Washington
Washington Employee Monitoring Laws: Biometric Privacy, Social Media, and Surveillance (2026)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 17, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 17, 2026. · 13 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

Washington employers who monitor company email, phone lines, and computer systems generally start from the same federal baseline as employers nationwide, but Washington layers on more state-specific rules than most states in this series. A social media privacy law, a felony-level voyeurism statute, and, most notably, Washington's own biometric privacy law, RCW 19.375, create a compliance picture that differs in real ways from neighboring states, and one that several national compliance blogs describe inaccurately.
This article provides general legal information about Washington employee monitoring law as of July 9, 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Consult a Washington-licensed attorney about your specific situation.
Scope: This article covers Washington law on an employer's authority to monitor employees, access personal social media, and conduct workplace video, GPS, and biometric monitoring. It does not re-derive Washington's general all-party consent recording rules (see our Washington recording laws guide) or GPS law generally outside employment (see our Washington GPS tracking laws guide).
The Federal Baseline: the "Ordinary Course of Business" Exception
Washington's starting point for any workplace monitoring question is federal law. Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act bars intentionally intercepting wire, oral, or electronic communications without consent (18 U.S.C. § 2511), but 18 U.S.C. section 2510(5)(a) excludes employer-furnished communications equipment from the Act's definition of a covered device when that equipment is used in the ordinary course of business, a business-extension exemption letting employers who own the phone, email, and computer systems their staff use monitor communications on those systems without triggering the Wiretap Act's interception prohibition.
The leading case is Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983): once a monitored call is identified as personal, the ordinary-course exception generally ends and continued listening can create liability. That federal floor governs reviewing stored company email or business calls in Washington like anywhere else. It does not resolve real-time listening or recording, which Washington's own stricter consent statute governs, addressed later in this article.
Does Washington Require Notice Before Electronic Monitoring? The Pending HB 1672
Connecticut, Delaware, New York, and Maine require employers to give notice before monitoring phone, email, or internet use. Washington has not enacted a comparable statute as of July 9, 2026, so employers monitoring their own systems today can generally rely on the federal ordinary-course exception, without a state-mandated notice step.
That could change. House Bill 1672 would require advance written notice before monitoring begins, describing its form, purpose, data collected, and retention period. As reported by the House Labor & Workplace Standards Committee, it would also bar monitoring during off-duty hours or in private spaces, restrict compelled monitoring software on personal devices, and prohibit facial, gait, or emotion recognition technology, enforced by the Department of Labor and Industries with escalating civil penalties up to $10,000 per violation. The Bill Report does not describe a private right of action.
HB 1672 is not law. Introduced January 28, 2025, it cleared committee as a first substitute but did not pass the House before the 2025 session ended. Reintroduced by resolution on January 12, 2026, it remains in House Appropriations as of July 9, 2026. Some compliance vendor sites wrongly describe it as already-effective with a mid-2026 effective date and an employee lawsuit right; it is a pending bill, not a statute. A narrower related bill, HB 2144, on AI-tool notice for performance evaluations, is also still pending.
Washington's Social Media Privacy Law for Employees
RCW 49.44.200 prohibits an employer from requiring an employee or applicant to disclose a personal social media password, requiring account access in the employer's presence, compelling them to add a supervisor as a contact, or requiring a privacy-setting change, and bars discharging, disciplining, or refusing to hire someone who declines. Exceptions let an employer request shared content when investigating specific misconduct information, an unauthorized transfer of proprietary information, or regulatory compliance, so long as it does not demand login credentials directly; the law does not limit authority over employer-provided accounts. It applies to any Washington employer with one or more employees, including state and local government.

RCW 49.44.205 lets an employee or applicant harmed by a violation recover injunctive relief, actual damages, a $500 statutory penalty, and attorney fees and costs. A court that finds the lawsuit frivolous can award the employer its own fees under RCW 4.84.185, a general frivolous-litigation fee-shifting statute enacted in 1983 and last amended in 1991, well before the 2013 social-media-privacy law it is invoked alongside here.
