Defamation Laws by State: Libel and Slander (2026)
Defamation law in the United States is built on a shared federal foundation but turns on state-specific rules, and the two variables that decide most cases are the statute of limitations and whether the state has an anti-SLAPP law. Filing deadlines run from 6 months to 3 years, and 10 jurisdictions have no anti-SLAPP statute at all.
This hub anchors our Defamation Laws by State series, with a deep guide for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. For the underlying concept, see what defamation of character means.
General guide; see the state page for detail.
Common Defamation Questions
These national guides explain how US defamation law works, alongside the state-by-state rules above.
- How to Sue for Defamation of Character (Step by Step)
- Can You Go to Jail for Defamation? Is It a Crime?
- How Much Can You Sue for Defamation?
- Elements of Defamation: What You Must Prove
- Libel vs Slander vs Defamation
- Defenses to Defamation (Is It Defamation If It’s True?)
- Defamation Cease and Desist Letter (and Retraction Demand)
- Can a Public Figure Sue for Defamation? (Actual Malice)
- Is Defamation a Tort? How US Law Classifies It
- Can You Defame a Dead Person? Defamation After Death
What is defamation?
Defamation is a false statement of fact that harms a person's reputation, and across the states a plaintiff generally must prove five elements. First, the statement must be a false statement of fact, not opinion, because a verifiable assertion can be proven true or false while pure opinion is constitutionally protected. Second, the statement must be published, meaning communicated to at least one third party other than the plaintiff. Third, it must be of and concerning the plaintiff, so that a reasonable listener would understand it to refer to that specific person. Fourth, the defendant must have acted with the required degree of fault, either negligence or actual malice depending on the plaintiff's status. Fifth, the statement must have caused damages, although certain categories of statement are defamatory per se and presume harm. Truth, or substantial truth, is a complete defense in every state.
Watch out: Opinion is not actionable. Courts ask whether a reasonable reader would understand the words as stating a verifiable fact rather than a subjective view, so "I think the food was terrible" is protected while "the kitchen failed its health inspection" can be tested for truth.
Libel vs slander
Libel and slander are the two forms of defamation, and the difference is the medium. Libel is defamation in a fixed, lasting form: writing, print, broadcasts, websites, social media posts, and online reviews. Slander is spoken defamation, such as a defamatory remark made aloud in a conversation or at a meeting. Historically courts treated libel as more serious because the written word endures and spreads, so libel was often actionable without proof of special damages while slander generally required the plaintiff to show concrete economic loss unless the words fell into a slander per se category. Most states apply the same statute of limitations to both forms, but a few do not: Arkansas, Rhode Island, and Tennessee set different deadlines for libel and slander, which makes correctly classifying the statement a threshold question in those states. In modern practice, almost all online and media defamation is treated as libel.
| Feature | Libel | Slander |
|---|---|---|
| Medium | Written, printed, broadcast, online | Spoken aloud |
| Permanence | Fixed and lasting | Transitory |
| Damages | Often presumed; broader per se categories | Special damages unless slander per se |
| Split-deadline states | Longer in AR and RI (3 years), 1 year in TN | 1 year in AR and RI, 6 months in TN |
The federal baseline: Sullivan and Gertz
One layer of defamation law is identical in all 50 states because it comes from the U.S. Constitution. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court held that a public official suing over statements about official conduct must prove actual malice, meaning the speaker knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for whether it was false. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), extended the actual-malice requirement to public figures and held that private plaintiffs need only prove negligence, though they generally must show actual injury when the speech involves a matter of public concern. Actual malice must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, a higher bar than the ordinary preponderance standard. Because this framework is federal constitutional law, no state can lower it, and whether a plaintiff is a public official, a public figure, or a private person is frequently the decisive issue in a defamation case.
That constitutional framework also limits how far a legislature can go in criminalizing false statements outside the defamation context. In Rodriguez-Cotto v. Gonzalez-Colon, No. 23-1626 (1st Cir. Aug. 4, 2026), the First Circuit struck down a Puerto Rico law that made it a crime to spread false information during a governor-declared emergency. Drawing on United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012), the court explained that false speech is not a category of unprotected expression the way knowing or reckless defamation is, because defamation involves a "legally cognizable harm" to reputation while the Puerto Rico statute "targets falsity and nothing more." Treating the law as a content-based restriction, the court applied strict scrutiny and held it unconstitutional. The ruling is a reminder that, outside the narrow and historically rooted category of defamation, the government generally cannot punish speech merely because it is false.
How the statute of limitations varies by state
The statute of limitations is the deadline to file a defamation lawsuit, and it is the single most important variable from state to state. A majority of states use a 1-year period, including California, New York, Texas, and Illinois, which makes prompt action essential. A smaller group uses 2 years, such as Florida, Alabama, and Washington. The longest deadlines are 3 years, found in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wisconsin. The shortest is Tennessee, where slander must be filed within 6 months, while libel gets 1 year. Three states split the deadline by form: in Arkansas and Rhode Island, slander carries a 1-year limit but libel gets 3 years, and in Tennessee slander is 6 months while libel is 1 year. Most states follow the single-publication rule, so the clock runs from the date of first publication rather than restarting each time a post is viewed or shared. The state table below lists the exact period and code section for every jurisdiction.
When the clock starts is as important as how long it runs. The defamation cause of action generally accrues at publication, meaning the moment the statement is first communicated to a third party, so the period usually begins before the plaintiff even learns of the statement. A minority of states recognize a narrow discovery rule that delays accrual when the defamatory statement was inherently undiscoverable and not a matter of public record, but most courts apply it sparingly in defamation cases. The single-publication rule, adopted in most states and embodied in the Uniform Single Publication Act, treats one edition of a book, one broadcast, or one online post as a single publication, so re-reading or re-sharing the same content does not reset the deadline. Substantially modifying the content, or republishing it to reach a new audience, can start a fresh limitations period, which matters for material that is edited and reposted online.
