be conducted so as to disclose all evidence, including testimony concerning the alleged offense and that might support the apparent or alleged justifiable use of force.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at mca.legmt.gov

Montana Code Annotated, Title 27

§ 27-1-722Civil Damages Immunity For Injury Caused By Legal Use Of ForceIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

27-1-722. Civil damages immunity for injury caused by legal use of force. (1) A use of force allowable under the provisions of Title 45, chapter 3, part 1, provides immunity to the person using the force from civil damages for injury to any person or property arising from injury to the person, or damage to the property of the person, against whom the force was used. (2) Conviction of a crime committed by the person who was injured or whose property was damaged by the use of force is not a prerequisite to a defense under subsection (1), but it is evidence that the act or omission to which the use of force was a response occurred. (3) The reasonableness of the use of force must be determined in light of the circumstances at the time that the force was used. (4) The prevailing party in an action in which a defense is asserted under this section is entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at mca.legmt.gov

Nebraska Revised Statutes, Chapter 28: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS

§ 28-1409Use of force in self-protectionIn forcecited in 6 of our articles

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 28-1414, the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion. (2) The use of such force is not justifiable under this section to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at nebraskalegislature.gov

Cited in 82 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Iromuanya (2006) applied section 28-1409's deadly force limits and held no self-defense instruction was required absent evidence of a reasonable, good faith belief in the need for deadly force. State v. Harris (2016) held the section 28-1409(4)(b)(i) privilege of nonretreat exists only in one's dwelling or place of work.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Iromuanya (Nebraska Supreme Court 2006, 272 Neb. 178)✓Iromuanya fired a derringer at a Lincoln party minutes after a brief scuffle, wounding one guest and killing another; the court held nothing in the record supported a good faith belief in the need for deadly force under section 28-1409, so no instruction was owed.
State v. Harris (Nebraska Supreme Court 2016, 294 Neb. 766)“…s addressed in § 28-1409(4)(b)(i). 9. Self-Defense. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409(4)(b)(i) (Reissue 2008), the privi…”
State v. Bedford (Nebraska Court of Appeals 2022, 31 Neb. Ct. App. 339)“…rrect statement of the law,” as it was “drawn directly from Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409 (2016) and NJI2d Crim. 7.1.” Brief for…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Nebraska Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 28-1416Justification an affirmative defense; available in certain civil actionsIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

(1) In any prosecution based on conduct which is justifiable under sections 28-1406 to 28-1416, justification is an affirmative defense. (2) The justification defenses provided for under sections 28-1406 to 28-1416 shall be available in any civil action for assault and battery or intentional wrongful death and, where applicable, shall be a bar to recovery.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at nebraskalegislature.gov

Nevada Revised Statutes, Chapter 200: CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON

§ 200.120“Justifiable homicide” defined; no duty to retreat under certain circumstances.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

1. Justifiable homicide is the killing of a human being in necessary self-defense, or in defense of an occupied habitation, an occupied motor vehicle or a person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors to commit a crime of violence, or against any person or persons who manifestly intend and endeavor, in a violent, riotous, tumultuous or surreptitious manner, to enter the occupied habitation or occupied motor vehicle, of another for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to any person dwelling or being therein. 2. A person is not required to retreat before using deadly force as provided in subsection 1 if the person: (a) Is not the original aggressor; (b) Has a right to be present at the location where deadly force is used; and (c) Is not actively engaged in conduct in furtherance of criminal activity at the time deadly force is used. 3. As used in this section: (a) “Crime of violence” means any felony for which there is a substantial risk that force or violence may be used against the person or property of another in the commission of the felony. (b) “Motor vehicle” means every vehicle which is self-propelled.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leg.state.nv.us

Cited in 18 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Runion v. State (2000) read NRS 200.120 with Nevada's self-defense scheme as consistent with the common law, covering apparent as well as actual danger, and held it error to limit the defense to actual danger. Kelso v. State (1979) held a killing in necessary self-defense is not unlawful, so the defendant need not prove it.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Runion v. State (Nevada Supreme Court 2000, 116 Nev. 1041)✓Runion fired into another car, saying a passenger had pointed a gun at him; reading NRS 200.120 with the other justifiable-homicide statutes, the court held they reach apparent danger too, so confining his defense to actual danger was error.
GUIDRY (RONNEKA) v. STATE (Nevada Supreme Court 2022, 510 P.3d 782)“…ments are not sufficiently supported. She first argues that NRS 200.120(1) applies, which states that a killing…”
Davis v. State (Nevada Supreme Court 2014, 2014 NV 16)“…two proposed instructions are near verbatim copies of NRS 200.120(1), 3 3 NRS…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Nevada Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

Nevada Revised Statutes, Chapter 041: ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS IN PARTICULAR CASES CONCERNING PERSONS

§ 41.095Presumption that person using deadly force against intruder in person’s residence, transient lodging or motor vehicle has reasonable fear of death or bodily injury; person who uses deadly force is immune from civil liability under certain circumstances; definitions.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

1. For the purposes of NRS 41.085 and 41.130, any person who uses: (a) While lawfully in his or her residence, in transient lodging or in a motor vehicle that is not his or her residence, force which is intended or likely to cause death or bodily injury is presumed to have had a reasonable fear of imminent death or bodily injury to himself or herself or another person lawfully in the residence, transient lodging or motor vehicle if the force is used against a person who is committing burglary, invasion of the home or grand larceny of the motor vehicle with the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that burglary, invasion of the home or grand larceny of the motor vehicle with the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon was being committed. An action to recover damages for personal injuries to or the wrongful death of the person who committed burglary, invasion of the home or grand larceny of the motor vehicle with the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon may not be maintained against the person who used such force unless the presumption is overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leg.state.nv.us

New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, TITLE LXII CRIMINAL CODE, CHAPTER 627 JUSTIFICATION

§ 627:4Physical Force in Defense of a Person.In forcecited in 6 of our articles

I. A person is justified in using non-deadly force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful, non-deadly force by such other person, and he may use a degree of such force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose. However, such force is not justifiable if: (a) With a purpose to cause physical harm to another person, he provoked the use of unlawful, non-deadly force by such other person; or (b) He was the initial aggressor, unless after such aggression he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so, but the latter notwithstanding continues the use or threat of unlawful, non-deadly force; or (c) The force involved was the product of a combat by agreement not authorized by law. II.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at gc.nh.gov

