Libel vs Slander vs Defamation: What's the Difference?

Defamation of character is the umbrella term for a false statement of fact that harms someone's reputation, and it splits into two types: libel, which is defamation in a fixed or permanent form such as writing, print, or an online post, and slander, which is spoken, transitory defamation. The distinction is set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 568, an American Law Institute treatise that courts treat as persuasive authority rather than enacted law, and it still shapes how a plaintiff proves damages. A minority of states write the definitions directly into their codes, including California (Cal. Civ. Code sections 44 to 46) and Montana (Mont. Code Ann. section 27-1-802); in most states libel and slander remain common-law categories.

This guide is part of our Defamation Laws by State series. To go deeper, see the elements of defamation, the defenses to defamation, and how to sue for defamation.

Defamation is the umbrella term

Defamation is the broad legal category for a false statement of fact, communicated to at least one other person, that injures a third party's reputation. Libel and slander are not competing claims; they are the two branches of the same tort, separated only by the form the false statement takes. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 558 sets out the core elements common to both: a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, an unprivileged publication to a third party, the requisite level of fault, and either special harm or actionability without it. So when people ask about the difference between libel and defamation, the accurate answer is that libel is a kind of defamation, not its opposite. The same logic answers what libel, slander, and defamation mean together: defamation is the genus, and libel and slander are its species.

Libel vs slander: the core difference

The difference between libel and slander is the medium, not the message. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 568, libel is the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, or by any other form that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words; slander is the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, transitory gestures, or any form of communication other than those covered by libel. In short, libel is defamation that is fixed and lasting, while slander is defamation that is spoken and fleeting. A defamatory letter, newspaper article, billboard, or photograph is libel; a defamatory remark shouted across a room or said over the phone is slander. The same false accusation, for example claiming a neighbor is a thief, is libel if you post it and slander if you only say it aloud.

Why the libel vs slander distinction matters

The practical reason the distinction survives is damages. At common law, libel was the stronger tort: because written defamation was seen as more deliberate and more enduring, courts presumed reputational harm and let the plaintiff recover without proving any specific economic loss. Slander was treated more cautiously. Outside a narrow set of categories, a slander plaintiff historically had to plead and prove special damages, meaning a concrete pecuniary loss such as a lost job or a lost sale, before the claim could proceed. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 575 reflects this rule, requiring special harm for slander that does not fall within a per se category, while section 569 makes libel actionable without proof of special harm. The Restatement candidly describes the schism between the two as a historical accident that is not sensibly defensible today but is too well settled to uproot.

Watch out: Many states have softened or merged these old rules, and constitutional law overrides them on matters of public concern. Whether harm is presumed in a given case depends on the state and on the plaintiff's public or private status, so the libel/slander label is a starting point, not the final answer.

Libel per se and slander per se

The per se categories are where the libel/slander split has its sharpest effect. A statement is defamatory per se when it is so obviously damaging on its face that courts allow harm to be presumed without extrinsic explanation. For libel, courts have generally held that a writing defamatory on its face is libel per se, while a writing that needs outside facts to reveal its defamatory sting is libel per quod and may require proof of special damages. States diverge on how far that general rule reaches: Colorado's official civil jury instructions record that under Denver Publishing Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893 (Colo. 2002), a statement must also fall into one of the four slander per se categories to sustain a libel per se claim. For slander, the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 570 fixes four traditional categories that are actionable without proof of special harm: imputing a serious crime (section 571), imputing a loathsome disease (section 572), imputing conduct incompatible with the plaintiff's business, trade, profession, or office (section 573), and imputing serious sexual misconduct (section 574). A slander that falls outside these four categories generally requires proof of special damages to be actionable.

Modern examples: tweets, posts, and spoken accusations

Applying the old categories to new media is usually straightforward because the test is whether the statement is fixed. A defamatory tweet, Facebook post, Instagram caption, blog entry, online review, text message, or email is libel, because each is recorded and can be read again by others. A defamatory statement made out loud, such as accusing a coworker of stealing during a meeting or telling a group that a contractor is a fraud, is slander, because the words are transitory. Broadcasts sit in between, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 568A resolves them by treating radio and television defamation as libel in most jurisdictions, whether or not the broadcaster reads from a script. Voicemails, podcasts, and livestream recordings raise the same fixed-versus-transitory question, and courts increasingly classify recorded audio and video as libel because it persists and can be replayed.

How constitutional rules apply to both

Whatever form defamation takes, federal constitutional rules apply equally to libel and slander once the speech touches public officials, public figures, or matters of public concern. Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), a public official must prove the statement was made with actual malice, meaning knowledge that it was false or reckless disregard for whether it was true. That requirement was extended to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), and its companion Associated Press v. Walker; the Court in Gertz later described the step as one announced in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) then set the rule for private plaintiffs, holding that they need only prove fault, generally negligence, to recover actual damages, and that states may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages absent a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) later confined that damages limit to statements on matters of public concern. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) added that there is no separate privilege for opinion: a statement framed as opinion is still actionable if it implies a provably false assertion of fact. To win, a plaintiff must satisfy these constitutional layers in addition to the common-law libel or slander elements.