Watch out: In single-publication-rule states, the deadline generally runs from the first time the statement was published, not from when you discovered it. For a 1-year or 6-month state, waiting even a few months can forfeit the claim.
Anti-SLAPP laws by state
A SLAPP is a "strategic lawsuit against public participation," a suit filed not to win but to silence a critic by burdening them with litigation costs. Anti-SLAPP statutes counter this by giving a defendant who is sued over protected speech a special motion to dismiss early in the case. These laws typically share three features: the special motion shifts the burden to the plaintiff to show the claim has merit, a discovery stay pauses costly fact-gathering while the motion is pending, and fee-shifting requires a losing plaintiff to pay the defendant's attorney fees. A recent wave of states has adopted the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), a model statute published by the Uniform Law Commission in 2020 that standardizes these protections, including Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Washington, with South Dakota's version taking effect July 1, 2026. UPEPA provides for an expedited special motion, an automatic stay of most proceedings, an expedited appeal of a ruling, and mandatory fee-shifting, giving these states a consistent framework. Ten jurisdictions still have no anti-SLAPP statute at all: Alabama, Alaska, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Hampshire, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In those states, a defendant sued over speech must rely on ordinary motions to dismiss and the constitutional defenses, without the early off-ramp and fee recovery that anti-SLAPP laws provide. The strength of these laws also varies among the states that have them: California and Texas have broad, well-developed statutes with extensive case law, while Maryland's law is comparatively weak and statutes in Missouri, Nebraska, and New Mexico are narrow, covering only limited categories of speech such as statements to government bodies.
Defamation per se and presumed damages
Defamation per se is a category of statement so inherently damaging that the law presumes harm to reputation, so the plaintiff does not have to prove a specific dollar loss. Courts have traditionally recognized four classic per se categories: falsely accusing someone of a crime, imputing a loathsome or contagious disease, attacking a person's competence or integrity in their business, trade, or profession, and imputing serious sexual misconduct or unchastity. When a statement is defamatory per se, most states presume general damages such as reputational harm and mental anguish. Statements that are defamatory only when paired with extrinsic facts are defamatory per quod and require proof of special damages. This presumption is not universal, however: Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, and Tennessee have moved away from presumed damages and per se liability, generally requiring a plaintiff to prove actual injury even for a statement that would be per se elsewhere. In those states, even a statement falsely accusing someone of a crime requires the plaintiff to show genuine reputational or emotional harm rather than relying on a legal presumption. The Gertz decision also limits presumed and punitive damages for private plaintiffs on matters of public concern absent actual malice, so the constitutional rule and the state-law trend against presumed damages reinforce each other. The practical effect is that documenting concrete harm, such as lost income, lost relationships, or treatment for emotional distress, strengthens a defamation claim everywhere, and is essential in the states that have abolished presumed damages.
Damages you can recover in a defamation case
The money a successful defamation plaintiff can recover falls into a few categories that are broadly consistent across the states. Special damages, also called actual or economic damages, compensate concrete losses that flow from the statement, such as lost wages, lost clients, canceled contracts, or lost business opportunities, and they must be proven with specific evidence. General damages compensate the more intangible harms of defamation, including injury to reputation, mental anguish, humiliation, and embarrassment. In a defamation per se case, most states presume general damages without proof of a specific dollar figure, although the four states that have abolished presumed damages require proof of actual injury instead. Punitive, or exemplary, damages punish especially egregious conduct and are generally available only where the plaintiff proves the defendant acted with actual malice, and Gertz limits them for private plaintiffs on matters of public concern. Several states also have retraction statutes that reduce the damages available, often eliminating punitive damages, when the defendant promptly publishes a correction after a demand.
How to sue for defamation
Pursuing a defamation claim generally follows a sequence, though the right path depends on the facts and the state. Most plaintiffs begin by preserving evidence: the exact statement, the date and place it was published, screenshots or recordings, and the identity of anyone who saw or heard it, because the single-publication rule often ties the deadline to first publication. Many then send a cease-and-desist letter or a retraction demand, which some states require or reward, since publishing a retraction can reduce the damages a plaintiff may recover. The plaintiff then files a complaint in the appropriate state court within that state's limitation period, which can be as short as 6 months. If the suit targets protected speech, the defendant may file an anti-SLAPP special motion that stays discovery and can shift fees, so plaintiffs in those states should be prepared to show the claim has merit. Because deadlines are short, the rules vary widely, and an anti-SLAPP loss can mean paying the other side's fees, consulting a licensed attorney in your state early is wise. This article is general information, not legal advice.
