Grandparents' Rights by State: Visitation Laws and Standards
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 12, 2026). · Law checked current as of August 12, 2026. · 6 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content
Grandparents do not have an automatic legal right to see their grandchildren anywhere in the United States. That single fact is the most commonly misunderstood piece of information in this entire subject area, and it is worth stating before anything else on this page: a fit parent's decision about who spends time with their child is entitled to real constitutional deference, and a grandparent seeking visitation or custody has to overcome that deference in court, not simply ask for it.
This hub exists because the honest answer to «what are grandparents' rights in my state» is genuinely different from state to state, and most of what circulates online flattens that difference in one direction or the other. Some sources oversell grandparents' odds; others undersell how often courts actually do grant these orders under the right facts. The most important thing this hub can tell you is not a single national rule; it is which of five distinct regimes your state actually falls into, because that regime controls almost everything else about whether a petition is realistic.
Information last verified on 2026-08-12, extracted directly from the 51 individual state pages linked in the table below. This article has not yet been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.
The Fit-Parent Presumption Comes First
Before any statute, any standing rule, or any state's particular test, there is a constitutional baseline that applies everywhere in the country: the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects a fit parent's right to make decisions about the care, custody, and control of their own child, and courts must presume a fit parent is acting in that child's best interest. A grandparent does not start on equal footing with a parent in a visitation or custody dispute. The grandparent is asking a court to override, or at least qualify, a decision the Constitution says belongs to the parent first.
That does not mean grandparents never win these cases. Thousands of grandparent-visitation orders are granted every year under the right facts, most often after a parent has died, where an established and undisputed bond already exists, or where the family largely agrees and simply wants an enforceable schedule. What it means is that the starting point everywhere is deference to the parent, not a neutral weighing of what a judge personally thinks would be nice for the child. Both directions of misinformation on this topic are errors: telling a grandparent «you have rights» overstates the law, and telling a grandparent «you have no chance at all» understates it just as badly.
What Troxel v. Granville Actually Requires, and Does Not
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), is the U.S. Supreme Court decision behind essentially every state's current approach, and it is also one of the most consistently oversimplified rulings in family law. Paternal grandparents petitioned for expanded visitation after their son, the children's father, died; the children's mother had not cut off contact, only limited it. Under a Washington statute that let «any person» petition for visitation «at any time» whenever a court thought it would serve the child's best interest, with no threshold showing required at all, a trial court granted the grandparents more visitation than the mother had offered, giving her wishes no special weight. The Supreme Court struck that outcome down, but there was no majority opinion; six justices wrote at least four different rationales. The one proposition that commanded real agreement is narrow: once a fit parent's decision becomes subject to judicial review, a court «must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination.»
What Troxel did not do matters just as much as what it did. It did not require proof of harm to the child as a nationwide constitutional rule; the plurality expressly declined to decide that question, leaving individual states free to require it or not under their own law. It did not strike down grandparent-visitation statutes generally; the ruling applied to one unusually broad Washington law and one specific set of facts, not a blanket rule against these statutes. And it did not set a single nationwide test. Each state has been free to build its own standard on top of that floor, as long as a fit parent's decision receives real, not nominal, weight, which is exactly why the state-by-state picture in the table below looks as varied as it does.
Six Ways States Answer the Same Question
Because Troxel set a floor rather than a single rule, states have built six recognizably different regimes on top of it. These are not official legal categories with the same name in every state's own code; they are patterns that emerge once all 51 state pages behind this hub are compared side by side.
Harm-standard states (13): AK, CT, FL, GA, HI, IL, KS, ND, OK, TN, UT, VA, WA. A grandparent must prove, usually by clear and convincing evidence, that the child would suffer real harm or detriment if visitation were denied. This is the hardest tier to clear. Florida limits standing to a parent's death, disappearance, or incapacity in the first place; Oklahoma's courts have held, on independent state constitutional grounds, that a court cannot even reach a best-interest analysis without a threshold harm showing. Utah arrived here by decision rather than statute text: in Jones v. Jones (2015), its Supreme Court held that a visitation order over a fit parent's objection must survive strict scrutiny, and both of the statute's rebuttal grounds are anchored in harm.