Cited in 57 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):New Hampshire courts read RSA 627:4 against the common law. State v. Pugliese (1980) held the dwelling exception to the retreat duty reaches the curtilage, so a person need not retreat outside the house but on its grounds. State v. Etienne (2011) held the deadly force provision implicitly requires the force to be reasonably necessary.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Pugliese (Supreme Court of New Hampshire 1980, 120 N.H. 728)✓Pugliese killed a man in a struggle on his beach some distance from his cottage; the court read dwelling in RSA 627:4, III(a) to reach the curtilage, so he was entitled to a no retreat instruction for his home's grounds, leaving to retrial whether the beach was within them.
State v. Etienne (Supreme Court of New Hampshire 2011, 163 N.H. 57)✓Etienne shot a man in the head on his porch and claimed defense of himself and a friend; the court held RSA 627:4, II implicitly requires that deadly force be reasonably necessary, so instructing the jury on a necessity requirement was not error.
State v. Ayer (Supreme Court of New Hampshire 2006, 154 N.H. 500)✓Ayer shot a family counselor who refused to leave his property, arguing RSA 627:4 justified deadly force to stop DCYF from kidnapping his son; the court upheld refusing that instruction because no evidence showed an intent to kidnap or that he believed one existed.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: New Hampshire Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

New York Penal Law

§ 35.15Justification; use of physical force in defense of a personIn forcecited in 6 of our articles

Justification; use of physical force in defense of a person. 1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subdivision two, use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself, herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person, unless: (a) The latter's conduct was provoked by the actor with intent to cause physical injury to another person; or (b) The actor was the initial aggressor; except that in such case the use of physical force is nevertheless justifiable if the actor has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other person but the latter persists in continuing the incident by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force; or (c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law. 2.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov

Cited in 780 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):People v. Goetz (1986) held that the reasonableness required by Penal Law 35.15 is objective, not simply what the defendant himself thought reasonable, though the jury weighs his circumstances and prior experiences. People v. McManus (1986) held justification is an ordinary defense the People must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

People v. Taylor (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York 2017, 2017 NY Slip Op 7649)“…s testimony that defendant was the initial aggressor ( see Penal Law § 35.15 [1] [b]; [2]; see generally People v W…”
People v. Goetz (New York Court of Appeals 1986, 68 N.Y.2d 96)✓Goetz shot four youths on a subway train after one asked him for five dollars; the court held Penal Law 35.15's "reasonably believes" keeps an objective element, so the prosecutor's "reasonable man in the defendant's situation" charge was right, and reinstated the indictment.
People v. McManus (New York Court of Appeals 1986, 67 N.Y.2d 541)✓McManus fired a rifle into a group he said was beating and robbing his companion and was convicted of depraved indifference murder after the court refused a justification charge on that count; the court held Penal Law 35.15 applies regardless of mens rea and ordered a new trial.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: New York Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 35.20Justification; use of physical force in defense of premises and in defense of a person in the course of burglaryIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

Justification; use of physical force in defense of premises and in defense of a person in the course of burglary. 1. Any person may use physical force upon another person when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of a crime involving damage to premises. Such person may use any degree of physical force, other than deadly physical force, which he or she reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose, and may use deadly physical force if he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of arson. 2. A person in possession or control of any premises, or a person licensed or privileged to be thereon or therein, may use physical force upon another person when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of a criminal trespass upon such premises.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov

Cited in 76 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

People v. Cox (New York Court of Appeals 1998, 92 N.Y.2d 1002)“…harge the defense of justification to terminate a burglary (Penal Law § 35.20 [3]), and defendant was convicted. The…”
People v. White (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York 2010, 75 A.D.3d 109)“…ury on the defense of justification in defense of premises (Penal Law § 35.20 [3]) as it pertained to the count of ma…”
People v. Hernandez (New York Court of Appeals 2002, 98 N.Y.2d 175)“…defined and used elsewhere in the Penal Law. Most notably, Penal Law § 35.20, which describes when a defendant may u…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

North Carolina General Statutes, Chapter 14: Criminal Law.

§ 14-51.3Use of force in defense of person; relief from criminal or civil liabilityIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

(a) A person is justified in using force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat in any place he or she has the lawful right to be if either of the following applies: (1) He or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another. (2) Under the circumstances permitted pursuant to G.S. 14-51.2.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ncleg.gov

Cited in 51 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):North Carolina courts have applied G.S. 14-51.3 to jury instructions. State v. Lee (2018) held that where the defendant offered evidence of self-defense on a public street he had a right to be on, the court had to instruct on his right to stand his ground. State v. Parks (2019) held refusing a self-defense instruction was error.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Lee (Supreme Court of North Carolina 2018, 370 N.C. 671)✓Lee shot a man who turned a gun on him seconds after that man fatally shot Lee's cousin in the street; the court held that leaving the stand your ground language of N.C.G.S. 14-51.3(a) out of the self-defense instruction was prejudicial error requiring a new trial.
State v. Parks (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2019, 264 N.C. App. 112)✓Parks cut a man with a box cutter outside a Raleigh restaurant after a crowd came at him; the court held witness accounts that he was unarmed and being beaten were competent evidence under 14-51.3(a)(1), so refusing a self-defense instruction was prejudicial error.
State v. Irabor (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2018)✓Irabor shot a man who advanced on him and reached behind his back toward his waistband; the court held the evidence of the victim's violent history supported self-defense under 14-51.3(a), and dropping the agreed no duty to retreat language was prejudicial error.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: North Carolina Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 14-51.2Home, workplace, and motor vehicle protection; presumption of fear of death or serious bodily harmIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

(a) The following definitions apply in this section: (1) Home. - A building or conveyance of any kind, to include its curtilage, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed as a temporary or permanent residence. (2) Law enforcement officer. - Any person employed or appointed as a full-time, part-time, or auxiliary law enforcement officer, correctional officer, probation officer, post-release supervision officer, or parole officer. (3) Motor vehicle. - As defined in G.S. 20-4.01(23). (4) Workplace. - A building or conveyance of any kind, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, which is being used for commercial purposes.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ncleg.gov