Defamation Laws by State
The table below summarizes the statute of limitations and anti-SLAPP status for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Click any jurisdiction for the full guide, including defamation per se categories, damages, and how to sue.
| Jurisdiction | Statute of limitations | Anti-SLAPP law |
|---|---|---|
| Alabama | 2 years (Ala. Code 6-2-38) | None |
| Alaska | 2 years (AS 09.10.070) | None |
| Arizona | 1 year (A.R.S. 12-541) | Yes (A.R.S. 12-751 to 752) |
| Arkansas | Slander 1 year / Libel 3 years (16-56-104/105) | Yes (16-63-501 et seq.) |
| California | 1 year (CCP 340(c)) | Yes, strong (CCP 425.16) |
| Colorado | 1 year (C.R.S. 13-80-103) | Yes (C.R.S. 13-20-1101) |
| Connecticut | 2 years (C.G.S. 52-597) | Yes (C.G.S. 52-196a) |
| Delaware | 2 years (10 Del. C. 8119) | Yes, UPEPA (10 Del. C. ch. 60) |
| District of Columbia | 1 year (D.C. Code 12-301) | Yes (D.C. Code 16-5501 et seq.) |
| Florida | 2 years (Fla. Stat. 95.11(5)(h)) | Yes (Fla. Stat. 768.295) |
| Georgia | 1 year (OCGA 9-3-33) | Yes (OCGA 9-11-11.1) |
| Hawaii | 2 years (HRS 657-4) | Yes, UPEPA (HRS ch. 634G) |
| Idaho | 2 years (Idaho Code 5-219) | Yes, UPEPA (Idaho Code ch. 6-39) |
| Illinois | 1 year (735 ILCS 5/13-201) | Yes (735 ILCS 110) |
| Indiana | 2 years (Ind. Code 34-11-2-4) | Yes (Ind. Code 34-7-7) |
| Iowa | 2 years (Iowa Code 614.1(2)) | Yes, UPEPA (Iowa Code ch. 652) |
| Kansas | 1 year (K.S.A. 60-514) | Yes (K.S.A. 60-5320) |
| Kentucky | 1 year (KRS 413.140) | Yes, UPEPA (KRS 454.460 to 454.478) |
| Louisiana | 2 years (La. C.C. 3493.1) | Yes (La. C.C.P. art. 971) |
| Maine | 2 years (14 M.R.S. 753) | Yes, UPEPA (14 M.R.S. 731 to 742) |
| Maryland | 1 year (Cts. and Jud. Proc. 5-105) | Yes, weak (Cts. and Jud. Proc. 5-807) |
| Massachusetts | 3 years (G.L. c. 260, 4) | Yes (G.L. c. 231, 59H) |
| Michigan | 1 year (MCL 600.5805) | Yes, UPEPA (MCL 691.1851 et seq.) |
| Minnesota | 2 years (Minn. Stat. 541.07) | Yes, UPEPA (Minn. Stat. 554.07 et seq.) |
| Mississippi | 1 year (Miss. Code 15-1-35) | None |
| Missouri | 2 years (RSMo 516.140) | Yes, narrow (RSMo 537.528) |
| Montana | 2 years (MCA 27-2-204) | Yes, UPEPA (MCA Title 27, ch. 34) |
| Nebraska | 1 year (Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-208) | Yes, narrow (25-21,241 et seq.) |
| Nevada | 2 years (NRS 11.190(4)(c)) | Yes, strong (NRS 41.635 to 41.670) |
| New Hampshire | 3 years (RSA 508:4) | None |
| New Jersey | 1 year (N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3) | Yes, UPEPA (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-49 et seq.) |
| New Mexico | 3 years (NMSA 37-1-8) | Yes, narrow (NMSA 38-2-9.1) |
| New York | 1 year (CPLR 215(3)) | Yes, broad (Civ. Rights Law 70-a, 76-a) |
| North Carolina | 1 year (N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-54(3)) | None |
| North Dakota | 2 years (N.D.C.C. 28-01-18) | None |
| Ohio | 1 year (R.C. 2305.11) | Yes, UPEPA (R.C. 2747.01 et seq.) |
| Oklahoma | 1 year (12 O.S. 95(A)(4)) | Yes (12 O.S. 1430 to 1440) |
| Oregon | 1 year (ORS 12.120(2)) | Yes (ORS 31.150 to 31.155) |
| Pennsylvania | 1 year (42 Pa.C.S. 5523(1)) | Yes, UPEPA (Act 72 of 2024) |
| Rhode Island | Slander 1 year / Libel 3 years (R.I.G.L. 9-1-14) | Yes (R.I.G.L. 9-33-1 et seq.) |
| South Carolina | 2 years (S.C. Code 15-3-550) | None |
| South Dakota | 2 years (SDCL 15-2-15) | Yes, UPEPA (SB 137, effective July 1, 2026) |
| Tennessee | Slander 6 months / Libel 1 year (28-3-103/104) | Yes (20-17-101 et seq.) |
| Texas | 1 year (Civ. Prac. and Rem. 16.002) | Yes (Civ. Prac. and Rem. ch. 27) |
| Utah | 1 year (Utah Code 78B-2-302) | Yes, UPEPA (Utah Code Title 78B, ch. 25) |
| Vermont | 3 years (12 V.S.A. 512) | Yes (12 V.S.A. 1041) |
| Virginia | 1 year (Va. Code 8.01-247.1) | Yes (Va. Code 8.01-223.2) |
| Washington | 2 years (RCW 4.16.100) | Yes, UPEPA (RCW ch. 4.105) |
| West Virginia | 1 year (W. Va. Code 55-2-12) | None |
| Wisconsin | 3 years (Wis. Stat. 893.57) | None |
| Wyoming | 1 year (Wyo. Stat. 1-3-105) | None |
Defamation Laws in Other Countries
Frequently Asked Questions
What are the elements of defamation?
Most states require five elements: a false statement of fact (not opinion), publication to at least one third party, that the statement is of and concerning the plaintiff, fault by the defendant (negligence or actual malice), and damages. Certain per se statements presume damages. Truth is a complete defense.
What is the difference between libel and slander?
Libel is defamation in a fixed form such as writing, print, broadcast, or an online post, while slander is spoken defamation. Libel is often actionable without proof of special damages; slander usually requires proof of economic loss unless it falls into a slander per se category. Almost all online and media defamation is libel.
What is the statute of limitations for defamation?