Presumption-rebuttal states (21): AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, DE, DC, IA, IN, LA, MI, MT, NE, NV, NH, NY, OR, RI, SC, TX, WV. These states apply a best-interest test built around a rebuttable presumption that favors the fit parent's own decision, with the exact evidentiary burden (preponderance or clear and convincing) varying by state. California runs presumptions squarely against granting visitation once a parent objects; Oregon's courts have expressly declined to add a separate harm requirement on top of the presumption.
Judicially-narrowed states (12): KY, MD, MA, ME, MO, MS, NC, NJ, NM, OH, PA, WI. In these states, the case is the law. The statute's own text is often bare, vague, or silent on the constitutional threshold, and a state supreme or appellate court has supplied the real controlling standard, sometimes without the legislature ever rewriting the code section to match. Maryland's statute is two sentences long with no mention of harm at all; Koshko v. Haining is what actually governs. North Carolina joined this tier by way of an intermediate appellate decision: Alexander v. Alexander (2021) requires deference to a fit parent's decision under the visitation statutes, though the state supreme court itself has not yet spoken. Treating the bare statute as the operative rule in any of these 12 states is a serious, common error.
Best-interest-surviving states (3): SD, VT, WY. These states have permissive-sounding statutes that read as an easy bar to clear, and no state appellate decision has tested that text against Troxel's special-weight requirement. This does not mean the statute is safe to rely on as written; it means an order granted purely on the bare best-interest language, without a court separately giving the parent's decision real deference, sits on genuinely uncertain constitutional ground. This is where the gap between advocacy-site optimism and actual legal risk is widest, and it is the warning this hub exists in part to deliver.
Statute struck down (1): ID. Idaho stands alone: in Nelson v. Evans (2022), the Idaho Supreme Court held the state's grandparent-visitation statute facially unconstitutional under strict scrutiny and dismissed the case outright rather than remand it. The text still sits in the code, but Idaho currently has no enforceable grandparent-visitation statute, and the legislature has not enacted a replacement.
Unresolved states (1): MN. Minnesota's leading case involved a different kind of petitioner entirely and said so directly; the governing standard for an ordinary grandparent petition remains genuinely unsettled. That is not a gap in this hub's research; it is an honest description of where the law currently stands.
Your own state's tier controls almost everything else about how a real petition would play out, which is why each state gets its own dedicated page rather than being compressed into a single national answer.
Visitation Is Not Custody
Everything above concerns visitation: scheduled contact while a parent keeps legal and physical custody of the child. Seeking actual custody or guardianship is a separate, substantially harder undertaking, because it displaces a parent's custodial rights rather than merely qualifying them. Courts apply an even more protective standard, commonly requiring proof of parental unfitness, extraordinary circumstances, or a formal de facto custodian showing, through a different legal track (guardianship, dependency, or third-party custody) than an ordinary visitation petition follows.
For the full picture on the visitation side, including standing rules, the adoption cutoff, and how a petition actually works nationally, see Grandparent Visitation Rights. For the harder custody and guardianship track specifically, including when it genuinely arises, kinship-care resources, and why it is the most oversold topic in this entire subject area, see Can Grandparents Get Custody? Both pages cover the national legal picture; the state table below covers what actually governs where you live.
What Happens to Visitation After an Adoption
In most states, a final adoption decree severs the child's legal relationship with the birth family on the side of any parent whose rights were terminated, and an existing grandparent-visitation order typically ends along with it. This is the general pattern, though the exact statutory language and its exceptions genuinely vary by state and deserve a state-specific check rather than an assumption either way.