Cited in 45 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Bass (Supreme Court of North Carolina 2018, 371 N.C. 535)“…(2) Under the circumstances permitted pursuant to [N.C.]G.S. 14-51.2. N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3(a) (2017). Second,…”
State v. Cook (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2017, 254 N.C. App. 150)“…ntend to shoot the attacker. The dissent states that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2, codifying the “castle doctrine,” warr…”
State v. Kuhns (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2018, 260 N.C. App. 281)“…14- 51.1 and enacted our current defensive force statutes, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-51.2, - 51.3, and -51.4. See generally An A…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Ohio Revised Code

§ 2901.09No duty to retreat in residence or vehicleIn forcecited in 6 of our articles

(A) As used in this section, "residence" has the same meaning as in section 2901.05 of the Revised Code. (B) For purposes of any section of the Revised Code that sets forth a criminal offense, a person has no duty to retreat before using force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of…

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at codes.ohio.gov

Cited in 198 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Knuff (Ohio Supreme Court 2024, 175 Ohio St. 3d 82)“…January Term, 2024 {¶ 192} Former R.C. 2901.09, Ohio’s “castle doctrine” statute, enac…”
State v. Shine-Johnson (Ohio Court of Appeals 2018, 117 N.E.3d 986)“…force in self-defense. Hubbard at ¶ 51 ; R.C. 2901.09(B) ("a person who lawfully is in that p…”
State v. Bundy (Ohio Court of Appeals 2012, 2012 Ohio 3934)“…350, 2012-Ohio-1952, ¶43 (construing complementary statute, R.C. 2901.09(B), the no-duty-to-retreat statute); S…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Ohio Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 2901.05Burden of proof - reasonable doubt - self-defenseIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

(A) Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all elements of the offense is upon the prosecution.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at codes.ohio.gov

Cited in 1,424 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Messenger (2022) held H.B. 228's amendment to R.C. 2901.05 left the defendant a burden of producing evidence of self-defense, after which the state must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt, reviewed for manifest weight, not sufficiency. State v. Jenkins (1984) applied the section's reasonable-doubt standard in a capital case.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Maurer (Ohio Supreme Court 1984, 15 Ohio St. 3d 239)✓Maurer, sentenced to death for the kidnapping and murder of a child, argued the state's burden in a capital case should be proof beyond all doubt; the court held the standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt as defined in R.C. 2901.05 and reaffirmed that definition.
State v. Jenkins (Ohio Supreme Court 1984, 15 Ohio St. 3d 164)✓Jenkins, sentenced to death for killing a police officer while fleeing a robbery, argued a capital jury must be told the state's burden is proof beyond all doubt; the court held the standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt as defined in R.C. 2901.05 and upheld that definition.
State v. Jones (Ohio Supreme Court 2001, 91 Ohio St. 3d 335)✓Jones, convicted of aggravated murder for shooting an Ashtabula police officer, argued the reasonable-doubt charge recited verbatim from R.C. 2901.05(D) let juries convict on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the court rejected that and reaffirmed the definition.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

§ 2305.40Owner, lessee, or renter of real property not liable to trespasserIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

(A) As used in this section: (1) "Firearm" has the same meaning as in section 2923.11 of the Revised Code. (2) "Tort action" means a civil action for damages for injury, death, or loss to person or property other than a civil action for damages for a breach of contract or another agreement between…

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at codes.ohio.gov

§ 2307.221Immunity from tort liability - nonprofit corporationsIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

(A) As used in this section, "tort action" has the same meaning as in section 2307.60 of the Revised Code. (B) No person is liable in a tort action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by the person's act of self-defense or defense of another when performed during the…

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at codes.ohio.gov

Oregon Revised Statutes, Chapter 161: General Provisions

§ 161.219Limitations on use of deadly physical force in defense of a personIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 161.209, a person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person unless the person reasonably believes that the other person is: (1) Committing or attempting to commit a felony involving the use or threatened imminent use of physical force against a person; or (2) Committing or attempting to commit a burglary in a dwelling; or (3) Using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force against a person.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at oregonlegislature.gov

Cited in 43 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Sandoval (2007) held ORS 161.219 imposes no duty to retreat before using deadly physical force, so a retreat instruction was error. State v. Gilmore (2024) held the statute conditions justification on a reasonable belief about the particular other person, so transferred intent does not extend it to a bystander.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Burns (Court of Appeals of Oregon 1973, 15 Or. App. 552)✓Burns shot a houseguest who refused to leave and grabbed at his rifle after threatening to beat him with it. The court read the triggers in ORS 161.219 as functionally equivalent to the case law's great bodily harm, so a self-defense instruction was required.
State v. Sandoval (Oregon Supreme Court 2007, 342 Or. 506)✓Sandoval shot his ex-wife's domestic partner on a road both men used, saying the man had aimed a pistol at him first. The court held ORS 161.219 imposes no duty to retreat before using deadly force against an imminent deadly threat, and reversed his murder conviction.
State v. Gilmore (Court of Appeals of Oregon 2024, 336 Or. App. 706)✓Gilmore fired at two men in his apartment, killing both; the trial court found one shooting justified and the other reckless. The court held justification under ORS 161.219 runs only against the particular other person reasonably believed to be doing the qualifying conduct.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Title 18 (Crimes and Offenses)

§ 505Use of force in self-protectionIn forcecited in 6 of our articles

(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the person.--The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion. (b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.-- (1) The use of force is not justifiable under this section: (i) to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful; or (ii) to resist force used by the occupier or possessor of property or by another person on his behalf, where the actor knows that the person using the force is doing so under a claim of right to protect the property, except that this limitation shall not apply if: (A) the actor is a public officer acting in the performance of his duties or a person lawfully assisting him therein or a person making or assisting in a lawful arrest; (B) the actor has been unlawfully dispossessed of the property and is making a reentry or recaption justified by section 507 of this title (relating to use of force for the protection of property); or (C) the actor…