It varies by state. A majority use 1 year, some use 2 years, and the longest is 3 years (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Wisconsin). The shortest is Tennessee at 6 months for slander. Arkansas, Rhode Island, and Tennessee set different deadlines for libel and slander.
Which states have the shortest defamation deadline?
Tennessee has the shortest, at 6 months for slander (1 year for libel). After that, the large group of 1-year states, including California, New York, Texas, and Illinois, has the next-shortest deadlines, so prompt action is critical in those jurisdictions.
What is an anti-SLAPP law?
An anti-SLAPP law lets a defendant sued over protected speech file an early special motion to dismiss. These statutes typically stay discovery while the motion is pending and shift attorney fees to a prevailing defendant, discouraging lawsuits filed to silence critics rather than to win.
Which states have no anti-SLAPP law?
Ten jurisdictions have no anti-SLAPP statute: Alabama, Alaska, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Hampshire, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In those states, a defendant must rely on ordinary motions to dismiss and constitutional defenses.
What is the actual malice standard?
Actual malice, from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, means the speaker knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for whether it was false. Public officials and public figures must prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Private plaintiffs generally need only prove negligence.
What is defamation per se?
Defamation per se is a statement so harmful that damages are presumed, such as falsely accusing someone of a crime, imputing a loathsome disease, attacking their professional competence, or imputing serious sexual misconduct. Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, and Tennessee have moved away from presumed damages and require proof of actual injury.
Is truth a defense to defamation?
Yes, in every state. Truth, or substantial truth, is a complete defense to a defamation claim. A statement that is substantially accurate cannot support liability no matter how damaging it is, because defamation requires a false statement of fact.
Can I sue over a bad online review?
Only if the review states a false fact rather than an opinion. Honest opinions and subjective complaints are protected speech. A review on a matter of public concern is also likely to trigger the state's anti-SLAPP law, which can shift attorney fees to the reviewer if the suit fails.
Updates
Added the First Circuit's ruling in Rodriguez-Cotto v. Gonzalez-Colon (Aug. 4, 2026) striking Puerto Rico's emergency false-information crime, holding that, unlike defamation, false speech alone is not an unprotected category.
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
State-by-state comparison
Each state guide below is paired with the governing statute our editors adjudicated for it, held in our own legal record and verified against the official source.
Each statute shown is the same adjudicated anchor its state guide renders, independently verified against primary sources. A dash means not yet adjudicated in our record — never that no law exists.
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 425.16In forcecited in 6 of our articles
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly. (b) (1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. (2) In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leginfo.legislature.ca.gov
Cited in 1,949 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Navellier v. Sletten (California Supreme Court 2002, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530)“…BROWN, J., Dissenting. The Legislature designed Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (hereafter section 425.16) to address a…”
- Ketchum v. Moses (California Supreme Court 2001, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377)“…In January 1996, he filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, on the ground that the suit constitute…”
- Oasis West Realty v. Goldman (California Supreme Court 2011, 51 Cal. 4th 811)“…edom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a)), enacted Code of Civil Proc…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: California Appeals Court Narrows, But Keeps Alive, Leah Remini's Scientology Defamation Suit, California Laws on Recording in Public: What Is Legal (2026), California Defamation Laws: Libel & Slander (2026)
Official Code of Georgia Annotated
§ 9-11-11.1Exercise of rights of freedom of speech and to petition government for redress of grievances; legislative findings; verification of claims; definitions; procedure on motions; exception; fees and expenses.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) The General Assembly of Georgia finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage participation by the citizens of Georgia in matters of public significance and public interest through the exercise of their constitutional rights of petition and freedom of speech.…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2021-08-17 · Read the full text in our law library
Cited in 119 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Berryhill v. Georgia Community Support & Solutions, Inc. (Supreme Court of Georgia 2006, 281 Ga. 439)“…(Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) statute. OCGA§ 9-11-11.1 (b). The trial court dismissed the acti…”
- Metzler v. Rowell (Court of Appeals of Georgia 2001, 248 Ga. App. 596)“…ding Judge. In this appeal we consider the application of OCGA § 9-11-11.1, the Georgia anti-SLAPP (Strategic Liti…”
- American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Zeh (Supreme Court of Georgia 2021, 312 Ga. 647)“…suits Against Public Participation (“anti-SLAPP”) statute, OCGA § 9-11-11.1.1 Zeh then 1 SLAPPs are “merit…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Georgia Defamation Laws: Libel, Slander & Suing (2026)
§ 9-3-33Injuries to the person; injuries to reputation; loss of consortium; exception.In forcecited in 9 of our articles
Except as otherwise provided in this article, actions for injuries to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues, except for injuries to the reputation, which shall be brought within one year after the right of action accrues, and except for actions for injuries…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2021-08-17 · Read the full text in our law library
Cited in 729 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Georgia courts apply section 9-3-33 by the nature of the injury, not the legal theory: Daniel v. American Optical Corp. (1983) held its two-year personal injury period covers strict liability claims, and Miles v. Ashland Chemical Co. (1991) declined to extend the discovery rule to wrongful death, which accrues at death.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Shessel v. Stroup (Supreme Court of Georgia 1984, 253 Ga. 56)✓A failed sterilization caused no injury until the patient became pregnant over two years later. Reading OCGA 9-3-33 to run only from when injury accrues, the court used that contrast to hold the separate medical malpractice limit unconstitutional as applied.
- Daniel v. American Optical Corp. (Supreme Court of Georgia 1983, 251 Ga. 166)✓Hot metal flew over a worker's safety glasses into his eye and he sued the manufacturer in strict liability three years later. The court held OCGA 9-3-33's two-year personal injury period turns on the nature of the injury, not the legal theory, so the claim was untimely.