A meaningful number of states carve out an exception for a stepparent or relative adoption, treating it differently from a stranger adoption for this purpose. South Dakota, for example, cuts off visitation only when the child is placed for adoption with someone other than a stepparent or grandparent, and ties that cutoff to placement rather than the final decree. Other states limit any such exception to orders that already existed before the adoption, and a few, like Maryland, have never resolved the question at all. Confirm your state's specific rule on its own page before assuming a stepparent adoption preserves, or ends, an existing order.
Consider Mediation Before You File
Grandparent-visitation and custody litigation is expensive, often takes the better part of a year or more, and puts a grandparent in direct legal conflict with the child's own parent. That adversarial posture carries a real cost regardless of who ultimately wins: even a successful petition can permanently damage the family relationship, and with it, the kind of informal access a grandparent might otherwise have kept. Mediation, family counseling, or simply a direct, calm conversation resolves a meaningful share of these disputes without a filing ever becoming necessary, and it is worth attempting first in nearly every situation, not as a formality before litigation but as a genuinely better outcome when it works. Every state page in the table below repeats this same practical advice before covering the courthouse process, because the honest odds and the honest costs both point the same direction.
Grandparents' Rights by State: Full Comparison Table
The table below reflects each state's own dedicated page, current as of August 2026. «Regime» uses the five categories explained above. «Controlling Authority» is the statute citation, or, for judicially-narrowed states, the case that actually governs. Click a state's name for the full page: exact standing triggers, the real evidentiary standard, the custody track, adoption-cutoff rules, and filing procedure.
| State | Regime | Who Can Petition | Standard to Win | Controlling Authority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | Presumption-rebuttal | Divorce/separation, death, out-of-wedlock birth, remarriage after death | Rebut presumption, clear and convincing | Ala. Code Section 30-3-4.2 |
| Alaska | Harm-standard | Any time, ongoing contact attempted | Clear and convincing proof of detriment | Ross v. Bauman (2015) |
| Arizona | Presumption-rebuttal | Parent's death/absence, divorce, out-of-wedlock birth, in loco parentis | Best interest, special weight to parent | Ariz. Rev. Stat. Section 25-409 |
| Arkansas | Presumption-rebuttal | Death, divorce, marital-status change, out-of-wedlock birth, court-found unfitness, child in non-parent custody | Rebuttable presumption, preponderance to rebut; untested on appeal since Linder | Ark. Code Ann. Section 9-13-103 (Act 679 of 2019) |
| California | Presumption-rebuttal | Barred if parents married and living together, absent listed exceptions | Rebut presumption AGAINST visitation | Cal. Fam. Code Section 3104 |
| Colorado | Presumption-rebuttal | Pending divorce/separation, no custody order, parent's death | Rebut presumption, clear and convincing | Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 14-10-124.4 |
| Connecticut | Harm-standard | Any time, no trigger required | Clear and convincing proof of harm | Roth v. Weston (2002) |
| Delaware | Presumption-rebuttal | Any time, no trigger required | Prove objection unreasonable, clear and convincing | 13 Del. C. Section 2412 |
| District of Columbia | Presumption-rebuttal | Consent, primary caregiving, or exceptional circumstance | Rebut presumption, clear and convincing | D.C. Code Section 16-831.05 |
| Florida | Harm-standard | Both parents deceased/missing/incapacitated, or one plus a violent felony | Clear and convincing proof of unfitness or harm | Fla. Stat. Section 752.011 |
| Georgia | Harm-standard | Divorce, death, remarriage/adoption after death, 6+ months residency | Clear and convincing proof of harm to welfare | O.C.G.A. Section 19-7-3 |
| Hawaii | Harm-standard | Parent incarcerated/died (freestanding); open custody case (secondary) | Significant harm; looser inside a custody case | HRS Section 571-46.3 |
