Vermont
Vermont Employee Monitoring Laws: Workplace Surveillance and Social Media (2026)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 17, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 17, 2026. · 8 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

Vermont employers can generally monitor work email, phone lines, and company computer systems without a state-mandated notice step, but they cannot demand an employee's personal social media password. Vermont's one genuinely state-specific employee monitoring statute, 21 V.S.A. section 495l, draws that line clearly, while most other workplace monitoring questions in Vermont are governed by federal law, general criminal statutes, and a new comprehensive privacy act that excludes the workplace.
This article provides general legal information about Vermont employee monitoring law as of July 9, 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Consult a Vermont-licensed attorney about your specific situation.
Scope: This article covers Vermont law on an employer's authority to monitor employees, access personal social media, and conduct workplace video, GPS, and biometric monitoring. It does not re-derive Vermont's consent-to-record framework (see our Vermont recording laws guide) or GPS law outside employment (see our Vermont GPS tracking laws guide).
The Federal Baseline: the "Ordinary Course of Business" Exception
Vermont's starting point for any workplace monitoring question is federal, not state, law. Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act makes it unlawful to intentionally intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications without consent, 18 U.S.C. sections 2510 to 2523, but it excludes employer-furnished communications equipment from the Act's definition of a covered device when that equipment is used in the ordinary course of business. Under this business-extension exemption, 18 U.S.C. section 2510(5)(a), a doctrine courts extend to employers who own the phone, email, and computer systems staff use, monitoring communications on systems an employer furnishes for business use generally falls outside the Act's definition of an interception altogether.
The leading case applying this exception is Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983): an employer monitored a sales line as part of a standing training program, and the court held that once a call is identified as personal, the exception generally ends and continued listening can create liability. Vermont has not enacted a statute narrowing or expanding this federal baseline, so it fills the gap for most employers.
Does Vermont Require Notice Before Electronic Monitoring?
No, not currently. A small group of states, Connecticut, Delaware, New York, and Maine, require employers to give employees written or posted notice before monitoring phone, email, or internet use on the job. Vermont has not enacted a comparable statute, so an employer monitoring company email, internet use, or phone lines on employer-owned systems can generally do so relying on the federal ordinary-course exception above, without a state-mandated notice or acknowledgment step.
Vermont lawmakers have considered joining that group. House Bill H.262, introduced in February 2025, would require detailed advance notice before electronic monitoring, ban monitoring in private spaces and off duty, and restrict facial, voice, and emotion-recognition technology. It remains assigned to the House Committee on General and Housing with no floor vote and no Governor's signature. It is not current law, but it is worth watching, since Vermont, like Maine before it, has shown a willingness to legislate here.
Vermont's Social Media Privacy Law for Employees
Vermont's one genuinely state-specific employee monitoring statute is 21 V.S.A. section 495l, effective January 1, 2018. It prohibits an employer from requiring, requesting, or coercing an employee or applicant to disclose a personal social media password, hand over an unlocked device so the employer can access such an account, access the account in the employer's presence, divulge its content, or change its privacy settings to increase third-party access, and it bars requiring an employee to add a supervisor as a contact. "Social media account" is defined broadly, but it excludes an account provided by the employer or intended primarily for the employer's business use.

The statute has real exceptions. An employer may request specifically identified content when it has information relevant to a harassment, threat, or misconduct investigation, or an unauthorized transfer of proprietary or financial information, or when disclosure is required by law. It does not limit an employer's ordinary authority over employer-issued devices, including a laptop password. No employee waiver is valid, and the statute bars retaliation against anyone who exercises these rights.
Enforcement runs through Vermont's broader Fair Employment Practices framework. Under 21 V.S.A. section 495b, the Attorney General or a State's Attorney can bring an enforcement action seeking civil penalties, and the same section gives an aggrieved employee a private right of action directly in Superior Court for compensatory and punitive damages, reinstatement, and attorney's fees, a materially stronger remedy than the small civil fines some other states impose for similar laws.
GPS and Vehicle Tracking of Vermont Employees
Vermont has not enacted a dedicated employer vehicle-tracking notice statute comparable to New Jersey's N.J. Stat. section 34:6B-22. The relevant general-purpose law is Vermont's stalking statute, 13 V.S.A. sections 1061 and 1062. Section 1061 defines "course of conduct" to include acts in which a person follows, monitors, or surveils another person, and provides that the definition applies to acts conducted directly or indirectly, and "by any action, method, device, or means." That wording is broad enough on its face to reach electronic and GPS-based tracking. Section 1062 then makes it a crime to purposefully engage in that conduct toward a person in a way that would cause a reasonable person to fear for their safety or suffer substantial emotional distress.