- Miles v. Ashland Chemical Co. (Supreme Court of Georgia 1991, 261 Ga. 726)✓Relatives of three workers who died of cancer sued over methylene chloride warnings more than two years after the deaths, saying they learned of the link later. The court refused to extend the discovery rule to wrongful death; OCGA 9-3-33's two years runs from the date of death.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Georgia Dog Bite Laws: Liability and Victim Rights, Georgia Car Accident Laws: Fault, Insurance, and Your Claim, Motorcycle Accident Laws in Georgia (2026): Deadlines & Helmets
Kansas Statutes Annotated, Chapter 60: PROCEDURE, CIVIL
§ 60-514Actions limited to one year.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
The following actions shall be brought within one year: (a) An action for libel or slander. (b) An action for assault, battery, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment. (c) An action upon statutory penalty or forfeiture. (d) An action brought pursuant to K.S.A. 43-173. Such action shall be brought within one year from the date of discharge or threat of discharge from employment.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ksrevisor.gov
Cited in 134 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State Ex Rel. Stovall v. Meneley (Supreme Court of Kansas 2001, 271 Kan. 355)“…ure pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1201. He specifically argues that K.S.A. 60-514(c) applies to the present ouster action…”
- O'Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. (Supreme Court of Kansas 2012, 294 Kan. 318)“…tes for application of the 1-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60-514(c), which governs “[a]n action upon sta…”
- Kelly v. Vinzant (Supreme Court of Kansas 2008, 287 Kan. 509)“…ely filed if the 1-year statute of limitations for battery, K.S.A. 60-514(b), applies and if the statute began to…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Kansas Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type, Kansas Defamation Laws: Libel, Slander & Suing (2026)
§ 60-5320Public speech protection act.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) This section shall be known and may be cited as the public speech protection act. (b) The purpose of the public speech protection act is to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of a person to petition, and speak freely and associate freely, in connection with a public issue or issue of public interest to the maximum extent permitted by law while, at the same time, protecting the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury. (c) As used in the public speech protection act: (1) "Claim" means any lawsuit, cause of action, claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or other judicial pleading or filing requesting relief. (2) "Communication" means the making or submitting of a statement or document in any form or medium, including oral, visual, written or electronic. (3) "Exercise of the right of association" means a communication between individuals who join together to collectively express, promote, pursue or defend common interests. (4) "Exercise of the right of free speech" means a communication made in connection with a public issue or issue of public interest.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ksrevisor.gov
Cited in 25 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Creative Planning v. Greco (Court of Appeals of Kansas 2026)“…otecting the rights of others to file meritorious lawsuits. K.S.A. 60-5320(b). 2. To effectuate its purpo…”
- Williams v. Greenstein (Court of Appeals of Kansas 2025)“…statutes. In 2016, the Kansas Legislature enacted the Act. K.S.A. 60-5320; L. 2016, ch. 58, § 1. The Act falls un…”
- Doe v. Kansas State University (Court of Appeals of Kansas 2021)“…t to petition or right of association within the meaning of K.S.A. 60-5320 (2019 Supp.). The Court finds th…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Kentucky Revised Statutes, Chapter 413: LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
§ 413.140Actions to be brought within one yearIn forcecited in 13 of our articles
(1) The following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued: (a) An action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff, or of her husband, his wife, child, ward, apprentice, or servant; (b) An action for injuries to persons, cattle, or other livestock by railroads or other corporations, with the exception of hospitals licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter 216; (c) An action for malicious prosecution, conspiracy, arrest, seduction, criminal conversation, or breach of promise of marriage; (d) An action for libel or slander; (e) An action against a physician, surgeon, dentist, or hospital licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter 216, for negligence or malpractice; (f) A civil action, arising out of any act or omission in rendering, or failing to render, professional services for others, whether brought in tort or contract, against a real property appraiser holding a certificate or license issued under KRS Chapter 324A or a real estate broker or sales associate holding a license issued under KRS Chapter 324; (g) An action for the escape of a prisoner, arrested or imprisoned on civil process; (h) An action for the recovery of usury paid for the loan…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-08 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov
Cited in 648 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Craft v. Rice (Kentucky Supreme Court 1984, 671 S.W.2d 247)“…applies to this situation rather than the one-year limit of KRS 413.140(1)(a) for injury "to the person of the…”
- Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville (Court of Appeals of Kentucky 1993, 853 S.W.2d 295)“…it was time barred under the one-year limitation period of KRS 413.140(l)(a). On December 5, 1990, following a…”
- Emberton v. GMRI, Inc. (Kentucky Supreme Court 2009, 299 S.W.3d 565)“…uit within the one-year statute of limitations, pursuant to KRS 413.140(l)(a). 7 In response, Embe…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Kentucky Hit and Run Laws: Penalties and What to Do, Kentucky Dashcam Laws: Legality, Mounting Rules, and Evidence Use, Kentucky Dog Bite Laws: Liability and Victim Rights
Kentucky Revised Statutes, Chapter 454: MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL PRACTICE PROVISIONS
§ 454.460Definitions for KRS 454.460 to 454.478In forcecited in 2 of our articles
As used in KRS 454.460 to 454.478: (1) "Cause of action" does not include: (a) A procedural action taken or motion made in an action that does not amend or add a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief; or (b) Post-judgment enforcement actions; (2) "Goods or services" does not include the creation, dissemination, exhibition, or advertisement or similar promotion of a dramatic, literary, musical, political, journalistic, or artistic work; (3) "Governmental unit" means a public corporation, government, or government subdivision, agency, or instrumentality; (4) "Matter of public concern" means a statement or activity regarding: (a) A public official, public figure, or other person who has drawn substantial public attention due to the person's official acts, fame, notoriety, or celebrity; (b) A matter of political, social, or other interest to the community; or (c) A subject of concern to the public; and (5) "Person" means an individual, estate, trust, partnership, business or nonprofit entity, governmental unit, or other legal entity.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov
Cited in 11 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Carl F. Corvin v. Hardin County Board of Education (Court of Appeals of Kentucky 2026)“…ovided in subsection (2) of this section, KRS 454.460 to 454.478 applies to a cause of…”
- Andes Roofing, LLC v. Joseph Rusnak (Court of Appeals of Kentucky 2025)“…mbly enacted the UPEPA in 2022, and the law is codified in KRS 454.460-KRS 454.478. The UPEPA was enacted as a…”
- Sharon Muse Johnson v. Kelli Kearney (Court of Appeals of Kentucky 2025)“…or other pleading that asserts a cause of action to which KRS 454.460 to 454.478 applies[.]” KRS 454.464.…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Kentucky Defamation Laws: Libel, Slander & Suing (2026)
Michigan Compiled Laws
§ 600.5805Injuries to persons or property; period of limitations; "adjudication," "criminal sexual conduct," and "dating relationship" definedIn forcecited in 19 of our articles
(1) A person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section. (2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the death or injury for all actions to recover damages for the death of a person or for injury to a person or property. (3) Subject to subsections (4) to (6), the period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging assault, battery, or false imprisonment. (4) Subject to subsection (6), the period of limitations is 5 years for an action charging assault or battery brought by a person who has been assaulted or battered by his or her spouse or former spouse, an individual with whom he or she has had a child in common, or a person with whom he or she resides or formerly resided.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-08 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.mi.gov
Cited in 1,140 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Michigan courts enforce Sec. 600.5805 as written: Garg v. MacOmb County Community Mental Health Services (2005) overruled the continuing violations doctrine as inconsistent with it, while Bryant v. Oakpointe Villa Nursing Centre, Inc (2004) let time-barred malpractice claims proceed on the equities of that case and others then pending.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Rory v. Continental Insurance (Michigan Supreme Court 2005, 473 Mich. 457)“…ited to being brought within three years pursuant to former MCL 600.5805(9), now MCL 600.5805(10), which governs…”
- Walters v. Nadell (Michigan Supreme Court 2008, 481 Mich. 377)✓A driver hurt in a 2001 crash could not serve the defendant, a servicemember, before the three-year period expired; the court held he waived the federal tolling provision by never raising it below, reasoning the limitations statute is likewise mandatory yet waivable.
- Garg v. MacOmb County Community Mental Health Services (Michigan Supreme Court 2005, 472 Mich. 263)✓A county psychologist won a $250,000 retaliation verdict resting partly on acts older than three years; the court held the statute requires suit within three years of each adverse act, overruled the continuing violations doctrine, and directed judgment for the employer.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Michigan Dog Bite Laws: Liability and Victim Rights, Michigan Car Accident Laws: No-Fault, PIP Tiers, and Your Claim, Michigan Defamation Laws: Libel & Slander (2026)
§ 691.1851Short title; purpose and intentIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
(1) This act may be cited as the "uniform public expression protection act". (2) The purpose and intent of this act is to do all of the following: (a) Establish that it is the public policy of this state to promote the rights of citizens to vigorously participate in government. (b) Protect citizens from the chilling effect of retributive and abusive strategic lawsuits against public participation, commonly referred to as SLAPP suits. (c) Enact substantive law to minimize the damage of lawsuits described in subdivision (b) by shifting the burden of litigation back to the party bringing the lawsuit, by doing all of the following: (i) Providing for expedited judicial review. (ii) Providing for a stay on discovery and other time and money consuming maneuvers during the expedited judicial review. (iii) Proscribing the evidence that may be considered in the expedited judicial review. (iv) Establishing the burden of proof for the expedited judicial review. (v) Providing for sanctions.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.mi.gov
Cited in 1 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Joyce Barber v. Lawrence J Morawa Md (Michigan Court of Appeals 2026)“…eedings under the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, MCL 691.1851 et seq. 2 We discuss the trial court…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 541: LIMITATION OF TIME, COMMENCING ACTIONS
§ 541.07TWO- OR THREE-YEAR LIMITATIONSIn forcecited in 4 of our articles
Except where the Uniform Commercial Code, this section, section 541.05, 541.073, 541.076, or 604.205 otherwise prescribes, the following actions shall be commenced within two years: (1) for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other tort resulting in personal injury, and all actions against veterinarians as defined in chapter 156, for malpractice, error, mistake, or failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort; provided a counterclaim may be pleaded as a defense to any action for services brought by a veterinarian after the limitations period if it was the property of the party pleading it at the time it became barred and was not barred at the time the claim sued on originated, but no judgment thereof except for costs can be rendered in favor of the party so pleading it; (2) upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, except as provided in sections 541.074 and 541.075; (3) for damages caused by a dam, other than a dam used for commercial purposes; but as against one holding under the preemption or homestead laws, the limitations shall not begin to run until a patent has been issued for the land so damaged; (4) against a master for breach of an indenture…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at revisor.mn.gov
Cited in 238 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Fabio v. Bellomo (Supreme Court of Minnesota 1993, 504 N.W.2d 758)“…during 1982-1984 was barred by the statute of limitations. Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1) (1992). These rulings were affirmed…”
- Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann (Supreme Court of Minnesota 2011, 808 N.W.2d 828)“…parties agree that the statute of limitations set forth in Minn.Stat. § 541.07(5) (2010) governs each of Ham-ann’s cla…”
- Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co. (Supreme Court of Minnesota 1989, 441 N.W.2d 801)“…Levin’s claim was barred by the two-year limitation set by Minn.Stat. § 541.07(5) (1988), and the parties rescinded th…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Minnesota Defamation Laws: Libel & Slander (2026), Minnesota Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type, Minnesota Final Paycheck Laws: The Demand-Triggered 24-Hour Rule
Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 554: FREE SPEECH; PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT
§ 554.07SHORT TITLEIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Sections 554.07 to 554.19 may be cited as the "Uniform Public Expression Protection Act."