Video and Audio Surveillance in Washington Workplaces
Washington addresses covert cameras through its criminal voyeurism statute, RCW 9A.44.115, rather than a labor law. It protects any place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, including a place where someone could reasonably disrobe without being photographed, language that covers restrooms, locker rooms, and changing areas. Voyeurism in the first degree, a class C felony, requires that the person act "for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person," and that purpose element opens RCW 9A.44.115(2)(a), so it governs both of the prongs that follow it: knowingly viewing, photographing, or filming someone without consent in such a place, and knowingly viewing, photographing, or filming another person's intimate areas without consent. Filming intimate areas with intent to distribute is voyeurism in the second degree, a gross misdemeanor, not a registerable sex offense. Courts may order the images destroyed.
The statute's only express exception is narrow and does not reach private employers: Department of Corrections or local jail personnel viewing, photographing, or filming for security purposes or during an investigation of alleged misconduct by a person in custody. A private employer has no comparable shelter, but the sexual-purpose element still has to be proven, so a restroom or locker-room camera installed purely for loss prevention, with no sexual purpose behind it, does not on the statute's face establish first-degree voyeurism. That is not a green light. Such a camera still supports a civil invasion-of-privacy claim, and if it captures audio it raises separate exposure under RCW 9.73. Cameras in ordinary work areas raise no comparable problem.
Audio is a separate question. Washington is an all-party consent state under RCW 9.73.030, so recording a private conversation generally requires everyone's consent. See our Washington workplace recording guide for that framework; the interaction with employer monitoring authority is addressed later in this article.
GPS and Vehicle Tracking of Washington Employees
Washington has no dedicated employer vehicle-tracking notice statute like New Jersey's N.J. Stat. section 34:6B-22, and recent legislative sessions show no comparable bill advancing. The relevant general law is the stalking statute, RCW 9A.46.110(1)(a)(iv), which makes it a gross misdemeanor, with felony enhancements for prior offenses or an armed offender, to knowingly and without consent install or monitor an electronic tracking device on another person.
Two exceptions matter, and they differ in scope. RCW 9A.46.110(4)(e) exempts an employer-owned device provided for organizational use, but only when its tracking function is limited to recovering lost or stolen items. RCW 9A.46.110(4)(f) is broader: it exempts the owner of fleet vehicles when tracking those vehicles, with no such limitation, so an employer tracking its own company vehicles is generally exempt without notice.
Washington has legislated in adjacent territory worth flagging even though it is not GPS-specific: Governor Bob Ferguson signed HB 2303 on March 11, 2026, effective June 11, 2026, now codified at RCW 49.44.235, barring an employer from requesting, requiring, or coercing an employee or applicant to have a microchip implanted beneath the skin, aside from implants used to diagnose, monitor, treat, or prevent a health condition. The section gives an aggrieved employee a civil action for injunctive relief, actual and punitive damages, and attorney fees. HB 1672, described above, would also fold location tracking into its broader notice regime if enacted. For general tracking-device law outside employment, see our Washington GPS tracking laws guide.
Biometric Monitoring: Washington's Biometric Identifiers Law, RCW 19.375
This is where Washington genuinely stands apart. Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14, requires written consent before any collection of a biometric identifier and creates a private right of action that has produced multimillion-dollar settlements against employers and timeclock vendors. Washington's Biometric Identifiers chapter, RCW 19.375, enacted in 2017, works quite differently.

RCW 19.375.010 defines "biometric identifier" as data generated by automatic measurement of biological characteristics, such as a fingerprint, voiceprint, or eye retinas and irises, used to identify a specific person. It expressly excludes a photograph, video, or audio recording (and data generated from one), plus health data already covered by HIPAA.
The operative duty, RCW 19.375.020, bars enrolling a biometric identifier in a database for a commercial purpose without first providing notice, obtaining consent, or offering a mechanism to prevent that use. "Enroll" means capturing the identifier, converting it to a reference template, and storing it in a matching database.
The nuance most compliance blogs miss is how narrowly RCW 19.375.010 defines "commercial purpose" itself: furtherance of the sale or disclosure to a third party of a biometric identifier for marketing goods or services unrelated to the transaction in which it was first collected, expressly excluding a security or law enforcement purpose. Read literally, a standard timeclock that captures a fingerprint or face template purely to track attendance, and never sells or discloses that data for marketing, does not obviously trigger the notice-and-consent duty at all, a narrower reading than Illinois' BIPA, where consent attaches to collection generally.