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at palegis.us

Cited in 309 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Commonwealth v. Rivera (2009) applied 18 Pa.C.S. 505 in holding the Commonwealth disproved self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt where the officer never used unlawful force under 505(a) and the defendant provoked the encounter. Commonwealth v. Busanet (2012) applied 505 to a self-defense theory the defendant's own testimony refuted.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Commonwealth v. Spotz (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 2014, 624 Pa. 4)✓Spotz shot and killed his brother after being stabbed with a butter knife, having left the kitchen for a gun and returned; on collateral review the court applied section 505 and found he was not free from fault in continuing the fight, so the charge caused no prejudice.
Commonwealth v. Busanet (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 2012, 618 Pa. 1)✓Busanet, a drug dealer, followed an unarmed rival down the street after saying he would kill him and fired at him; the court held self-defense and imperfect self-defense had no arguable merit under 18 Pa.C.S. 505(b) because he began the encounter and could have retreated safely.
Commonwealth v. Rivera (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 2009, 603 Pa. 340)✓Rivera fatally shot a plainclothes officer who chased him after he fired a gun in a crowded parking lot; the court held the Commonwealth disproved self-defense under 18 Pa.C.S. 505: the officer used no unlawful force, Rivera provoked the encounter, and could have kept running.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Pennsylvania Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Title 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure)

§ 8340.2Civil immunity for use of forceIn forcecited in 4 of our articles

(a) General rule.--An actor who uses force: (1) in self-protection as provided in 18 Pa.C.S. § 505 (relating to use of force in self-protection); (2) in the protection of other persons as provided in 18 Pa.C.S. § 506 (relating to use of force for the protection of other persons); (3) for the protection of property as provided in 18 Pa.C.S. § 507 (relating to use of force for the protection of property); (4) in law enforcement as provided in 18 Pa.C.S. § 508 (relating to use of force in law enforcement); or (5) consistent with the actor's special responsibility for care, discipline or safety of others as provided in 18 Pa.C.S. § 509 (relating to use of force by persons with special responsibility for care, discipline or safety of others) is justified in using such force and shall be immune from civil liability for personal injuries sustained by a perpetrator which were caused by the acts or omissions of the actor as a result of the use of force.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at palegis.us

Rhode Island General Laws, Title 11: Criminal Offenses, Chapter 11-8: Burglary and Breaking and Entering

§ 11-8-8Injury or death — DefenseIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

In the event that any person shall die or shall sustain a personal injury in any way or for any cause while in the commission of any criminal offense enumerated in §§ 11-8-2 — 11-8-6, it shall be rebuttably presumed as a matter of law in any civil or criminal proceeding that the owner, tenant, or occupier of the place where the offense was committed acted by reasonable means in self-defense and in the reasonable belief that the person engaged in the criminal offense was about to inflict great bodily harm or death upon that person or any other individual lawfully in the place where the criminal offense was committed. There shall be no duty on the part of an owner, tenant, or occupier to retreat from any person engaged in the commission of any criminal offense enumerated in §§ 11-8-2 — 11-8-6.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at webserver.rilegislature.gov

Also relied on in: Rhode Island Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)

South Carolina Code of Laws, Title 16: CRIMES AND OFFENSES

§ 16-11-440Presumption of reasonable fear of imminent peril when using deadly force against another unlawfully entering residence, occupied vehicle or place of businessIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

(A) A person is presumed to have a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to himself or another person when using deadly force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury to another person if the person: (1) against whom the deadly force is used is in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or has unlawfully and forcibly entered a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if he removes or is attempting to remove another person against his will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and (2) who uses deadly force knows or has reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act is occurring or has occurred.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at scstatehouse.gov

Cited in 43 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Jones (2016) read Section 16-11-440(C) to cover a person attacked in her own residence by a cohabitant, holding a residence counts as another place where she has a right to be. State v. Manning (2016) found no abuse of discretion in denying immunity under subsections (A) and (C) where the victim was an invited, unarmed guest.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Manning (Supreme Court of South Carolina 2016, 418 S.C. 38)✓Manning shot his girlfriend, an invited guest in his home. Applying section 16-11-440, the court held subsection (A)'s presumption did not apply because she was lawfully present, and that denying immunity under subsection (C) was no abuse of discretion since she was unarmed.
State v. Glenn (Supreme Court of South Carolina 2019)“…l and forcible act is occurring or has occurred. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-440(A) (2015). The presumption of subsectio…”
State v. Jones (Supreme Court of South Carolina 2016, 416 S.C. 283)✓Jones fatally stabbed her live-in boyfriend inside the apartment they shared. The court held that a person's own residence qualifies as another place where he has a right to be under subsection (C), and affirmed her pretrial immunity from prosecution.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: South Carolina Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

South Dakota Codified Laws, Chapter 22-18: ASSAULTS AND PERSONAL INJURIES

§ 22-18-4.1Deadly force--Defense of person.In forcecited in 4 of our articles

A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if the person reasonably believes that using or threatening to use deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself, herself, or another, or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this section does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground, if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is: (1) Not engaged in a criminal activity; and (2) In a place where the person has a right to be.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at sdlegislature.gov

Cited in 4 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Braveheart (South Dakota Supreme Court 2026, 2026 S.D. 36)“…it within the statutes themselves. Under the provisions of SDCL 22-18-4.1 and SDCL 22-18- 4.2, a person using de…”
State v. Bendel (South Dakota Supreme Court 2026, 2026 S.D. 35)“…The justifiable use of deadly force is defined in SDCL 22-18-4.1. That statute reads, in its entirety:…”
Anderson v. Streeter (South Dakota Supreme Court 2026, 2026 S.D. 17)“…justified in exercising deadly force in self-defense under SDCL 22-18-4.1 and was immune from civil liability un…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: South Dakota Supreme Court Affirms Stand Your Ground Immunity in Bunker-Community Shooting, South Dakota Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

Tennessee Code Annotated

§ 39-11-611Self-defense.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

(a) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (1) “Business” means a commercial enterprise or establishment owned by a person as all or part of the person's livelihood or is under the owner's control or who is an employee or agent of the owner with responsibility for…

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library

Cited in 300 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State of Tennessee v. Joseph Wert (2025) applied the residential presumption in subsection (c) to require an actual unlawful and forcible entry, so a shooting on adjacent land did not qualify. State v. Sims (2001) held a defendant who provoked the encounter by burglary was not entitled to a self-defense instruction.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Sims (Tennessee Supreme Court 2001, 45 S.W.3d 1)✓Sims shot a homeowner who interrupted his burglary; the court held he got no self-defense charge because under 39-11-611(d) he provoked the encounter and never abandoned it, and that charging the subsection (b) residential presumption for the victim was harmless error.
State of Tennessee v. Ledarren S. Hawkins (Tennessee Supreme Court 2013, 406 S.W.3d 121)✓Hawkins fired a shotgun at a man who approached him during a parking lot brawl; applying 39-11-611, the court agreed the proof fairly raised self-defense, which the jury was charged on, but held it did not raise defense of a third person under 39-11-612.
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Wert (Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee 2025)✓Wert shot a man about ninety-five feet from his house after being punched outside; the court held the 39-11-611(c) castle doctrine presumption did not apply because the statute requires an actual unlawful entry into the residence, not force used on the surrounding land.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Tennessee Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

