New York
New York Grandparents' Rights Laws: Visitation, Custody, and Two Tracks Inside One Statute
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 12, 2026). · Law checked current as of August 12, 2026. · 4 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

No grandparent has automatic visitation rights anywhere in the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), that a fit parent's decision about who spends time with their child gets special constitutional weight, and New York's highest court has confirmed that its own grandparent statute already satisfies that rule, once its two-step structure is understood correctly.
New York's statute, Domestic Relations Law section 72, is unusual because it folds two very different things into one section: an ordinary visitation track and a separate, much harder custody track. Reading the bare text without knowing which subsection governs which situation, and without knowing the case law that explains how each one actually works, is a real source of confusion. This page keeps the two apart.
Information last verified on 2026-08-12 from N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law section 72 and the New York Court of Appeals decisions in E.S. v. P.D. and Matter of Suarez v. Williams. This article has not yet been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.
Do Grandparents Have Visitation Rights in New York?
New York allows grandparent visitation under DRL 72(1), and it is more accessible on its face than many states: a grandparent may petition where a parent has died, or where «circumstances show that conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene,» an open-ended catch-all with no further statutory definition. There is no requirement of a pending divorce the way many other states require.
A second, separate pathway also exists. DRL 240 gives a court discretion to grant grandparent visitation as part of a custody or support order within a matrimonial, meaning divorce, action. This is a narrower route than DRL 72(1)'s independent «equity» petition, because it only applies where a divorce case is already underway.
The Real Standard for Visitation: What E.S. v. P.D. Requires
E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150 (2007), is the New York Court of Appeals decision that explains how DRL 72(1) actually operates after Troxel. The court held the statute facially constitutional and constitutional as applied, describing a two-step inquiry: first, the grandparent must establish standing based on a parent's death or equitable circumstances; second, if standing exists, the court determines whether visitation is in the child's best interest, applying a strong presumption that a fit parent's decision is correct. Because section 72(1)'s standing requirement is narrowly drawn, unlike the «breathtakingly broad» Washington statute struck down in Troxel, which let any person petition, the Court of Appeals held it «necessarily gives the parent's decision presumptive weight» even without the statute saying so in as many words. On the facts of that case, the grandmother, who had lived with and been the child's primary caregiver for years after the mother's death, met that high bar, and the Court of Appeals affirmed her visitation award.

The practical takeaway: New York's visitation standard is not a neutral best-interest test. A fit parent's own decision carries real, court-confirmed weight, and a grandparent needs a genuinely strong case, not simply a wish for more contact, to overcome it.
The Real Standard for Custody: What Matter of Suarez v. Williams Requires
DRL 72(2) is a different provision entirely, addressing grandparent custody, not visitation. It codifies an «extraordinary circumstances» standard, paralleling the common-law Bennett v. Jeffreys doctrine, and defines one qualifying scenario as an extended disruption of custody, including a continuous 24-month or longer period during which a parent voluntarily relinquished care and control of the child to the grandparent, though courts may find extraordinary circumstances existed over a shorter period on the right facts.
Matter of Suarez v. Williams, 26 N.Y.3d 440 (2015), construed this provision directly. The Court of Appeals held that grandparents may establish standing to seek custody under DRL 72(2) based on extraordinary circumstances where the child lived with them for a prolonged period, even if the child also had ongoing contact with a parent during that time. Applying the two-prong Bennett v. Jeffreys framework, extraordinary circumstances first, then best interest, the court held that the statute's 24-month definition does not require that the parent have had no contact with the child during that period; partial, ongoing parental contact does not by itself defeat standing. The court reversed a lower appellate ruling that had dismissed the grandparents' custody petition and sent the case back for further proceedings.
This is a genuinely different, and in some ways more demanding, standard than ordinary visitation: it requires proving extraordinary circumstances, most often an extended period of the grandparent actually raising the child, before the court even reaches a best-interest determination for custody, not just visitation.
Custody vs. Visitation in New York: Keeping the Two Tracks Separate
Because DRL 72 covers both visitation (subsection 1) and custody (subsection 2) inside a single statute, it is easy to blur the two. They should not be blurred. Visitation under 72(1) asks whether a fit parent's decision to limit contact should be overridden for scheduled time with the child; the parent keeps custody either way. Custody under 72(2) asks whether the grandparent should actually take over custodial responsibility, requiring extraordinary circumstances, a materially different and harder showing. New York also has a foster-care-specific custody vehicle, the Kinship Guardianship Assistance Program under Social Services Law section 458-b, which lets a relative caregiver, including a grandparent, become a permanent guardian, but only for a child already in foster care for at least six consecutive months in that relative's home, where return home or adoption are not appropriate; financial status cannot be considered in eligibility. See New York child custody laws and can grandparents get custody for the fuller custody picture.
What Happens to Visitation After Adoption
DRL 72 contains no adoption-cutoff or stepparent-exception language, and the New York Court of Appeals settled the question directly in 1981. In People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320 (1981), a maternal grandmother sought visitation with a grandson whose parents had both died and who had since been adopted by his paternal grandparents. The court held that «on its face, the section encompasses the situation where the child has been adopted,» and it affirmed her visitation award over the adoptive parents' objection.