Because the statute targets unauthorized surveillance of another person, an employer tracking a vehicle it owns is not engaged in the unwanted monitoring the stalking law addresses; it is tracking its own property. That practical owner-consent framework means Vermont employees generally cannot stop an employer from GPS-tracking a company vehicle, and no statute imposes a special advance-notice duty before doing so. The analysis can get more complicated when an employee also uses the vehicle off duty. For the fuller framework governing tracking devices in Vermont, see our Vermont GPS tracking laws guide.
Video and Audio Surveillance in Vermont Workplaces
Vermont has no employment-specific video-surveillance statute, and it is unusual in another respect: it has no general criminal wiretap or eavesdropping statute governing in-person conversations at all. Its consent framework for recording rests instead on the federal default under 18 U.S.C. section 2511(2)(d), which lets a participant in a conversation record it, plus Vermont constitutional privacy doctrine and narrowly targeted criminal statutes, a meaningfully different foundation than most states. Our Vermont recording laws guide and its workplace page cover that framework in full; this article does not re-derive it.
What Vermont does have is a targeted criminal voyeurism statute, 13 V.S.A. section 2605, prohibiting intentionally viewing, photographing, filming, or recording a person's intimate areas without consent in a place with a reasonable expectation of privacy, and separately prohibiting covert surveillance or recording within a home without consent. An employer installing a camera in a restroom, locker room, or changing area, even for loss-prevention reasons, faces criminal and civil liability regardless of a posted policy. Cameras in ordinary work areas are generally permissible without a state-specific notice requirement, subject to the reasonableness limits Vermont courts apply to invasion-of-privacy claims.
Biometric Monitoring and Vermont's New Data Privacy Law
Employers increasingly use fingerprint or facial-recognition time clocks, and in trucking, driver-facing cameras that can capture biometric identifiers. Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14, is the strongest law of this kind nationally, requiring written consent before collection and creating a private right of action; it does not apply outside Illinois, and Vermont has no comparable statute. Vermont's biometric protection currently comes indirectly, through its security-breach-notification law, which counts biometric data as personally identifiable information and triggers notice duties if exposed, and its data-broker registration law, which requires registered brokers to disclose biometric-data practices.

Vermont also enacted a broad new consumer privacy law in 2026, the Vermont Data Privacy and Online Surveillance Act, signed by Governor Phil Scott as Act 145 (S.71) on June 16, 2026, and taking effect on January 1, 2028. The Act gives consumers rights to access, correct, delete, and opt out of certain processing of personal data, including biometric identifiers, enforced solely by the Attorney General with no private right of action. Critically, its "consumer" definition was revised to exclude an individual acting in a commercial or employment context, so a Vermont employee's fingerprint or face scan for a workplace time clock generally falls outside its protections, as in several other states. Vermont employees are protected mainly by employer policy and common-law privacy claims rather than a dedicated statute. See our Vermont data privacy laws guide and its biometric privacy page for the consumer-facing rules.
What Vermont Employees Can Do About Monitoring Concerns
An employee who believes an employer crossed a legal line has a few concrete options. A demand for a social media password, or retaliation for refusing one, can support a claim under 21 V.S.A. section 495l, enforceable by the Attorney General or directly by the employee in Superior Court under section 495b, with the possibility of damages, reinstatement, and attorney's fees. A camera in a restroom or locker room can support both a police report under Vermont's voyeurism statute and a civil invasion-of-privacy claim. Monitoring tied to a protected characteristic or retaliation for a workers' compensation claim may fall under the Vermont Human Rights Commission or the National Labor Relations Board instead.
Because Vermont's monitoring rules are split across several sources, an employee with a specific fact pattern should keep records and consult a Vermont-licensed employment attorney rather than assume a single statute covers it. For the broader 50-state picture, see our Employee Monitoring Laws by State hub and our general US recording laws guide.
Disclaimer
This article provides general legal information about Vermont employee monitoring law as of July 9, 2026. It is not a substitute for individualized legal advice. Employment monitoring disputes often involve overlapping statutes, employer policy, and federal law, and outcomes depend on specific facts. Readers should consult an attorney licensed in Vermont for advice about a particular situation.
Related articles
- Employee Monitoring Laws by State
- Vermont Recording Laws
- Vermont Workplace Recording Laws
- Vermont GPS Tracking Laws
- Vermont Data Privacy Laws
- Vermont Biometric Privacy Laws
- US Recording Laws by State

Last updated: July 9, 2026. Statutes cited reflect their in-force version as of that date.
More Vermont Laws
Frequently Asked Questions
Can my employer read my work email in Vermont?