| Idaho | Statute struck down | None; the statute was held void in 2022 | Facially unconstitutional under strict scrutiny | Nelson v. Evans (2022) |
| Illinois | Harm-standard | Death/incompetence/incarceration of a parent, divorce, unmarried parents | Undue harm, rebut presumption | 750 ILCS 5/602.9 |
| Indiana | Presumption-rebuttal | Parent's death, Indiana divorce, out-of-wedlock birth | Special weight to parent, no fixed burden | Ind. Code Section 31-17-5-1 |
| Iowa | Presumption-rebuttal | Death of the grandparent's own child (the parent) | Clear and convincing, rebut presumption | Iowa Code Section 600C.1 |
| Kansas | Harm-standard | 12-month caretaker, familial relationship, or emotional bond | Harm required (3-element test) | K.S.A. 23-3308 |
| Kentucky | Judicially-narrowed | Any time; easier presumption if the parent has died | Clear and convincing, 8-factor test | Walker v. Blair (2012) |
| Louisiana | Presumption-rebuttal | Divorce/separation/unmarried parents, or death/incarceration/6+ months apart | Presumption weighed as a factor | La. Civil Code Art. 136 |
| Maine | Judicially-narrowed | Sufficient existing relationship or compelling state interest | Clear and convincing, parental role plus harm | Rideout v. Riendeau (2000) |
| Maryland | Judicially-narrowed | Any time, no trigger required | Prove unfitness or exceptional circumstances | Koshko v. Haining (2007) |
| Massachusetts | Judicially-narrowed | Divorce, separation, parent's death, out-of-wedlock birth | Preponderance, significant harm | Blixt v. Blixt (2002) |
| Michigan | Presumption-rebuttal | Divorce, death, unmarried parents apart, established custodial environment | Preponderance, rebut presumption | MCL 722.27b |
| Minnesota | Unresolved | Death, divorce/separation, out-of-wedlock birth, 12+ months residency | Unresolved for an ordinary grandparent case | Minn. Stat. Section 257C.08 |
| Mississippi | Judicially-narrowed | Divorce, death, rights termination, 6+ months support/overnight visits | 10-factor test, capped below parent-level | Martin v. Coop (1997) |
| Missouri | Judicially-narrowed | Barred if parents married and together; else 60-day denial plus trigger | Occasional, minimal contact only | Herndon v. Tuhey (1993) |
| Montana | Presumption-rebuttal | Any time (2-year re-filing bar) | Clear and convincing, rebut presumption | Polasek v. Omura (2006) |
| Nebraska | Presumption-rebuttal | Parent's death, pending dissolution, out-of-wedlock birth | Clear and convincing, 3-element test | Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 43-1802 |
| Nevada | Presumption-rebuttal | After a parent already denied visits, plus a relationship trigger | Clear and convincing, rebut presumption | Nev. Rev. Stat. Section 125C.050 |
| New Hampshire | Presumption-rebuttal | Access already restricted at a qualifying event | Special weight to parent's decision | Petition of Lundquist (2016) |
| New Jersey | Judicially-narrowed | Any time, no trigger required | Preponderance, actual harm | Moriarty v. Bradt (2003) |
| New Mexico | Judicially-narrowed | Divorce, death, 3-6 months residency, stepparent adoption | Special factors beyond best interest | Williams v. Williams (2002) |
| New York | Presumption-rebuttal | Parent's death or equitable circumstances | Strong presumption favors parent | E.S. v. P.D. (2007) |
| North Carolina | Judicially-narrowed | Only inside a pending custody case, or post-adoption | Best interest, with court-required deference to the parent | Alexander v. Alexander (2021); N.C.G.S. Section 50-13.2(b1) |
| North Dakota | Harm-standard | Any time, no trigger required | 12-month caretaker, or relationship plus harm | N.D.C.C. ch. 14-09.4 |
| Ohio | Judicially-narrowed | Parent's death, unmarried parents, or existing divorce case | Special weight to parent required | Harrold v. Collier (2005) |
| Oklahoma | Harm-standard | One of nine statutory triggers | Harm or threat of harm, threshold gate | Neal v. Lee (2000) |
| Oregon | Presumption-rebuttal | Child-parent relationship, or 1+ year ongoing relationship | Rebut presumption, no harm required | ORS 109.119 |
| Pennsylvania | Judicially-narrowed | Parent's death, active custody dispute, or 12-month residency | Best-interest factors after standing met | 23 Pa.C.S. Section 5324 |
| Rhode Island | Presumption-rebuttal | Death, divorce, or 30 days of refused visits | Clear and convincing, rebut presumption | R.I. Gen. Laws Section 15-5-24.3 |