The adoptive parents had argued that DRL 117 severs all of the child's ties to the natural family. The Court of Appeals rejected that reading, holding that it «interprets section 117 overbroadly and would interfere with the court's ability to protect the best interest of the child,» and that «the rights recognized under section 72 are unaffected by section 117.» DRL 117 repays a careful reading here, because it is not merely an inheritance provision: subdivision 1(a) is a general severance rule under which the birth parents «shall be relieved of all parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for and shall have no rights over such adoptive child or to his property by descent or succession, except as hereinafter stated,» and the stepparent-consent rule in 117(1)(d) and the birth-grandparent rule in 117(1)(e) are carve-outs from it. Paragraph 117(1)(i) then limits that entire subdivision to «the intestate descent and distribution of real and personal property,» while subdivision 2 governs how wills and other instruments are construed. What Sibley held is that nothing in the section «purports to abrogate the interests of the grandparents, and the child, in continued contacts.»
Surviving an adoption is not the same as winning. Sibley stressed that section 72 gives grandparents no automatic right of visitation: the court still decides the case on the best interest of the child, and visitation «may not be awarded when doing so will hinder the adoptive relationship.» The facts of Sibley matter too, since both of the child's parents had died and the adoptive parents were his other grandparents. A grandparent in a different posture, for example where a fit parent remains in the picture after a stepparent adoption, still faces the strong presumption in favor of that parent's decision described in E.S. v. P.D. Review the specific facts with a New York family-law attorney before filing.

How to File for Grandparent Visitation or Custody in New York
DRL 72(1) petitions may be brought in Family Court or Supreme Court as an independent special proceeding, or in some circumstances via habeas corpus, and are available independent of any matrimonial action, a genuinely broad, low-barrier standing provision compared to most states' divorce-or-death-only triggers. The separate DRL 240 visitation pathway, by contrast, requires an existing matrimonial action in Supreme Court. New York does not publish a single statewide filing fee for this type of petition; confirm the current cost with the court where you plan to file.
Before You File: Mediation, Cost, and Realistic Odds
New York's DRL 72(1) is unusually accessible on its face, with no divorce requirement and an open equitable-circumstances standard. But E.S. v. P.D. makes clear that accessibility at the standing stage does not translate into an easy case on the merits; a fit parent's decision still carries a strong, court-confirmed presumption of correctness that a grandparent must overcome with real evidence, not simply a desire for more contact.
Given that presumption, and given how much harder the custody track under DRL 72(2) is by comparison, mediation and a genuine attempt to resolve the disagreement directly with the child's parent are the more realistic first step for most New York families before filing anything in court. Litigation is adversarial toward the parent by design, and pursuing it, especially on the harder custody track, can take real time and take a toll on the family relationship regardless of the outcome.
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Related New York Family Law Resources
For the broader custody picture in this state, see New York child custody laws and New York divorce laws. For the nationwide picture on visitation and the harder custody track, see grandparent visitation rights and can grandparents get custody, and the state-by-state grandparents' rights guide for how New York compares to other states.
Disclaimer
This article provides general information about New York grandparent visitation and custody law. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Grandparent visitation and custody cases are fact-intensive and outcomes depend heavily on the specific family history involved. Verify current statutory text and consult a licensed New York family-law attorney before relying on anything here for a specific situation.

Last updated: 2026-08-12.
Frequently Asked Questions
Do grandparents automatically have visitation rights in New York?
No. Although DRL 72(1)'s standing rule is broad, E.S. v. P.D. confirmed that a fit parent's decision receives a strong presumption of correctness that a grandparent must overcome.
What is the difference between DRL 72(1) and DRL 72(2)?
DRL 72(1) governs ordinary visitation, where the parent keeps custody. DRL 72(2) governs grandparent CUSTODY, a separate and harder track requiring proof of extraordinary circumstances, typically an extended period where a parent voluntarily gave up care of the child to the grandparent.
Can a grandparent get custody in New York if the parent still had some contact with the child?
Possibly. Matter of Suarez v. Williams held that partial, ongoing parental contact during an extended period of grandparent caregiving does not by itself defeat standing to seek custody under DRL 72(2).
Does a grandparent need a pending divorce to file for visitation in New York?
Not under DRL 72(1), which allows filing based on a parent's death or broader equitable circumstances. A separate provision, DRL 240, allows visitation only within an existing divorce case.
Does adoption end a grandparent's visitation rights in New York?
Not automatically. In People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320 (1981), the New York Court of Appeals held that DRL 72 on its face reaches a child who has been adopted and that DRL 117 does not cut off a grandparent's right to seek visitation, and it affirmed a maternal grandmother's visitation award over the adoptive parents' objection. The grandparent still has to satisfy the best-interest standard, and visitation cannot be ordered where it would hinder the adoptive relationship.
Can grandparents get custody through New York's foster care system?
Yes, through the Kinship Guardianship Assistance Program, but only for a child who has already been in foster care for at least six consecutive months in that relative's home.
