Supreme Court Rejects "Clean-Hands" Wiretap Loophole, Sends Influencer's Case Back to Sixth Circuit

Supreme Court Rejects "Clean-Hands" Wiretap Loophole, Sends Influencer's Case Back to Sixth Circuit

On June 22, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court granted, vacated, and remanded (GVR'd) Ashley Grayson's murder-for-hire case, No. 25-851, after the Solicitor General conceded a lower court wrongly created a "clean-hands" exception to the federal Wiretap Act's suppression rule.

Information last verified on July 5, 2026. This is a developing story; we update it as the record changes.

Jurisdiction scope: This case involves the federal Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. 2510-2522), which governs interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications and applies nationwide in federal court. It does not itself decide whether a particular state's recording-consent law was violated; those rules are separate and vary from state to state. See our Two-Party Consent States guide for state-by-state rules.

What Happened

Ashley Grayson, a social-media influencer, was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire after prosecutors introduced a secretly recorded FaceTime call as key evidence. According to court filings and reporting on the case, the call was recorded not by law enforcement but by Olivia Johnson, the person Grayson allegedly solicited to carry out the killing; Johnson recorded the conversation herself and it was later obtained by the government.

Grayson moved to suppress the recording at trial, arguing it was intercepted in violation of the federal Wiretap Act and therefore barred from evidence under 18 U.S.C. 2515. The trial court allowed the recording under a "clean-hands" theory, reasoning that suppression should not apply because the government itself played no role in the interception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the clean-hands exception and Grayson's conviction.

Grayson petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. In a brief filed May 12, 2026, the Solicitor General, representing the United States, conceded that the Sixth Circuit had erred in reading a clean-hands exception into Section 2515's suppression rule. The government argued, however, that the error was harmless given the rest of the evidence against Grayson.

On June 22, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Sixth Circuit's judgment, and remanded the case "for further consideration in light of the position asserted by the Solicitor General in his brief for the United States." This procedural move, known as a GVR, does not resolve whether the FaceTime recording is ultimately admissible; it directs the Sixth Circuit to redo its analysis without relying on the clean-hands theory the government itself abandoned.

Justice Alito dissented alone. He agreed with the government's fallback argument that any suppression error was harmless, writing that:

"Even setting aside the FaceTime recording, a mountain of properly admitted evidence proved" Grayson's guilt.

He would have denied further review and let the conviction stand rather than send the case back to the Sixth Circuit.

What the Law Actually Says

The federal Wiretap Act, formally Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 as amended, is codified at 18 U.S.C. 2510 through 2522. Two provisions are central to the Grayson dispute.

18 U.S.C. 2511 prohibits the intentional interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, subject to specific statutory exceptions (such as consent by a party to the call in most circumstances). Our overview of the Federal Wiretap Act and ECPA walks through what the interception ban covers and how it interacts with state consent laws.

18 U.S.C. 2515 is the suppression rule: it states that no part of the contents of an unlawfully intercepted communication, and no evidence derived from it, "may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding" in federal or state court, if disclosure would violate the Act. The Sixth Circuit's clean-hands theory read an unwritten exception into that suppression rule, allowing the recording in because the government had not itself done the intercepting. The Solicitor General's concession that this reasoning was wrong is what triggered the GVR.

The Wiretap Act's interception ban is a floor, not the whole picture. Because federal consent rules interact with, but do not replace, state recording laws, whether a given recording was lawful to make in the first place also depends on which state's consent rule applies. Two-party consent states such as Illinois, Florida, and California generally require all parties to a call to consent before it can be recorded, with narrower exceptions than one-party consent jurisdictions.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

The Grayson GVR is narrow in what it decides but notable in what it removes from circulation. By conceding error, the Solicitor General effectively closed off a theory, a freestanding "clean-hands" carve-out from Section 2515's suppression rule, that the Sixth Circuit had used to admit an intercepted recording without applying the statute's own text. The Supreme Court's order does not hold that the FaceTime recording must be suppressed, nor does it hold that Grayson's conviction is invalid. It simply requires the Sixth Circuit to reconsider the suppression question without relying on the reasoning the government itself has abandoned.

That distinction matters for how this case should be read going forward. A GVR is a procedural signal, not a merits ruling. The Sixth Circuit could still find, on remand, some other basis to admit the recording, or it could find the error harmless, as the government and Justice Alito both argued. Nothing in the June 22, 2026 order forecloses either outcome.

What the order does reinforce is that Section 2515's suppression rule is meant to be applied on its own terms, not supplemented with judge-made exceptions keyed to who did the intercepting. For a site focused on recording law, the underlying reminder is a familiar one: the federal Wiretap Act's suppression rule addresses the use of an unlawfully intercepted communication in court, a distinct question from whether the recording itself was lawful to make under the interception ban in Section 2511 or under the consent rules of the state where it happened.

How This Affects You

This case does not change any state's recording-consent rules, and it does not establish that secretly recorded calls generally are, or are not, admissible in court. Admissibility questions turn on the specific facts of interception, who made the recording, under what circumstances, and which jurisdiction's consent law applied, and on the posture of each case. Anyone with a question about a specific recording or a specific prosecution should consult a licensed attorney rather than rely on this or any other single case as a general rule.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. It covers the federal Wiretap Act and reflects sources verified on July 5, 2026. Laws change and this story is developing; consult a lawyer licensed in your jurisdiction about your specific situation.

Sources

• Supreme Court Order List, June 22, 2026 (608 U.S.)
• No. 25-851, Grayson v. United States, order and Alito dissent (06/22/2026)
• Ashley Grayson v. United States, No. 25-851, docket
• 18 U.S.C. 2515, Prohibition of use as evidence of intercepted wire or oral communications
• 18 U.S.C. 2511, Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited
• Ashley Grayson v. United States, Supreme Court case page, Legal Information Institute

Related articles

• Federal Wiretap Act and ECPA
• Two-Party Consent States
• Illinois Recording Laws: Recording Police
• Florida Recording Laws: Phone Calls
• California Recording Laws: Phone Calls

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Last updated: 2026-07-05. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-07-05.