Texas Penal Code

§ 9.31SELF-DEFENSEIn forcecited in 3 of our articles

(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. The actor's belief that the force was immediately necessary as described by this subsection is presumed to be reasonable if the actor: (1) knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the force was used: (A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor's occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; (B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was attempting to remove unlawfully and with force, the actor from the actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; or (C) was committing or attempting to commit aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery; (2) did not provoke the person against whom the force was used; and (3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating…

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at statutes.capitol.texas.gov

Cited in 520 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Morales, Jose Manuel (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas 2011, 357 S.W.3d 1)“…involve deadly force were also added. See Tex. Penal Code § 9.31(e), (f); Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 1, §…”
Elizondo, Jose Guadalupe Rodriguez (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas 2016, 487 S.W.3d 185)“…ti 2014). . Id. at *7. . Id. at *8, . Texas Penal Code § 9.31(a). . Texas Penal Code §§ 9.32(a)…”
Boget v. State (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas 2002, 74 S.W.3d 23)“…2 . Id. 3 . Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31 (Vernon 1997). 4…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Texas Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

§ 9.32DEADLY FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PERSONIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

(a) A person is justified in using deadly force against another: (1) if the actor would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.31; and (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary: (A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or (B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at statutes.capitol.texas.gov

Cited in 260 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Morales (2011) held that because the 2007 amendments deleted the general duty to retreat from section 9.32, instructing a jury on such a duty is unauthorized and comments on the weight of the evidence. Gamino (2017) held that producing a gun only to create apprehension is not deadly force, so section 9.31 rather than 9.32 applied.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Morales, Jose Manuel (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas 2011, 357 S.W.3d 1)✓Morales shot a man who had been fighting his brother in a gang brawl, on conflicting accounts of who beat whom; the court held the 2007 amendments deleted the retreat requirement from 9.32, so a general retreat charge was unauthorized and commented on the weight of the evidence.
Elizondo, Jose Guadalupe Rodriguez (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas 2016, 487 S.W.3d 185)✓Elizondo, an off duty federal agent, shot a nightclub owner who faced him with a gun after a parking lot fight; the court held the provocation instruction should not have been given, and that without it the omitted 9.32(b) presumption language might have affected the jury.
Krajcovic v. State (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas 2013, 393 S.W.3d 282)✓Krajcovic shot a man in his home and sought the no duty to retreat charge that 9.32(c) added on September 1, 2007; the court held that with no affirmative evidence the killing occurred on or after that date, refusing the instruction was not error.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

§ 83.001CIVIL IMMUNITYIn forcecited in 5 of our articles

A defendant who uses force or deadly force that is justified under Chapter 9, Penal Code, is immune from civil liability for personal injury or death that results from the defendant's use of force or deadly force, as applicable.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at statutes.capitol.texas.gov

Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2022

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Dantonio M. Swanson v. State (Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) 2008)“…nt of Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 9.01, 9.31, 9.32 and Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 83.001). 4: Zuliani v. State , 9…”
John Ray Sain v. State (Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) 2007)“…nt of Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 9.01, 9.31, 9.32 and Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 83.001). 4: A person is justified in…”
Morales v. Carrillo (District Court, W.D. Texas 2022)“…ury . . . that results from the [person’s] use of force.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 83.001. Section 9.31 of the Texas Penal Code…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Utah Code, Title 76: Criminal Offenses

§ 76-2-402Force in defense of person -- Forcible felony defined.In forcecited in 4 of our articles

(1) As used in this section: (a) "Forcible felony" means aggravated assault, mayhem, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, rape of a child, object rape, object rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, and aggravated sexual assault as defined in Chapter 5, Offenses Against the Individual, and arson, robbery, and burglary as defined in Chapter 6, Offenses Against Property. (b) "Forcible felony" includes any other felony offense that involves the use of force or violence against an individual that poses a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury. (c) "Forcible felony" does not include burglary of a vehicle, as defined in Section 76-6-204, unless the vehicle is occupied at the time unlawful entry is made or attempted. (2) (a) An individual is justified in threatening or using force against another individual when and to the extent that the individual reasonably believes that force or a threat of force is necessary to defend the individual or another individual against the imminent use of unlawful force.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at le.utah.gov

Cited in 68 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Utah courts have applied the exclusions in Utah Code 76-2-402. State v. Gonzalez (2015) held that evidence of the defendant's words and conduct was enough for a jury to find he was the aggressor and not justified. State v. Silva (2019) addressed whether the felony in progress bar foreclosed self-defense but affirmed on lack of prejudice.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Gonzalez (Utah Supreme Court 2015, 779 Utah Adv. Rep. 124)✓Gonzalez followed a rival gang member into a store restroom, blocked the exit and stabbed him; the court held the evidence let a jury find he was the aggressor, so the section 76-2-402 self-defense justification was unavailable and the directed verdict was properly denied.
State v. Lee (Court of Appeals of Utah 2014, 751 Utah Adv. Rep. 16)“…son against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1) (LexisNexis 2003). But this general…”
State v. Silva (Utah Supreme Court 2019, 456 P.3d 718)✓The trial court barred Silva from arguing perfect self-defense under section 76-2-402(2)(a)(ii) because he was committing felonies when he shot an unarmed man in the back of the head; the court assumed that ruling was error but held it harmless and affirmed.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Utah Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

Vermont Statutes Annotated, Title 13: Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Chapter 53: Homicide

§ 2305Justifiable homicideIn forcecited in 7 of our articles

(a) If a person kills or wounds another under any of the circumstances enumerated below, the person shall be guiltless: (1) in the just and necessary defense of the person’s own life or the life of any other person; (2) if the person reasonably believed that the person, or any other person, was in imminent peril and that it was necessary to repel that peril with deadly force in the forceful or violent suppression of a person attempting to commit murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, burglary, or robbery; or (3) in the case of a law enforcement officer as defined in 20 V.S.A. § 2351(a) using force in compliance with 20 V.S.A. § 2368(b)(1)–(2) and (5) or deadly force in compliance with 20 V.S.A. § 2368(c)(1)–(4) and (6). (b) This section shall not be construed to limit or infringe upon defenses granted at common law. (Amended 1983, No. 23, § 2; 2019, No. 165 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. July 1, 2021; 2021, No. 27, § 4, eff. Oct. 1, 2021; 2021, No. 95 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 21, 2022.)