| South Carolina | Presumption-rebuttal | Death, divorce, or parents living apart | Clear and convincing, compelling circumstances | Camburn v. Smith (2003) |
| South Dakota | Best-interest-surviving | Any time, no trigger required | Bare best interest, untested against Troxel | SDCL 25-4-52 |
| Tennessee | Harm-standard | One of several enumerated triggers | Danger of substantial harm | Hawk v. Hawk (1993) |
| Texas | Presumption-rebuttal | Parent's death, incarceration, incompetence, or no custody order | Preponderance, significant impairment | Tex. Fam. Code Section 153.433 |
| Utah | Harm-standard | Any time, no trigger required | Strict scrutiny; clear and convincing, parent-like role whose loss threatens substantial harm | Jones v. Jones (2015) |
| Vermont | Best-interest-surviving | Within a pending case, or parent death/incapacity/abandonment | Bare best interest, untested against Troxel | 15 V.S.A. Section 1011 |
| Virginia | Harm-standard | No separate statute; folded into custody provisions | Clear and convincing, actual harm | Va. Code Section 20-124.2 |
| Washington | Harm-standard | 2+ year relationship (or half the child's life) | Dual harm showing, clear and convincing | RCW ch. 26.11 |
| West Virginia | Presumption-rebuttal | Depends on procedural posture (3 tracks) | Presumption if no case pending; lower if pending | W. Va. Code Section 48-10-702 |
| Wisconsin | Judicially-narrowed | Petition in circuit court with notice to parents | Clear and convincing, rebut presumption | Michels v. Lyons (2019) |
| Wyoming | Best-interest-surviving | Any time, no trigger required | Bare best interest, untested against Troxel | Wyo. Stat. Section 20-7-101 |
Where to Go Next
This hub covers the state-by-state comparison. For the deeper national walkthrough of a specific question, see:
- Grandparent Visitation Rights: what Troxel actually requires, standing rules, the adoption cutoff, and the realistic odds nationally.
- Can Grandparents Get Custody?: the separate, harder custody and guardianship track, when it genuinely arises, and kinship-care resources.
For related family-law topics, see Child Custody Laws and Divorce Laws for the state pages covering the broader disputes a grandparent case often sits alongside.
Disclaimer
This hub provides general information comparing how the 50 states and the District of Columbia handle grandparents' visitation and custody rights. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. This is a genuinely fact-intensive, frequently misunderstood area of law, and several states covered here are governed primarily by court decisions that can change without any statutory amendment at all. Confirm current details on the specific state page linked above, or with a licensed family-law attorney in that state, before relying on anything here for an actual filing.
Last updated: 2026-08-12. Regime classifications, standing rules, and citations reflect their published status as of August 2026, extracted directly from each state's own dedicated page.
Frequently Asked Questions
Do grandparents have a legal right to see their grandchildren?
No, not automatically, and not in any state. A fit parent's decision about who spends time with their child gets constitutional deference everywhere in the country, and a grandparent has to file a petition, establish standing under that state's rules, and then overcome the presumption favoring the parent.
What did Troxel v. Granville actually decide?
The Supreme Court struck down, as applied to one family, a Washington statute that let any person petition for visitation at any time with no threshold showing, where the trial court had given the mother's wishes no special weight at all. The Court held a fit parent's decision must get at least some special weight. It expressly declined to require proof of harm nationally, and it did not set one single test every state must follow.
Which states are hardest for a grandparent to win in?
The 13 harm-standard states (Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Washington) require the grandparent to prove, usually by clear and convincing evidence, that the child would suffer real harm without visitation. Several judicially-narrowed states, including Maryland and Missouri, apply similarly demanding case-law standards even though their statutes read more permissively.
Is it easier to get visitation or custody?