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at revisor.mn.gov
Cited in 2 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- J&D Dental, et al., Respondents, vs. Liya Hou, Appellant (Court of Appeals of Minnesota 2025)“…the scope of the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 554.07-.20 (2024), is determined, consistent w…”
- Carsten James Quinlan v. Fraser, Alissa Puls (Court of Appeals of Minnesota 2025)“…Minnesota Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 554.07-.20 (2024), which allows a party, withi…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Revised Statutes of Missouri, Title XXXV (CIVIL PROCEDURE AND LIMITATIONS), Chapter 516
§ 516.140What actions within two years.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
Within two years: an action for libel, slander, injurious falsehood, assault, battery, false imprisonment, criminal conversation, malicious prosecution or actions brought under section 290.140. An action by an employee for the payment of unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation or liquidated damages by reason of the nonpayment of minimum wages or overtime compensation, and for the recovery of any amount under and by virtue of the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and amendments thereto, such act being an act of Congress, shall be brought within two years after the cause accrued.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at revisor.mo.gov
Cited in 116 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting Co. (Supreme Court of Missouri 1986, 709 S.W.2d 475)“…hat the action is (1) barred by the statute of limitations, § 516.140, RSMo 1978; (2) the petition alleges a tort n…”
- Sheehan v. Sheehan (Supreme Court of Missouri 1995, 901 S.W.2d 57)“…olled claims for childhood sexual abuse by a family member: § 516.140 RSMo 1986, the two-year statute for assault…”
- H.R.B. v. J.L.G. (Missouri Court of Appeals 1995, 913 S.W.2d 92)“…which case the plaintiff has two years to file the action, RSMo § 516.140; or the action may be brought pursuant…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Missouri Defamation Laws: Libel & Slander (2026), Missouri Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type
New Mexico Statutes Annotated 1978, Chapter 37
§ 37-1-8Actions against sureties on fiduciary bonds; injuries to person or reputation.In forcecited in 17 of our articles
Actions must be brought against sureties on official bonds and on bonds of guardians, conservators, personal representatives and persons acting in a fiduciary capacity, within two years after the liability of the principal or the person for whom they are sureties is finally established or determined by a judgment or decree of the court, and for an injury to the person or reputation of any person, within three years.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at nmonesource.com
Cited in 172 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Roberts v. Southwest Community Health Services (1992) applied Section 37-1-8's three-year period to a malpractice claim against a nonqualified health care provider and held such a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury and its cause. Williams v. Stewart (2005) applied that period to distress claims.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Maestas v. Zager (New Mexico Court of Appeals 2005, 136 N.M. 764)“…tes are the general personal injury statute of limitations, NMSA 1978, § 37-1-8 (1976); the Medical Malpractice Act sta…”
- Garcia on Behalf of Garcia v. La Farge (New Mexico Supreme Court 1995, 119 N.M. 532)✓A cardiologist twice told a boy's parents he was fine; after cardiac arrest left him brain damaged, the court held the Malpractice Act limit unconstitutional as applied and used Section 37-1-8's three year accrual period instead, making the suit timely.
- Williams v. Stewart (New Mexico Court of Appeals 2005, 137 N.M. 420)✓Relatives sued over a Los Alamos program that took organs during autopsies without consent; the court applied Section 37-1-8's three year personal injury period to their claims and held news publicity did not, as a matter of law, trigger a duty to inquire that started it running.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: New Mexico Dog Bite Laws: Liability and Victim Rights, New Mexico Recording Laws (2026): One-Party Consent Rules, New Mexico Car Accident Laws: Fault, Insurance, and Your Claim
New Mexico Statutes Annotated 1978, Chapter 38
§ 38-2-9.1Special motion to dismiss unwarranted or specious lawsuits; procedures; sanctions; severability.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
A. Any action seeking money damages against a person for conduct or speech undertaken or made in connection with a public hearing or public meeting in a quasi- judicial proceeding before a tribunal or decision-making body of any political subdivision of the state is subject to a special motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion for summary judgment that shall be considered by the court on a priority or expedited basis to ensure the early consideration of the issues raised by the motion and to prevent the unnecessary expense of litigation. B. If the rights afforded by this section are raised as an affirmative defense and if a court grants a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion for summary judgment filed within ninety days of the filing of the moving party's answer, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by the moving party in defending the action. If the court finds that a special motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment is frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney fees to the party prevailing on the motion. C.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at nmonesource.com
Cited in 15 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Cordova v. Cline (New Mexico Supreme Court 2017, 2017 NMSC 20)“…tion against public participation (Anti-SLAPP statute). See NMSA 1978, § 38-2-9.1 (2001). We also conclude that petitione…”
- Ferebee v. Hume (New Mexico Court of Appeals 2021, 485 P.3d 778)“…tigation against public participation (Anti-SLAPP statute), NMSA 1978, § 38-2-9.1 (2001), as well as the applicability of…”
- Valenzuela v. My Way Holdings, LLC (New Mexico Court of Appeals 2023, 541 P.3d 191)“…ticipation (Anti-SLAPP statute) expedited appeal provision, NMSA 1978, § 38-2-9.1(C) (2001), as well as considering the s…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: New Mexico Defamation Laws: Libel & Slander (2026)
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
§ 215Actions to be commenced within one year: against sheriff, coroner or constable; for escape of prisoner; for assault, battery, false impri...In forcecited in 3 of our articles