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.vermont.gov

Cited in 8 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2014

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Vermont treats 13 V.S.A. Section 2305(1) as the self-defense justification in homicide. Under State v. Wheelock (1992), a killing is just and necessary only if the defendant's belief of imminent peril was reasonable, judged with his individual attributes; Wheelock held voluntary intoxication is not one of them.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Ovitt (Supreme Court of Vermont 2005, 178 Vt. 605)✓Ovitt shot his mother's ex-husband in the head and buried the body, claiming self-defense. Addressing that claim under Section 2305(1), the court restated that a defendant must reasonably believe he faced imminent peril, and upheld excluding a violent act seven to nine years old.
State v. Wheelock (Supreme Court of Vermont 1992, 158 Vt. 302)✓Wheelock shot a man at close range during a drug and alcohol binge, believing the victim had a knife. Applying Section 2305(1)'s just and necessary defense standard, the court held a jury may weigh the defendant's traits but must disregard voluntary intoxication, and affirmed.
State v. Camley (Supreme Court of Vermont 1981, 140 Vt. 483)“…f Manosh had been done in self-defense, and was thus, under 13 V.S.A. § 2305, justifiable homicide for which he shou…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: How Long Is a Life Sentence in Vermont? (2026 Guide), Vermont Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground by Case Law & Castle Doctrine (2026)

Revised Code of Washington

§ 9A.16.050Homicide—By other person—When justifiable.In forcecited in 4 of our articles

Homicide is also justifiable when committed either: (1) In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished; or (2) In the actual resistance of an attempt to commit a felony upon the slayer, in his or her presence, or upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode, in which he or she is.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov

West Virginia Code

§ 55-7-22Civil relief for persons resisting certain criminal activities.In forcecited in 7 of our articles

(a) A lawful occupant within a home or other place of residence is justified in using reasonable and proportionate force, including deadly force, against an intruder or attacker to prevent a forcible entry into the home or residence or to terminate the intruder's or attacker's unlawful entry if the occupant reasonably apprehends that the intruder or attacker may kill or inflict serious bodily harm upon the occupant or others in the home or residence or if the occupant reasonably believes that the intruder or attacker intends to commit a felony in the home or residence and the occupant reasonably believes deadly force is necessary. (b) A lawful occupant within a home or other place of residence does not have a duty to retreat from an intruder or attacker in the circumstances described in subsection (a) of this section.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at code.wvlegislature.gov

Also relied on in: West Virginia Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)

Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 939: Crimes

§ 939.48Self-defense and defense of others.In forcecited in 6 of our articles

(1) A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his or her person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself. (1m) (a) In this subsection: 1. “Dwelling” has the meaning given in s. 895.07 (1) (h). 2. “Place of business” means a business that the actor owns or operates.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at docs.legis.wisconsin.gov

Cited in 39 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025

In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Head (2002) held Wis. Stat. 939.48(1) sets a reasonable objective threshold for perfect self-defense: a reasonable belief in unlawful interference and that the force used was necessary. State v. Hamdan (2003) applied it to hold that generalized high-crime fear is not the actual unlawful interference the statute requires.

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

State v. Head (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2002, 255 Wis. 2d 194)✓Head shot her husband after he threatened her during an argument about their daughter. The court held section 939.48(1) requires objectively reasonable beliefs for perfect self-defense, while imperfect self-defense needs only actual beliefs, and ordered a new trial.
State v. Payano (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2009, 2009 WI 86)“…tat. § 904.01 ; Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772 ; see also Wis. Stat. § 939.48 (1) and (4). ¶ 73 In terms of contex…”
State v. Hamdan (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2003, 264 Wis. 2d 433)✓Hamdan, a grocer in a high-crime area, was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon in his store. The court rejected his self-defense privilege because section 939.48 requires an actual unlawful interference, absent that night, but reversed his conviction on other grounds.

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

Also relied on in: Wisconsin Self-Defense Laws: Castle Doctrine & Duty to Retreat (2026)

Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 895: Damages, Liability, And Miscellaneous Provisions Regarding Actions In Courts

§ 895.62Use of force in response to unlawful and forcible entry into a dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business; civil liability immunity.In forcecited in 5 of our articles

(1) In this section: (a) “Actor” means a person who uses force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another person. (b) “Dwelling” has the meaning given in s. 895.07 (1) (h). (c) “Place of business” means a business that the actor owns or operates. (2) Except as provided in sub. (4), an actor is immune from civil liability arising out of his or her use of force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm if the actor reasonably believed that the force was necessary to prevent imminent death or bodily harm to himself or herself or to another person and either of the following applies: (a) The person against whom the force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering the actor’s dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, the actor was on his or her property or present in the dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, and the actor knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring.

Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at docs.legis.wisconsin.gov

Cited in 2 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025

Opinions citing this section in our collection:

Brandon Velez, Plaintiff v. Rachael Eutzy, Erik Slocum, Casey Seigle, and The City of Manchester, N.H., Defendants (District Court, D. New Hampshire 2025, 2025 DNH 061)“…and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8340.2; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-622; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.62(5); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-204(c). Yet,…”
Velez v. Eutzy (District Court, D. New Hampshire 2025)“…at. Ann. § 8340.2; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-622; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.62(5); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-2…”

Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.