Visitation, by a wide margin. Visitation asks a court to qualify a parent's decision about contact while the parent keeps custody. Custody asks a court to displace the parent's custodial rights entirely, so courts apply a stricter standard, typically requiring proof of unfitness or extraordinary circumstances. See Can Grandparents Get Custody? for that separate, harder track.
Does adoption end a grandparent's visitation rights?
Usually, if the adoption is by someone other than a stepparent or another grandparent. Most states cut off an existing order at that point, though a meaningful number of states carve out an exception for a stepparent or relative adoption. The exact rule varies by state; check your state's own page before assuming either way.
How do I find the exact rules for my state?
Use the table above and click your state's name. Each of the 51 linked pages covers that state's specific standing triggers, the real evidentiary standard (including any controlling case law), the custody track, the adoption-cutoff rule, and how to actually file.
Updates
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
State-by-state comparison
Each state guide below is paired with the governing statute our editors adjudicated for it, held in our own legal record and verified against the official source.
Each statute shown is the same adjudicated anchor its state guide renders, independently verified against primary sources. A dash means not yet adjudicated in our record — never that no law exists.
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
California Family Code
§ 3104In forcecited in 3 of our articles
(a) On petition to the court by a grandparent of a minor child, the court may grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparent if the court does both of the following: (1) Finds that there is a preexisting relationship between the grandparent and the grandchild that has engendered a bond such that visitation is in the best interest of the child. (2) Balances the interest of the child in having visitation with the grandparent against the right of the parents to exercise their parental authority. (b) A petition for visitation under this section shall not be filed while the natural or adoptive parents are married, unless one or more of the following circumstances exist: (1) The parents are currently living separately and apart on a permanent or indefinite basis. (2) One of the parents has been absent for more than one month without the other spouse knowing the whereabouts of the absent spouse. (3) One of the parents joins in the petition with the grandparents. (4) The child is not residing with either parent. (5) The child has been adopted by a stepparent. (6) One of the parents is incarcerated or involuntarily institutionalized.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leginfo.legislature.ca.gov
Cited in 20 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):California courts have applied Family Code 3104 to grandparent visitation. In re Marriage of Harris (2004) held section 3104 valid on its face and as applied, with subdivision (f)'s presumption governing when a sole-custody parent objects. Lopez v. Martinez (2000) held a stepparent adoption requires terminating visitation.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Jasmine M. (California Court of Appeal 2014, 228 Cal. App. 4th 953)✓A mother invoked Family Code 3104(f) against grandmother visitation ordered as her dependency case closed; the court held section 3104 does not govern dependency proceedings, so Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4 supplied authority for the exit visitation order.
- In Re Marriage of Harris (California Supreme Court 2004, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 842)✓A sole-custody mother objected to paternal grandparent visitation the father supported; the court held section 3104 governs after a dissolution judgment, upheld it against facial and as-applied attack, and remanded because the trial court ignored subdivision (f)'s presumption.