That reading carries real caveats. No Washington court has tested how far "commercial purpose" reaches in employment, and routing timeclock data through a third-party vendor's cloud platform can shift the analysis toward disclosure provisions that apply regardless of marketing intent. RCW 19.375.040 excludes financial institutions under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, HIPAA data, and law enforcement authority, but has no express carve-out, either direction, for employment or time-and-attendance uses; the commercial-purpose gate in the definitions, not a topic-based exclusion, is what actually limits the statute here.
Enforcement is the other major divergence from Illinois. RCW 19.375.030 makes a violation an unfair or deceptive act under the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86, but enforcement runs solely through the Washington Attorney General. There is no private right of action; an employee cannot personally sue over a biometric time clock the way an Illinois employee could under BIPA, though a complaint can be filed with the Attorney General's office.
Washington's My Health My Data Act, RCW 19.373, is worth checking separately since it is the state's other major recent privacy statute, but it does not extend to employment. RCW 19.373.010 defines "consumer" to act "only in an individual or household context" and states plainly that "consumer" does not include an individual acting in an employment context. That exclusion means MHMDA's opt-in consent, its consumer health data protections, and its private right of action do not reach data a Washington employer collects about its own employees, including through a wellness program or biometric time clock. There is no meaningful MHMDA connection to employee biometric monitoring; RCW 19.375, narrower and AG-only, remains the only state biometric statute that could reach Washington workplace biometric data at all. See our Washington biometric privacy guide and guide to the My Health My Data Act for how these laws work outside employment.
All-Party Consent and the Ordinary Course of Business Exception
Washington's consent law creates a more interesting interaction with the federal ordinary-course-of-business exception than most states produce. RCW 9.73.030 requires the consent of all participants before a private communication can be recorded or intercepted, and unlike the federal Wiretap Act, it has no business-extension exception. Washington courts read its interception language broadly, reaching real-time listening, not just recording: in State v. Christensen, 153 Wn.2d 186, 102 P.3d 789 (2004), the Washington Supreme Court held that a person who used a cordless phone's speakerphone to listen to another private conversation violated the Privacy Act even without recording, and that a cordless call carries no reduced expectation of privacy.
The practical consequence is that the federal ordinary-course exception, which lets an employer as system owner listen to business calls under federal law, does not by itself satisfy Washington's stricter all-party consent requirement for a live call. An employer generally needs Washington's own consent mechanism. RCW 9.73.030(3) supplies it: consent is deemed given once a party announces, in a reasonably effective manner, that a call is being recorded or monitored, provided the announcement is itself recorded; a person who stays on the line afterward is treated as consenting. That familiar "this call may be monitored" notice, not the federal exception alone, is what Washington employers actually rely on. See our Washington recording laws guide for the full consent framework.
What Washington Employees Can Do About Monitoring Concerns
A demand for a social media password supports a civil claim under RCW 49.44.205 for actual damages, a $500 penalty, and attorney fees. A camera in a restroom or locker room supports a civil invasion-of-privacy claim, and a law enforcement report under the voyeurism statute where the statute's sexual-purpose element is present. A biometric time clock enrolled for a commercial purpose without notice can be reported to the Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division, though it does not support an individual lawsuit. A secretly monitored call without proper notice can support a criminal complaint and a civil claim under the Privacy Act, while monitoring tied to a protected characteristic or concerted activity may fall under the Washington Human Rights Commission or the National Labor Relations Board instead.
Washington's rules are split across criminal law, a narrow social media statute, an even narrower biometric statute, and a pending general notice bill, so an employee with a specific fact pattern should keep records, save any written policy, and consult a Washington-licensed employment attorney. For the broader picture, see our Employee Monitoring Laws by State hub and our general US recording laws guide.
Disclaimer
This article provides general legal information about Washington employee monitoring law as of July 9, 2026. It is not a substitute for individualized legal advice. Washington's monitoring rules are split across several distinct statutes, a pending bill, and federal law, and outcomes depend on specific facts. Readers should consult an attorney licensed in Washington for advice about a particular situation.