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Sources and References

Alabama: Ala. Code Section 13A-3-23(b) (effective until Oct. 1, 2026)(alison.legislature.state.al.us).gov
Alaska: Alaska Stat. Section 11.81.335(b)(5)(www.akleg.gov).gov
Alaska: Alaska Stat. Section 09.65.330(a)-(b)(www.akleg.gov).gov
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sections 13-405(B), 13-411(B), 13-418(B)(www.azleg.gov).gov
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sections 13-411(C)-(D), 13-419(A)-(D)(www.azleg.gov).gov
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Section 13-205(A)(www.azleg.gov).gov
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Section 13-413(www.azleg.gov).gov
Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. Sections 5-2-606(c), 5-2-607(b), as amended by 2021 Ark. Acts 250(www.arkleg.state.ar.us).gov
Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-620(arkleg.state.ar.us).gov
Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. Section 16-120-106, enacted by 2015 Ark. Acts 1073(www.arkleg.state.ar.us).gov
California: Judicial Council of California, CALCRIM 2026, Nos. 505 and 3470(courts.ca.gov).gov
California: Cal. Penal Code Section 198.5(leginfo.legislature.ca.gov).gov
California: Cal.Civ.Code §§ 50,847(a)-(g)(leginfo.legislature.ca.gov).gov
Colorado: Colorado Judicial Branch, COLJI-Crim 2025, H:12 (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704)(www.coloradojudicial.gov).gov
Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 18-1-704.5(2)(olls.info).gov
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 53a-19(b)(www.cga.ct.gov).gov
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Sections 53a-19(b)(1), 53a-20(www.cga.ct.gov).gov
Delaware: 11 Del. C. Section 464(e)(2)(delcode.delaware.gov).gov
District of Columbia: In re Robertson, D.C. Ct. App. Nos. 00-FM-925 & 04-FM-1269, slip op. at 24-25 (Jan. 24, 2008), quoting Gillis v. United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979)(testweb.dccourts.gov).gov
Florida: Fla. Stat. Section 776.012(1)-(2) (2026)(www.leg.state.fl.us).gov
Florida: Fla. Stat. Section 776.013(2)-(3) (2026)(www.leg.state.fl.us).gov
Florida: Fla. Stat. Section 776.032(1)-(2), (4) (2026)(www.leg.state.fl.us).gov
Georgia: Ga. Code Section 16-3-23.1, enacted by 2006 Ga. Laws Act 599 (SB 396)(dlg.usg.edu).gov
Georgia: Medina v. State, S26A0362 (Ga. Mar. 3, 2026) (applying OCGA §§ 16-3-23 and 16-3-24.1)(www.gasupreme.us).gov
Georgia: Ga. Code Section 16-3-24.2, as amended by 2024 Ga. Laws Act 545 (SB 517)(gov.georgia.gov).gov
Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 703-304(5)(b)(data.capitol.hawaii.gov).gov
Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 703-301(1)(data.capitol.hawaii.gov).gov
Idaho: Idaho Code Section 19-202A(3)(legislature.idaho.gov).gov
Idaho: Idaho Code Section 6-808(1)-(2)(legislature.idaho.gov).gov
Illinois: Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal 24-25.09X, Committee Note (citing People v. Hughes and People v. Miller)(ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net).gov
Illinois: 720 ILCS5/7-2(a),2-6(a)(ftp.ilga.gov).gov
Illinois: 720 ILCS 5/7-1(a), 7-2(a)(www.ilga.gov).gov
Illinois: 720 ILCS5/7-1(b),7-2(b),7-3(b)(ftp.ilga.gov).gov
Indiana: Ind. Code Section 35-41-3-2(c)(iga.in.gov).gov
Indiana: Ind. Code Section 35-41-3-2(www.in.gov).gov
Indiana: Ind. Code Section 34-30-31-1; P.L. 107-2019 (HB 1284)(iga.in.gov).gov
Iowa: Iowa Code Section 704.1(3)(www.legis.iowa.gov).gov
Iowa: Iowa Code Section 704.2A(www.legis.iowa.gov).gov
Iowa: Iowa Code Section 704.13(www.legis.iowa.gov).gov
Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. Sections 21-5222(c), 21-5230(www.kslegislature.gov).gov
Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. Sections 21-5223, 21-5224(www.kslegislature.gov).gov
Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 21-5231(a)-(c)(www.kslegislature.gov).gov
Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Sections 503.050(4), 503.055(3)(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Section 503.055(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Section 503.085(1)-(2)(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Sections 14:19(C)-(D), 14:20(C)-(D)(www.legis.la.gov).gov
Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Section 9:2800.19(www.legis.la.gov).gov
Maine: 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Section 108(2)(C)(3)(a)(legislature.maine.gov).gov
Maryland: Shae-Von Edwards v. State, No. 0799, Sept. Term 2023 (Md. App. Ct. Oct. 31, 2025)(www.mdcourts.gov).gov
Maryland: Joiner v. State, No. 1949, Sept. Term 2023 (Md. App. Ct. May 30, 2025)(www.mdcourts.gov).gov
Massachusetts: Massachusetts Model Jury Instructions on Homicide III, notes 81-84 (discussing G.L. c. 278, Section 8A)(www.mass.gov).gov
Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, Section 8A(malegislature.gov).gov
Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.972(www.legislature.mi.gov).gov
Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.951(www.legislature.mi.gov).gov
Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.961(www.legislature.mi.gov).gov
Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 600.2922b(www.legislature.mi.gov).gov
Minnesota: State v. Blevins, 10 N.W.3d 29, 35-40 (Minn. 2024) (discussing State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 402 (Minn. 2001))(mncourts.gov).gov
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Section 609.065(www.revisor.mn.gov).gov
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Section 609.066(3)(www.revisor.mn.gov).gov
Mississippi: Miss. Code Section 97-3-15(4)(billstatus.ls.state.ms.us).gov
Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031.3(www.revisor.mo.gov).gov
Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.074.1(www.revisor.mo.gov).gov
Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-110(mca.legmt.gov).gov
Montana: Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-3-103, 45-2-101(47)(mca.legmt.gov).gov
Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-112(mca.legmt.gov).gov
Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-722(mca.legmt.gov).gov
Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409(4)(b)(nebraskalegislature.gov).gov
Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1416(1)(nebraskalegislature.gov).gov
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.120(2)(www.leg.state.nv.us).gov
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.095(1)(b)(www.leg.state.nv.us).gov
New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:4 III(a)(gc.nh.gov).gov
New Jersey: N.J. Model Criminal Jury Charge, Justification - Self Defense (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4)(www.njcourts.gov).gov
New Mexico: UJI 14-5190 NMRA(supremecourt.nmcourts.gov).gov
New Mexico: UJI 14-5170 NMRA(supremecourt.nmcourts.gov).gov
New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(www.nysenate.gov).gov
New York: N.Y. Penal Law §§ 35.15(2)(a)(i), 35.20(3)(www.nysenate.gov).gov
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a)(www.ncleg.gov).gov
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(www.ncleg.gov).gov
North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-07(2)(b)(2)(ndlegis.gov).gov
Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.09(B)-(C)(codes.ohio.gov).gov
Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.05(B)(2)-(4)(codes.ohio.gov).gov
Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2305.40(B), 2307.221(B)(codes.ohio.gov).gov
Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.25(D)(www.oklegislature.gov).gov
Oregon: State v. James, 350 Or. App. 71, 80 (2026)(ojd.contentdm.oclc.org).gov
Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 161.219, 161.225(www.oregonlegislature.gov).gov
Pennsylvania: 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2.3)-(2.4)(www.palegis.us).gov
Pennsylvania: 42 Pa.C.S. § 8340.2(www.palegis.us).gov
Rhode Island: State v. Urena, No. 2004-199-C.A., slip op. at 8-9 & n.4 (R.I. June 16, 2006) (quoting State v. Quarles)(www.courts.ri.gov).gov
Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-8(webserver.rilegislature.gov).gov
South Carolina: S.C. Code § 16-11-440(C)(www.scstatehouse.gov).gov
South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-18-4.1(sdlegislature.gov).gov
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(b), enacted by 2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 210(capitol.tn.gov).gov
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(c)-(d); 2008 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 1012; 2026 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 886(capitol.tn.gov).gov
Texas: Tex. Penal Code §§ 9.31(e)-(f), 9.32(c)-(d)(statutes.capitol.texas.gov).gov
Texas: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 83.001(statutes.capitol.texas.gov).gov
Utah: Utah Code § 76-2-402(4)(le.utah.gov).gov
Vermont: Vermont Office of Legislative Counsel, Meaning of ‘Necessary’ When Using Force in Self-Defense (Mar. 23, 2022) (discussing State v. Tubbs and State v. Hatcher)(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
Vermont: 13 V.S.A. § 2305(a)(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
Virginia: Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 0753-09-3, slip op. at 4 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2010)(courts.state.va.us).gov
Virginia: Horne v. Commonwealth, No. 1267-22-1, slip op. at 10-11 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2023)(www.courts.state.va.us).gov
Washington: State v. Courtney, No. 76108-1-I, slip op. at 22-25 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2018) (unpublished) (quoting WPIC 16.08)(www.courts.wa.gov).gov
Washington: Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.050(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
West Virginia: W. Va. Code § 55-7-22(b)-(c)(code.wvlegislature.gov).gov
Wisconsin: State v. Wenger, No. 98-1739-CR, slip op. at 7 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1999)(www.wicourts.gov).gov
Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1m)(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov).gov
Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 895.62(2)-(5)(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov).gov
Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-602(e)(wyoleg.gov).gov
Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. § 6-1-204(wyoleg.gov).gov