- Punsly v. Ho (California Court of Appeal 2003, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89)“…as unconstitutional as applied under a companion statute, Family Code section 3104. (In re Marriage of Harris…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: California Grandparents' Rights: Visitation Law Under Family Code 3104, Grandparent Visitation Rights
Kansas Statutes Annotated, Chapter 23: KANSAS FAMILY LAW CODE-REVISED
§ 23-3308Requirements for order of visitation.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) A court may order visitation to a nonparent only if the nonparent proves that: (1) The denial of visitation would result in harm to the child; (2) the nonparent: (A) Is or has been a consistent caretaker as described in subsection (b) within one year of the initiation of the action; or (B) has a substantial relationship with the child as described in subsection (c); and (3) an order of visitation to the nonparent is in the best interest of the child applying the factors in K.S.A. 2025 Supp. 23-3315, and amendments thereto.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ksrevisor.gov
Also relied on in: Kansas Grandparents' Rights: The 2024 Nonparent Visitation Law
Maryland Code, Family Law Article
§ 9-102In forcecited in 2 of our articles
§9–102. An equity court may: (1) consider a petition for reasonable visitation of a grandchild by a grandparent; and (2) if the court finds it to be in the best interests of the child, grant visitation rights to the grandparent.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at mgaleg.maryland.gov
Cited in 2 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2003
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Herrick v. Wain (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 2003, 154 Md. App. 222)“…aint for reasonable visitation by a grandparent pursuant to Md.Code Ann., Fam. Law § 9-102 (2008). Herrick filed an answer to the…”
- L.F.M. v. Department of Social Services (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 1986, 67 Md. App. 379)“…8 . This statute is found in its present form in Md.Code Ann., Family Law Section 9-102 (1984). 9 . We not…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Maryland Grandparents' Rights: The Koshko Standard Behind a Bare Statute
Michigan Compiled Laws
§ 722.27bOrder for grandparenting time; circumstances; acknowledgment of parentage; commencement of action; procedures; affidavit; basis for entry of order; best interests of child; alternative dispute resolution; frequency of filing complaint or motion seeking order; attorney fees; order prohibiting change of domicile of child; effect of entry of order; modifying or terminating order; record; termination of grandparent's right to commence actionIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
(1) A child's grandparent may seek a grandparenting time order under 1 or more of the following circumstances: (a) An action for divorce, separate maintenance, or annulment involving the child's parents is pending before the court. (b) The child's parents are divorced, separated under a judgment of separate maintenance, or have had their marriage annulled. (c) The child's parent who is a child of the grandparents is deceased. (d) The child's parents have never been married, they are not residing in the same household, and paternity has been established by the completion of an acknowledgment of parentage under the acknowledgment of parentage act, 1996 PA 305, MCL 722.1001 to 722.1013, by an order of filiation entered under the paternity act, 1956 PA 205, MCL 722.711 to 722.730, or by a determination by a court of competent jurisdiction that the individual is the father of the child. (e) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (13), legal custody of the child has been given to a person other than the child's parent, or the child is placed outside of and does not reside in the home of a parent.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.mi.gov
Cited in 58 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):DeRose v. DeRose (2003) held an earlier version of MCL 722.27b unconstitutional under Troxel because it gave no deference to a fit parent's decision, prompting the 2004 rewrite. Varran v. Granneman (2015) rejected a facial challenge to the rewritten statute, holding its substantial-risk-of-harm showing gives parents sufficient deference.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Hunter v. Hunter (Michigan Supreme Court 2009, 484 Mich. 247)“…one provision in the CCA refers to parental fitness at all. MCL 722.27b requires a court considering whether to…”
- Frame v. Nehls (Michigan Supreme Court 1996, 452 Mich. 171)✓A paternal grandfather sought visitation after a paternity action established his son's fatherhood. The Michigan Supreme Court held a paternity case is not a child custody dispute under MCL 722.27b(2), so he lacked standing, and rejected his equal protection challenge.
- Varran v. Granneman (Michigan Court of Appeals 2015, 312 Mich. App. 591)✓Grandparents who had raised the boy for years won grandparenting time after his father cut back visits. The Michigan Court of Appeals held such an order affects custody and is appealable by right, rejected a facial challenge to MCL 722.27b's preponderance standard, and affirmed.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Michigan Grandparents' Rights: How the Law Was Rebuilt After DeRose
Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 257C: DE FACTO CUSTODIAN AND INTERESTED THIRD PARTY
§ 257C.08RIGHTS OF VISITATION TO UNMARRIED PERSONSIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Subdivision 1. If parent is deceased. If a parent of an unmarried minor child is deceased, the parents and grandparents of the deceased parent may be granted reasonable visitation rights to the unmarried minor child during minority by the district court upon finding that visitation rights would be in the best interests of the child and would not interfere with the parent child relationship. The court shall consider the amount of personal contact between the parents or grandparents of the deceased parent and the child prior to the application. Subd. 2. Family court proceedings.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at revisor.mn.gov
Cited in 14 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Rohmiller v. Hart (2012) held section 257C.08 unambiguous and denied visitation to an aunt outside the classes it lists, adding that she had no common law right because she never stood in loco parentis. Christianson v. Henke (2013) held a filed Recognition of Parentage is a proceeding under subdivision 2.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Christianson v. Henke (Supreme Court of Minnesota 2013, 831 N.W.2d 532)✓The child's unmarried parents signed and filed a Recognition of Parentage instead of litigating paternity; the court held that a filed Recognition of Parentage is a "proceeding" for parentage under 257C.08, subdivision 2, so the district court could order grandmother visitation.