Related articles
- Employee Monitoring Laws by State
- Washington Recording Laws
- Washington Workplace Recording Laws
- Washington GPS Tracking Laws
- Washington Biometric Privacy Laws
- Washington Data Privacy Laws
- What Is the Washington My Health My Data Act?
- US Recording Laws by State
Last updated: July 9, 2026. Statutes cited reflect their in-force version as of that date.
More Washington Laws
Frequently Asked Questions
Does Washington require my employer to notify me before monitoring my email or internet use?
Not yet. Washington has no enacted electronic-monitoring notice statute like Connecticut, Delaware, New York, or Maine. House Bill 1672 would create one, but as of July 9, 2026 it remains pending in House Appropriations, not a law.
Can my Washington employer ask for my Instagram or Facebook password?
No, not for a personal account. RCW 49.44.200 prohibits requiring a personal social media password, except in narrow misconduct-investigation or regulatory-compliance circumstances where credentials still cannot be demanded directly.
Can my Washington employer require a fingerprint or face scan for the time clock?
Possibly, without extra notice. RCW 19.375's notice-and-consent duty applies only when a biometric identifier is enrolled 'for a commercial purpose,' defined narrowly as sale or disclosure to a third party for marketing. A purely internal timeclock may fall outside that trigger, and the law is enforced only by the Attorney General, not by employee lawsuit.
Does Washington's My Health My Data Act protect my biometric or health data at work?
No. RCW 19.373.010 defines 'consumer' to exclude an individual acting in an employment context, so the Act's rights do not extend to data an employer collects about its own employees.
Can my employer put a camera in a Washington workplace restroom or locker room?
Practically, no. RCW 9A.44.115 makes first-degree voyeurism a class C felony only when the viewing, photographing, or filming is done 'for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person,' so a camera installed purely for loss prevention would not on the statute's face meet that element. It still exposes the employer to a civil invasion-of-privacy claim, and to separate liability under RCW 9.73 if it records audio. The statute's only exception covers corrections and jail personnel, not private employers.
Can my Washington employer GPS track a company vehicle I drive?
Generally yes. RCW 9A.46.110(4)(f) exempts the owner of fleet vehicles from the general electronic-tracking-device prohibition, with no notice requirement, when tracking a vehicle it owns.
Can my Washington employer secretly record my phone calls?
No, generally not without consent. Washington is an all-party consent state under RCW 9.73.030 with no ordinary-course-of-business exception. Employers typically rely on the statute's consent-by-announcement mechanism instead, such as a recorded notice that a call may be monitored.
Can my Washington employer require me to have a tracking microchip implanted?
No. RCW 49.44.235, effective June 11, 2026, bars employers from requesting, requiring, or coercing a microchip implant beneath an employee's or applicant's skin, aside from implants used to diagnose, monitor, treat, or prevent a health condition. An aggrieved employee may sue for injunctive relief, actual and punitive damages, and attorney fees.
Updates
Corrected the voyeurism section: first-degree voyeurism under RCW 9A.44.115 requires a sexual-gratification purpose that applies to both statutory prongs, so a loss-prevention restroom camera is described accurately as civil invasion-of-privacy and audio-recording exposure rather than automatic felony exposure, and the microchip-implant ban is now cited to its codified section, RCW 49.44.235.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Corrected the claim that RCW 4.84.185 and RCW 49.44.205 were enacted together in 2013. RCW 4.84.185 is a general frivolous-litigation fee-shifting statute dating to 1983 (last amended 1991); only RCW 49.44.205 is from 2013.
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Corrected the employer 'ordinary course of business' monitoring doctrine, previously misattributed to 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(a)(i) (the service-provider exception), to its actual source: the business-extension exemption in 18 U.S.C. 2510(5)(a).