Stand Your Ground States: Rules in All 50 States and DC

What does stand your ground mean, and how were states classified?

Retreat rule by jurisdiction

What conditions and exceptions limit a no-duty rule?

Does stand your ground create criminal or civil immunity?

How does stand your ground differ from castle doctrine?

Related self-defense guides

Frequently Asked Questions

How many states have stand your ground laws?

Which states require a person to retreat?

Is Wisconsin a stand your ground state?

Does stand your ground mean force is automatically lawful?

Does every stand your ground state provide immunity before trial?

Is castle doctrine the same as stand your ground?

Updates

The Law Behind This Article

Alaska Statutes, Title 11. Criminal Law, Chapter 81. General Provisions

Alaska Statutes, Title 9. Code of Civil Procedure, Chapter 65. Actions, Immunities, Defenses, and Duties

Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 13 (Criminal Code), Chapter 4 (JUSTIFICATION)

Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 13 (Criminal Code), Chapter 2 (GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY)

Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated

California Penal Code

California Civil Code

Colorado Revised Statutes, Title 18: Criminal Code

Connecticut General Statutes, Title 53a (Penal Code), Chapter 951

Delaware Code, Title 11 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure), Chapter 004 (DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY)

Florida Statutes

Official Code of Georgia Annotated

Hawaii Revised Statutes, Chapter 703: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTIFICATION

Idaho Code

Illinois Compiled Statutes Chapter 720, Act 5 (Criminal Code of 2012)

Indiana Code, TITLE 35. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

Indiana Code, TITLE 34. CIVIL LAW AND PROCEDURE

Iowa Code, Chapter 704: FORCE

Kansas Statutes Annotated, Chapter 21: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS

Kentucky Revised Statutes, Chapter 503: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTIFICATION

Louisiana Revised Statutes

Maine Revised Statutes, Title 17-A: MAINE CRIMINAL CODE, Part 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES, Chapter 5: DEFENSES AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES; JUSTIFICATION

Michigan Compiled Laws

Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 609: CRIMINAL CODE

Mississippi Code of 1972 Annotated

Revised Statutes of Missouri, Title XXXVIII (CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT; PEACE OFFICERS AND PUBLIC DEFENDERS), Chapter 563

Montana Code Annotated, Title 45

Montana Code Annotated, Title 27

Nebraska Revised Statutes, Chapter 28: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS

Nevada Revised Statutes, Chapter 200: CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON

Nevada Revised Statutes, Chapter 041: ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS IN PARTICULAR CASES CONCERNING PERSONS

New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, TITLE LXII CRIMINAL CODE, CHAPTER 627 JUSTIFICATION

New York Penal Law

North Carolina General Statutes, Chapter 14: Criminal Law.

Ohio Revised Code

Oregon Revised Statutes, Chapter 161: General Provisions

Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Title 18 (Crimes and Offenses)

Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Title 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure)

Rhode Island General Laws, Title 11: Criminal Offenses, Chapter 11-8: Burglary and Breaking and Entering

South Carolina Code of Laws, Title 16: CRIMES AND OFFENSES

South Dakota Codified Laws, Chapter 22-18: ASSAULTS AND PERSONAL INJURIES

Tennessee Code Annotated

Texas Penal Code

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

Utah Code, Title 76: Criminal Offenses

Vermont Statutes Annotated, Title 13: Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Chapter 53: Homicide

Revised Code of Washington

West Virginia Code

Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 939: Crimes

Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 895: Damages, Liability, And Miscellaneous Provisions Regarding Actions In Courts

Sources and References