- Soohoo v. Johnson (Supreme Court of Minnesota 2007, 731 N.W.2d 815)✓A former partner who had co-parented two adopted children sought visitation after the couple split; the court upheld 257C.08, subdivision 4, on its face and as applied, but required the petitioner to prove its elements by clear and convincing evidence and struck subdivision 7.
- Rohmiller v. Hart (Supreme Court of Minnesota 2012, 811 N.W.2d 585)✓An aunt who had never stood in loco parentis sought visitation with her deceased twin sister's daughter over the father's objection; the court held 257C.08 unambiguously lists who may petition, aunts are not among them, and no common law or equitable route supplied the right.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Minnesota Grandparents' Rights: An Honestly Unsettled Standard
South Dakota Codified Laws, Chapter 25-4: DIVORCE AND SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
§ 25-4-52Visitation rights for grandparents--Enforcement by circuit court.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
The circuit court may grant grandparents reasonable rights of visitation with their grandchild, with or without petition by the grandparents, if the visitation is in the best interests of the grandchild and: (1) If the visitation will not significantly interfere with the parent- child relationship; or (2) If the parent or custodian of the grandchild has denied or prevented the grandparent reasonable opportunity to visit the grandchild. The circuit court shall issue any orders necessary to enforce or to protect visitation rights granted pursuant to this section. As used in this section, the term grandparents includes great-grandparents.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at sdlegislature.gov
Cited in 12 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2012
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Currey v. Currey (2002) rejected a Troxel challenge to SDCL 25-4-52, treating its final sentence presuming visitation after a parent's death as unconstitutional but severable. Medearis v. Whiting (2005) reversed an award where the trial court presumed visitation was best for the child and gave a fit mother's decision no special weight.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Currey v. Currey (South Dakota Supreme Court 2002, 650 N.W.2d 273)✓After a divorce decree gave the paternal grandparents visitation, the mother moved and asked that SDCL 25-4-52 be declared unconstitutional; the court held the amended statute is not unconstitutional on these facts, and its deceased-parent presumption is invalid but severable.
- Medearis v. Whiting (South Dakota Supreme Court 2005, 695 N.W.2d 226)✓A grandmother won visitation with a four-year-old whose mother had been raped by his father; the court reversed, holding SDCL 25-4-52 was applied unconstitutionally by presuming visitation was in the child's best interests and giving the fit mother's decision no special weight.
- Zimmer v. Zimmer (South Dakota Supreme Court 2010, 781 N.W.2d 482)✓Parents who cut off contact after years of conflict with the grandparents were ordered to allow two week-long visits a year; the court reversed and set out five steps required by SDCL 25-4-52, including a parental presumption and clear and convincing proof of special factors.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: South Dakota Grandparents' Rights: Visitation Law and the Troxel Gap
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Sources and References
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), official bound-volume opinion(supremecourt.gov).gov
- Fla. Stat. Section 752.011, Grandparent Visitation Rights(leg.state.fl.us).gov
- Md. Code, Family Law Section 9-102, Visitation of Grandchild by Grandparent(mgaleg.maryland.gov).gov
- South Dakota Codified Laws 25-4-52, Grandparent Visitation Rights(sdlegislature.gov).gov
- Minn. Stat. Section 257C.08, Grandparent Visitation(www.revisor.mn.gov).gov
- California Family Code Section 3104, Grandparent visitation petition(leginfo.legislature.ca.gov).gov