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Revised Code of Washington
§ 9.73.030Intercepting, recording, or divulging private communication—Consent required—Exceptions.In forcecited in 41 of our articles
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it shall be unlawful for any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or the state of Washington, its agencies, and political subdivisions to intercept, or record any: (a) Private communication transmitted by telephone, telegraph, radio, or other device between two or more individuals between points within or without the state by any device electronic or otherwise designed to record and/or transmit said communication regardless how such device is powered or actuated, without first obtaining the consent of all the participants in the communication; (b) Private conversation, by any device electronic or otherwise designed to record or transmit such conversation regardless how the device is powered or actuated without first obtaining the consent of all the persons engaged in the conversation.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
Cited in 221 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Washington courts have policed what counts as a private communication under Sec. 9.73.030: State v. Gunwall (1986) concluded a pen register intercept comes within a private communication transmitted by telephone, while State v. Riley (1993) held a line trap that reveals only the calling number does not record one.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Salinas (Washington Supreme Court 1992, 119 Wash. 2d 192)“…alties for divulging a telegram or opening a sealed letter. RCW 9.73.030-.070, making it unlawful to intercept,…”
- State v. Gunwall (Washington Supreme Court 1986, 106 Wash. 2d 54)✓Everett police pulled a suspected cocaine dealer's toll records and put a pen register on her line without valid legal process; the court held a pen register intercept is a private communication transmitted by telephone, installable only under the eavesdropping statutes.
- State v. Brown (Washington Supreme Court 1997, 132 Wash. 2d 529)✓Palm Springs officers secretly recorded a Washington murder suspect's statements after his arrest; the court treated RCW 9.73.090, not 9.73.030, as the provision reaching recordings of arrested persons, and held the Privacy Act did not require suppressing that recording.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: US Recording Laws by State (2026): All 50 States Explained, Washington Recording Laws (2026): All-Party Consent Rules, Federal Wiretap Act and ECPA: The Complete Guide (2026)
§ 19.375.020Enrollment, disclosure, and retention of biometric identifiers.In forcecited in 9 of our articles
(1) A person may not enroll a biometric identifier in a database for a commercial purpose, without first providing notice, obtaining consent, or providing a mechanism to prevent the subsequent use of a biometric identifier for a commercial purpose. (2) Notice is a disclosure, that is not considered affirmative consent, that is given through a procedure reasonably designed to be readily available to affected individuals. The exact notice and type of consent required to achieve compliance with subsection (1) of this section is context-dependent.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
Also relied on in: Washington Smart Glasses Recording Laws (2026), Washington Data Privacy Laws: My Health My Data Act & More (2026), Washington Biometric Privacy Laws: Collection, Consent & Penalties (2026)
§ 19.375.010Definitions.In forcecited in 4 of our articles
The definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter , unless the context clearly requires otherwise. (1) "Biometric identifier" means data generated by automatic measurements of an individual's biological characteristics, such as a fingerprint, voiceprint, eye retinas, irises, or other unique biological patterns or characteristics that is used to identify a specific individual. "Biometric identifier" does not include a physical or digital photograph, video or audio recording or data generated therefrom, or information collected, used, or stored for health care treatment, payment, or operations under the federal health insurance portability and accountability act of 1996. (2) "Biometric system" means an automated identification system capable of capturing, processing, and storing a biometric identifier, comparing the biometric identifier to one or more references, and matching the biometric identifier to a specific individual. (3) "Capture" means the process of collecting a biometric identifier from an individual.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
§ 19.375.030Application of consumer protection act.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
(1) The legislature finds that the practices covered by this chapter are matters vitally affecting the public interest for the purpose of applying the consumer protection act, chapter 19.86 RCW. A violation of this chapter is not reasonable in relation to the development and preservation of business and is an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce and an unfair method of competition for the purpose of applying the consumer protection act, chapter 19.86 RCW. (2) This chapter may be enforced solely by the attorney general under the consumer protection act, chapter 19.86 RCW.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
Also relied on in: Washington Security Camera Laws: Rules for Home and Business Surveillance (2026)
§ 19.375.040Exclusions.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(1) Nothing in this chapter applies in any manner to a financial institution or an affiliate of a financial institution that is subject to Title V of the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley act of 1999 and the rules promulgated thereunder. (2) Nothing in this chapter applies to activities subject to Title V of the federal health insurance privacy and portability act of 1996 and the rules promulgated thereunder. (3) Nothing in this chapter expands or limits the authority of a law enforcement officer acting within the scope of his or her authority including, but not limited to, the authority of a state law enforcement officer in executing lawful searches and seizures.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
§ 49.44.200Personal social networking accounts—Restrictions on employer access—Definitions.In force