Updates
Corrected the adoption section: New York's Court of Appeals resolved this in People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard (1981), which held that DRL 72 visitation can survive a child's adoption and that DRL 117 does not cut it off, and the page's description of DRL 117 was corrected to match the statute's actual text.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
New York Domestic Relations Law
§ 72Special proceeding or habeas corpus to obtain visitation rights or custody in respect to certain infant grandchildrenIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Special proceeding or habeas corpus to obtain visitation rights or custody in respect to certain infant grandchildren. 1. Where either or both of the parents of a minor child, residing within this state, is or are deceased, or where circumstances show that conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene, a grandparent or the grandparents of such child may apply to the supreme court by commencing a special proceeding or for a writ of habeas corpus to have such child brought before such court, or may apply to the family court pursuant to subdivision (b) of section six hundred fifty-one of the family court act; and on the return thereof, the court, by order, after due notice to the parent or any other person or party having the care, custody, and control of such child, to be given in such manner as the court shall prescribe, may make such directions as the best interest of the child may require, for visitation rights for such grandparent or grandparents in respect to such child. 2.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov
Cited in 329 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):New York courts treat DRL 72 as a procedural route to standing, not an automatic right to visitation. Wilson v. McGlinchey (2004) affirmed terminating grandparent visitation where family hostility made continued visits contrary to the child's best interest. E.S. v. P.D. (2007) held section 72(1) constitutional on its face and as applied.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Wilson v. McGlinchey (New York Court of Appeals 2004, 2 N.Y. 375)✓Grandparents held stipulated visitation until the parents moved to end it after one visit ended with the mother calling police; the court affirmed termination as in the child's best interest and restated that Domestic Relations Law 72 confers standing, not an automatic right.
- E.S. v. P.D. (New York Court of Appeals 2007, 8 N.Y.3d 150)✓A grandmother who cared for her grandson for nearly five years, three and a half after his mother died, sued when the father evicted her and cut contact; the court affirmed her visitation and held Domestic Relations Law 72(1) constitutional facially and as applied under Troxel.
- The Matter of Ricardo Suarez v. Melissa Williams (New York Court of Appeals 2015, 26 N.Y.3d 440)✓Paternal grandparents who had raised the boy for nearly ten years sought custody after the mother took him back; the court held Domestic Relations Law 72(2) standing does not require that the parent have had no contact, and that extended disruption of custody was extraordinary.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Grandparent Visitation Rights
§ 240Custody and child support; orders of protectionIn forcecited in 4 of our articles
Custody and child support; orders of protection. 1. (a) In any action or proceeding brought (1) to annul a marriage or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, or (2) for a separation, or (3) for a divorce, or (4) to obtain, by a writ of habeas corpus or by petition and order to show cause, the custody of or right to visitation with any child of a marriage, the court shall require verification of the status of any child of the marriage with respect to such child's custody and support, including any prior orders, and shall enter orders for custody and support as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and to the best interests of the child and subject to the provisions of subdivision one-c of this section.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-05 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov
Cited in 1,319 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):New York courts apply Section 240(1-b)'s three-step formula before deviating. Bast v. Rossoff (1998) held the formula governs shared custody cases too and rejected a proportional offset. Smith v. Smith (2014) recalculated a parent's pro rata share under it and sustained a deviation from the presumptive amount as unjust or inappropriate.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Bast v. Rossoff (New York Court of Appeals 1998, 91 N.Y.2d 723)✓Two attorney parents split their daughter's week under a stipulated shared custody schedule, and the lower courts set support using the paragraph (f) factors instead of the formula; the court held the three-step formula must be calculated first and remitted for redetermination.
- Smith v. Smith (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York 2014, 116 A.D.3d 1139)✓After the father was found to be the custodial parent, the court recalculated the mother's presumptive obligation under Domestic Relations Law 240(1-b) at $283.50 weekly, agreed a downward deviation was warranted, but held the reduction to $30 excessive and set $150 weekly.
- Holterman v. Holterman (New York Court of Appeals 2004, 3 N.Y.3d 1)✓A physician paying his ex-wife yearly installments for her share of his medical license's enhanced earnings argued those should come off his income; the court held Domestic Relations Law 240(1-b) allows no such deduction and does not count the award as the recipient's income.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Kyra's Law Explained: New York's Custody-Safety Overhaul Awaits the Governor's Signature, New York Child Support Laws (2026): Guidelines & Calculator, New York Child Custody Laws: Best Interests, Case Law Standards, and Your Rights
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Sources and References
- N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law section 72, Special Proceeding or Habeas Corpus to Obtain Visitation Rights(legislation.nysenate.gov).gov
- N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law section 240, Custody and Child Support; Orders of Protection(nysenate.gov).gov
- N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law section 458-b, Kinship Guardianship Assistance Program(nysenate.gov).gov
- E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150 (2007); Matter of Suarez v. Williams, 26 N.Y.3d 440 (2015)(nycourts.gov).gov
- People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320 (N.Y. 1981) (DRL 72 visitation survives adoption; DRL 117 does not sever it)(courtlistener.com)
- N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law section 117, Effect of Adoption(nysenate.gov)