Generally yes, once the email is on an employer-owned system. Vermont has no state notice statute, so employers rely on the federal business-extension exemption in 18 U.S.C. section 2510(5)(a), which excludes employer-provided equipment used in the ordinary course of business from the Wiretap Act's definition of an interception device.
Can my employer ask for my Facebook or Instagram password in Vermont?
No, not for personal accounts. 21 V.S.A. section 495l prohibits requiring or requesting a personal social media username or password, except in narrow harassment or legal-compliance investigations.
Does Vermont law require my employer to tell me I'm being monitored?
Not by a current statute. Unlike Connecticut, Delaware, New York, and Maine, Vermont has no general electronic-monitoring notice law. A bill that would create one, H.262, is stuck in a House committee and is not law.
Can my employer GPS track a company vehicle I drive in Vermont?
Generally yes. Vermont's stalking statute, 13 V.S.A. sections 1061 to 1062, targets unauthorized surveillance of another person, and an employer tracking a vehicle it owns is not doing that. No statute requires special notice for company-vehicle GPS tracking.
Is Vermont a one-party consent state for recording conversations at work?
Vermont functions as a one-party consent state, but unusually has no dedicated state wiretap statute at all. The framework rests on the federal ECPA default and Vermont constitutional case law; see our Vermont recording laws guide for the full picture.
Can my employer put a camera in a Vermont workplace restroom or locker room?
No. Vermont's voyeurism statute, 13 V.S.A. section 2605, prohibits recording someone without consent in a place with a reasonable expectation of privacy, and this applies to employer-installed cameras like anyone else's.
Does Vermont's new privacy law give me rights over my workplace monitoring data?
No. The Vermont Data Privacy and Online Surveillance Act (Act 145, effective January 1, 2028) excludes people acting in an employment context from its definition of consumer.
What can I do if my Vermont employer violates the social media password law?
An employee can ask the Attorney General or a State's Attorney to enforce 21 V.S.A. section 495l, or sue directly in Superior Court under section 495b for damages, reinstatement, and attorney's fees.
Updates
Corrected the quotation of Vermont's stalking "course of conduct" definition in 13 V.S.A. section 1061, removed an unsupported claim about why the legislature broadened it, and clarified that all of Act 145 takes effect January 1, 2028.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Corrected the employer 'ordinary course of business' monitoring doctrine, previously misattributed to 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(a)(i) (the service-provider exception), to its actual source: the business-extension exemption in 18 U.S.C. 2510(5)(a).
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Vermont Statutes Annotated, Title 21: Labor, Chapter 5: Employment Practices, Subchapter: FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
§ 495lSocial media account privacy; prohibitionsIn force
(a) As used in this section: (1) “Social media account” means an account with an electronic medium or service through which users create, share, and interact with content, including videos, still photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts, instant or text messages, e-mail, online services or accounts, or internet website profiles or locations. “Social media account” does not include an account provided by an employer or intended to be used primarily on behalf of an employer. (2) “Specifically identified content” means data, information, or other content stored in a social media account that is identified with sufficient particularity to distinguish the individual piece of content being sought from any other data, information, or content stored in the account. “Specifically identified content” shall not include a username, password, or other means of authentication for the purpose of accessing an employee’s or applicant’s social media account.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.vermont.gov
§ 495bPenalties and enforcementIn force
(a)(1) The Attorney General or a State’s Attorney may enforce the provisions of this subchapter by restraining prohibited acts, seeking civil penalties, obtaining assurances of discontinuance, and conducting civil investigations in accordance with the procedures established in 9 V.S.A. §§ 2458–2461 as though an unlawful employment practice were an unfair act in commerce. Any employer, employment agency, or labor organization complained against shall have the same rights and remedies as specified in 9 V.S.A. §§ 2458–2461. The Superior Courts are authorized to impose the same civil penalties and investigation costs and to order other relief to the State of Vermont or an aggrieved employee for violations of this subchapter as they are authorized to impose or order under the provisions of 9 V.S.A. §§ 2458 and 2461 in an unfair act in commerce. In addition, the Superior Courts may order restitution of wages or other benefits on behalf of an employee and may order reinstatement and other appropriate relief on behalf of an employee.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.vermont.gov
Cited in 19 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Whitingham School Board (Supreme Court of Vermont 1981, 140 Vt. 405)“…495, and authorizes enforcement by the attorney general. 21 V.S.A. § 495b. Like its federal counterpart, Title VI…”
- Spooner v. Town of Topsham (Supreme Court of Vermont 2010, 188 Vt. 293)“…for an award of attorney’s fees and costs, as allowed under 21 V.S.A. § 495b(b). The trial court issued *297…”
- Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., Inc. (Supreme Court of Vermont 1992, 160 Vt. 150)“…reasonable attorney’s fees and other appropriate relief.” 21 V.S.A. § 495b(b) (emphasis added). 2 The…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Vermont Statutes Annotated, Title 13: Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Chapter 19: Breach of the Peace; Disturbances, Subchapter: STALKING
§ 1061DefinitionsIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
As used in this subchapter: (1)(A) “Course of conduct” means two or more acts over a period of time, however short, in which a person follows, monitors, surveils, threatens, or makes threats about another person, or interferes with another person’s property. This definition shall apply to acts conducted by the person directly or indirectly, and by any action, method, device, or means. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of “course of conduct.” (B) As used in subdivision (A) of this subdivision (1), threaten shall not be construed to require an express or overt threat. (2) “Emotional distress” means significant mental suffering or distress that may, but does not necessarily, require medical or other professional treatment or counseling. (3) “Reasonable person” means a reasonable person in the victim’s circumstances. (4) “Stalk” means to engage purposefully in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that the person engaging in the conduct knows or should know would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety or the safety of another or would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress. (Added 1993, No.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.vermont.gov
Cited in 13 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Hinchliffe (Supreme Court of Vermont 2009, 186 Vt. 487)“…physical safety or to fear substantial emotional distress, 13 V.S.A. § 1061(1)(B), and defendant argued the State l…”
- C. Paige Hinkson v. Stuart Stevens (Supreme Court of Vermont 2020, 2020 VT 69)“…cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress.” 13 V.S.A. § 1061(4). The civil statute uses identical l…”
- State of Vermont v. Christian J. Noll (Supreme Court of Vermont 2018, 199 A.3d 1054)“…so we do not consider it. All citations in this opinion to 13 V.S.A. §§ 1061-1062 refer to the version effective in…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Vermont GPS Tracking Laws: Is It Legal to Put a Tracker on a Car? (2026)
§ 1062StalkingIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Any person who intentionally stalks another person shall be imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $5,000.00, or both. (Added 1993, No. 95, § 1.)
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-26 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.vermont.gov
Cited in 9 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2020
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Vermont courts have applied 13 V.S.A. 1062 to persistent unwanted contact. State v. Ellis (2009) reversed a stalking conviction because the conduct would not make a reasonable person fear unlawful restraint. State v. Noll (2018) upheld the statute facially, reading it to reach only true threats. Both read definitions amended in 2016.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Ellis (Supreme Court of Vermont 2009, 186 Vt. 232)✓A high school student sent his classmate persistent emails and waited outside her classes after she told him to stop; the court reversed his Section 1062 conviction, holding the conduct would not cause a reasonable person to fear unlawful restraint or bodily injury.
- C. Paige Hinkson v. Stuart Stevens (Supreme Court of Vermont 2020, 2020 VT 69)“…or criminal stalking can be up to two years’ imprisonment. 13 V.S.A. § 1062. Thus, although this defendant does not…”
- State of Vermont v. Christian J. Noll (Supreme Court of Vermont 2018, 199 A.3d 1054)“…Noll appeals from his conviction for stalking pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 1062 (2015). He argues that: (1) the crimina…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Vermont Statutes Annotated, Title 13: Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Chapter 59: Lewdness and Prostitution, Subchapter: LEWD AND INDECENT CONDUCT
§ 2605VoyeurismIn forcecited in 14 of our articles
(a) As used in this section: (1) “Bona fide private investigator or bona fide security guard” means an individual lawfully providing services, whether licensed or unlicensed, pursuant to 26 V.S.A. §§ 3151 and 3151a. (2) “Female breast” means any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola. (3) “Circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy” means circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that his or her intimate areas would not be visible to the public, regardless of whether that person is in a public or private area. This definition includes circumstances in which a person knowingly disrobes in front of another, but does not expect nor give consent for the other person to photograph, film, or record his or her intimate areas. (4) “Intimate areas” means the naked or undergarment-clad genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female breast of a person.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.vermont.gov
Cited in 6 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2022
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):In State v. DEVOID (2010) the Vermont Supreme Court reversed an attempted voyeurism conviction under section 2605(b)(1), holding the evidence could not show the defendant, on the ground, was able to see the complainant's intimate areas as the statute defines them, so looking at her window was not an overt act.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. DEVOID (Supreme Court of Vermont 2010, 188 Vt. 445)✓A man stared up at a second-floor shower window from the parking lot; a photograph taken inside the bathroom showed the complainant's intimate areas, as the statute defines them, were below the sill, so the court reversed his attempted-voyeurism conviction as unsupported.