(1) An employer may not: (a) Request, require, or otherwise coerce an employee or applicant to disclose login information for the employee's or applicant's personal social networking account; (b) Request, require, or otherwise coerce an employee or applicant to access his or her personal social networking account in the employer's presence in a manner that enables the employer to observe the contents of the account; (c) Compel or coerce an employee or applicant to add a person, including the employer, to the list of contacts associated with the employee's or applicant's personal social networking account; (d) Request, require, or cause an employee or applicant to alter the settings on his or her personal social networking account that affect a third party's ability to view the contents of the account; or (e) Take adverse action against an employee or applicant because the employee or applicant refuses to disclose his or her login information, access his or her personal social networking account in the employer's presence, add a person to the list of contacts associated with his or her personal social networking account, or alter the settings on his or her personal social…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
Cited in 2 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Branson v. Wash. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC (Washington Supreme Court 2025)“…review denied, 4 Wn.3d 1021 (2025). Additionally, RCW 49.44.200(1) prohibits employers from requesting…”
- Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp. (Washington Supreme Court 2018, 430 P.3d 229)“…her personal social networking account—all in violation of RCW 49.44.200(1)(e). A female Cornwell(Da…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 49.44.205Violations of RCW 49.44.200—Civil action—Remedies.In force
An employee or applicant aggrieved by a violation of RCW 49.44.200 may bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction. The court may: (1) Award a prevailing employee or applicant injunctive or other equitable relief, actual damages, a penalty in the amount of five hundred dollars, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; and (2) Pursuant to RCW 4.84.185, award any prevailing party against whom an action has been brought for a violation of RCW 49.44.200 reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees upon final judgment and written findings by the trial judge that the action was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
Cited in 1 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Branson v. Wash. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC (Washington Supreme Court 2025)“…is provided a private right of action for violations under RCW 49.44.205. If the legislature intended to add a…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 19.373.010Definitions.In forcecited in 6 of our articles
The definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter unless the context clearly requires otherwise. (1) "Abortion" means the termination of a pregnancy for purposes other than producing a live birth. (2) "Affiliate" means a legal entity that shares common branding with another legal entity and controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with another legal entity. For the purposes of this definition, "control" or "controlled" means: (a) Ownership of, or the power to vote, more than 50 percent of the outstanding shares of any class of voting security of a company; (b) Control in any manner over the election of a majority of the directors or of individuals exercising similar functions; or (c) The power to exercise controlling influence over the management of a company. (3) "Authenticate" means to use reasonable means to determine that a request to exercise any of the rights afforded in this chapter is being made by, or on behalf of, the consumer who is entitled to exercise such consumer rights with respect to the consumer health data at issue.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
§ 4.84.185Prevailing party to receive expenses for opposing frivolous action or defense.In force
In any civil action, the court having jurisdiction may, upon written findings by the judge that the action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause, require the nonprevailing party to pay the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, incurred in opposing such action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense. This determination shall be made upon motion by the prevailing party after a voluntary or involuntary order of dismissal, order on summary judgment, final judgment after trial, or other final order terminating the action as to the prevailing party. The judge shall consider all evidence presented at the time of the motion to determine whether the position of the nonprevailing party was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause. In no event may such motion be filed more than thirty days after entry of the order. The provisions of this section apply unless otherwise specifically provided by statute.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
Cited in 411 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley (Washington Supreme Court 1992, 118 Wash. 2d 801)“…warded attorney fees to defendant alternatively pursuant to RCW 4.84.185 and RCW 90.58.230. Plaintiffs so…”
- Biggs v. Vail (Washington Supreme Court 1994, 124 Wash. 2d 193)“…5,000 in attorney fees under the frivolous lawsuit statute, RCW 4.84.185. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judg…”
- Stiles v. Kearney (Court of Appeals of Washington 2012, 168 Wash. App. 250)“…ive challenges to the trial court’s imposition of CR 11 and RCW 4.84.185 sanctions. Discerning no error, we affi…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
United States Code Title 18
§ 2511Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibitedIn forcecited in 422 of our articles
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who— intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication; intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when— such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication; or such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,045 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Griggs-Ryan v. Smith (1990) applied the Section 2511(2)(d) prior-consent exception, treating a tenant repeatedly told that all incoming calls were taped as having impliedly consented. United States v. United States District Court (1972) read the then-current Section 2511(3) as conferring no presidential surveillance power.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Mitchell v. Forsyth (Supreme Court of the United States 1985, 472 U.S. 511)✓The Attorney General authorized a warrantless 1970 national security wiretap that caught the plaintiff's calls; the Court held the since-repealed Section 2511(3) disclaimer left the tap lawful under Title III, and that Mitchell had qualified immunity.
- United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Supreme Court of the United States 1972, 407 U.S. 297)✓The Attorney General approved warrantless wiretaps on members of a domestic group accused of bombing a CIA office; the Court read Section 2511(3) as a congressional disclaimer conferring no surveillance power, then held the Fourth Amendment required prior judicial approval.
- Forsyth v. Barr (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1994, 19 F.3d 1527)✓Dallas police used, in an internal affairs probe of an officer, calls private parties allegedly intercepted illegally; assuming that was unlawful, the Fifth Circuit held Section 2517(1) and (2) allowed the disclosure and use, defeating the Section 2511(1)(c) and (d) claims.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Connecticut Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid Consent Rules Explained, Oregon Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid One-Party and All-Party Rules, Hawaii Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid Consent State Rules
§ 2510DefinitionsIn forcecited in 126 of our articles
As used in this chapter— “wire communication” means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce; “oral communication” means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic communication; “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States; “intercept” means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.1 So in original. The period probably should be a semicolon.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,382 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):United States v. New York Telephone Co. (1977) held that pen registers fall outside Title III because they do not acquire the contents of a communication as Section 2510(4) and (8) define interception. Forsyth v. Barr (1994) applied the same definitions, treating the defendant officers as law enforcement officers under Section 2510(7).
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Forsyth v. Barr (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1994, 19 F.3d 1527)✓Neighbors tapped an informant's home line and the overheard charges reached Dallas internal affairs; the Fifth Circuit saw no evidence the police defendants intercepted anything and held they were 2510(7) law enforcement officers, so 2517(1) and (2) allowed their use of it.
- Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (Supreme Court of the United States 1977, 433 U.S. 425)“…of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510 et seq. 408 F. Supp., at 363 . We…”
- Gannett Co. v. DePasquale (Supreme Court of the United States 1979, 443 U.S. 368)“…of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. § 2510 et seq., be preserved prior to the d…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Surveillance Camera Laws by State (2026 Guide), Georgia Recording Laws (2026): One-Party Audio, All-Party Video, District of Columbia Recording Laws (2026): One-Party Consent Rules
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Sources and References
- RCW 49.44.200, Personal social networking accounts, information, or services(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- RCW 49.44.205, Violations, civil action(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- RCW 19.375.010, Definitions (Biometric Identifiers)(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- RCW 19.375.020, Enrollment, disclosure, and retention of biometric identifiers(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- RCW 19.375.030, Application of consumer protection act(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- RCW 9A.44.115, Voyeurism(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- RCW 9.73.030, Intercepting, recording, or divulging private communication, consent required, exceptions(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- RCW 9A.46.110, Stalking, electronic tracking device, employer and fleet-vehicle exceptions(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- RCW 19.373.010, Definitions (My Health My Data Act, 'consumer' excludes employment context)(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. section 2510(5)(a), Electronic Communications Privacy Act (business-extension exemption for employer-provided communications equipment used in the ordinary course of business)(uscode.house.gov).gov
- Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983)(law.resource.org)
- House Bill 1672 (2025-26), Relating to technology used by employers in the workplace, current status House Appropriations Committee(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- Engrossed Substitute House Bill 2303, Certification of Enrollment (employee microchip implant ban), signed March 11, 2026(lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. § 2511 – Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited(uscode.house.gov).gov
- RCW 49.44.235, Microchipping of employees, prohibition, cause of action, definitions(app.leg.wa.gov)