- State v. Squiers (Supreme Court of Vermont 2006, 179 Vt. 388)“…r any object into the genital or anal opening of another”); 13 V.S.A. § 2605(a)(4) & (b) (prohibiting the viewing or…”
- State v. Beaudoin (Supreme Court of Vermont 2008, 185 Vt. 164)“…ter 1 includes §§ 2601 and 2602 and a section on voyeurism, 13 V.S.A. § 2605. Section 2601 makes it a felony to enga…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Vermont Medical Recording Laws, Vermont Laws on Recording in Public, Vermont School Recording Laws
United States Code Title 18
§ 2510DefinitionsIn forcecited in 126 of our articles
As used in this chapter— “wire communication” means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce; “oral communication” means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic communication; “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States; “intercept” means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.1 So in original. The period probably should be a semicolon.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,382 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):United States v. New York Telephone Co. (1977) held that pen registers fall outside Title III because they do not acquire the contents of a communication as Section 2510(4) and (8) define interception. Forsyth v. Barr (1994) applied the same definitions, treating the defendant officers as law enforcement officers under Section 2510(7).
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Forsyth v. Barr (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1994, 19 F.3d 1527)✓Neighbors tapped an informant's home line and the overheard charges reached Dallas internal affairs; the Fifth Circuit saw no evidence the police defendants intercepted anything and held they were 2510(7) law enforcement officers, so 2517(1) and (2) allowed their use of it.
- Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (Supreme Court of the United States 1977, 433 U.S. 425)“…of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510 et seq. 408 F. Supp., at 363 . We…”
- Gannett Co. v. DePasquale (Supreme Court of the United States 1979, 443 U.S. 368)“…of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. § 2510 et seq., be preserved prior to the d…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Surveillance Camera Laws by State (2026 Guide), US Recording Laws by State (2026): All 50 States Explained, Georgia Recording Laws (2026): One-Party Audio, All-Party Video
§ 2511Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibitedIn forcecited in 422 of our articles
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who— intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication; intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when— such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication; or such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,045 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Griggs-Ryan v. Smith (1990) applied the Section 2511(2)(d) prior-consent exception, treating a tenant repeatedly told that all incoming calls were taped as having impliedly consented. United States v. United States District Court (1972) read the then-current Section 2511(3) as conferring no presidential surveillance power.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Mitchell v. Forsyth (Supreme Court of the United States 1985, 472 U.S. 511)✓The Attorney General authorized a warrantless 1970 national security wiretap that caught the plaintiff's calls; the Court held the since-repealed Section 2511(3) disclaimer left the tap lawful under Title III, and that Mitchell had qualified immunity.
- United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Supreme Court of the United States 1972, 407 U.S. 297)✓The Attorney General approved warrantless wiretaps on members of a domestic group accused of bombing a CIA office; the Court read Section 2511(3) as a congressional disclaimer conferring no surveillance power, then held the Fourth Amendment required prior judicial approval.
- Forsyth v. Barr (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1994, 19 F.3d 1527)✓Dallas police used, in an internal affairs probe of an officer, calls private parties allegedly intercepted illegally; assuming that was unlawful, the Fifth Circuit held Section 2517(1) and (2) allowed the disclosure and use, defeating the Section 2511(1)(c) and (d) claims.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Connecticut Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid Consent Rules Explained, Oregon Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid One-Party and All-Party Rules, Hawaii Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid Consent State Rules
Search our full record of US law — 2.1 million sections, every state + federal →
Sources and References
- 21 V.S.A. section 495l, Social media account privacy; prohibitions(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
- 21 V.S.A. section 495b, Penalties and enforcement (Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act)(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. section 2511, Electronic Communications Privacy Act (party-consent exception at 2511(2)(d))(law.cornell.edu)
- Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983)(law.resource.org)
- 13 V.S.A. section 1061, Definitions (Vermont stalking chapter)(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
- 13 V.S.A. section 1062, Stalking(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
- 13 V.S.A. section 2605, Voyeurism(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
- H.262, An act relating to restricting electronic monitoring of employees and employment-related automated decision systems, Vermont General Assembly bill status(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
- Act 145 (S.71), Vermont Data Privacy and Online Surveillance Act, as enacted(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. section 2510(5)(a), Electronic Communications Privacy Act (business-extension exemption for employer-provided communications equipment used in the ordinary course of business)(uscode.house.gov).gov
- 2015 No. 162 (Adj. Sess.) (S.154), An act relating to stalking, criminal threatening, and enhanced penalties for assault, as enacted (Sec. 5 amending 13 V.S.A. ch. 19, subch. 7)(legislature.vermont.gov)