Actions to be commenced within one year: against sheriff, coroner or constable; for escape of prisoner; for assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel or slander; for violation of right of privacy; for penalty given to informer; on arbitration award. The following actions shall be commenced within one year: 1. an action against a sheriff, coroner or constable, upon a liability incurred by him by doing an act in his official capacity or by omission of an official duty, except the non-payment of money collected upon an execution; 2. an action against an officer for the escape of a prisoner arrested or imprisoned by virtue of a civil mandate; 3. an action to recover damages for assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, false words causing special damages, or a violation of the right of privacy under section fifty-one of the civil rights law; 4.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov
Also relied on in: New York Defamation Laws: Libel & Slander (2026), New York Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
§ 16.002ONE-YEAR LIMITATIONS PERIODIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
(a) A person must bring suit for malicious prosecution, libel, slander, or breach of promise of marriage not later than one year after the day the cause of action accrues. (b) A person must bring suit to set aside a sale of property seized under Subchapter E, Chapter 33, Tax Code, not later than one year after the date the property is sold.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at statutes.capitol.texas.gov
Cited in 112 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Toranto v. Wall (Texas Court of Appeals, 6th District (Texarkana) 1994, 891 S.W.2d 3)“…e suit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 16.002, 16.003 (Vernon 1986). The motion for s…”
- Carlos Marcos Lavernia v. Ronald Earle, Chief Prosecutor, Travis County, Texas David Lowery, Managing Editor, Austin American Statesman And Elizabeth Watson, Chief of Police, Austin, Texas (Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) 1999)“…r than one year after the day a cause of action accrues. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.002 (a) (West Supp. 1999). A libel or sl…”
- Rahul K. Nath, M.D. v. Texas Children's Hospital and Baylor College of Medicine (Texas Supreme Court 2014, 57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1328)“…Defamation is subject to a one-year statute of limitations, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 16.002(a), while tortious interference is subj…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: How to Sue for Defamation of Character (Step by Step), Texas Defamation Laws: Libel, Slander & Suing (2026)
Revised Code of Washington
§ 4.16.100Actions limited to two years.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
Within two years: (1) An action for libel, slander, assault, assault and battery, or false imprisonment. (2) An action upon a statute for a forfeiture or penalty to the state.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
Cited in 113 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Tyson v. Tyson (Washington Supreme Court 1986, 107 Wash. 2d 72)“…ght within 3 years of the time the cause of action accrued. RCW 4.16.100(1) provides that an action for assault…”
- Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co. (Washington Supreme Court 1986, 106 Wash. 2d 466)“…red by the 2-year libel and slander statute of limitations (RCW 4.16.100), but moved for partial summary judgmen…”
- U. S. Oil & Refining Co. v. Department of Ecology (Washington Supreme Court 1981, 96 Wash. 2d 85)“…hat they were barred by the 2-year statute of limitation in RCW 4.16.100(2). The penalties were affirmed upon…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Washington Defamation Laws: Libel, Slander & Suing (2026), Washington Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type
Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 893: Limitations Of Commencement Of Actions And Proceedings; Procedure For Claims Against Governmental Units
§ 893.57Intentional torts.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
An action to recover damages for libel, slander, assault, battery, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment or other intentional tort to the person shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred. Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.21 (2) renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at docs.legis.wisconsin.gov
Cited in 78 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Beloit Liquidating Trust v. Grade (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2004, 270 Wis. 2d 356)“…red under the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.57 . ¶ 12. Judge Timothy G. Dugan,…”
- Zastrow v. Journal Communications, Inc. (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2006, 291 Wis. 2d 426)“…As a result, the two-year statute of limitations found in Wis. Stat. § 893.57 (2003-04), [2] which is applicable to…”
- Munger v. Seehafer (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin 2016, 372 Wis. 2d 749)“…y granted the Respondents' motion to dismiss. We hold that Wis. Stat. § 893.57 , which sets forth the limitations peri…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Wisconsin Defamation Laws: Libel & Slander (2026), Wisconsin Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type
Explore the law
The laws cited above reference these related sections in their own text:
- Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.520b — Criminal sexual conduct in the first degree; circumstances; felony; consecutive terms view in our statute record · read at the official source
- Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.520c — Criminal sexual conduct in the second degree; felony view in our statute record · read at the official source
- Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.520d — Criminal sexual conduct in the third degree; felony view in our statute record · read at the official source
- Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.520e — Criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree; misdemeanor view in our statute record · read at the official source
Related law for further reading — not part of this article’s citations.
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Sources and References
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)(law.cornell.edu)
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)(law.cornell.edu)
- Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), Uniform Law Commission(uniformlaws.org)
- California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, anti-SLAPP special motion to strike(leginfo.legislature.ca.gov).gov
- Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 16.002, one-year limitation for libel and slander(statutes.capitol.texas.gov).gov
- N.Y. C.P.L.R. 215(3), one-year statute of limitations for libel and slander(nysenate.gov).gov
- Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, 4, three-year limitation for libel and slander(malegislature.gov).gov
- Rodriguez-Cotto v. Gonzalez-Colon, No. 23-1626 (1st Cir. Aug. 4, 2026)(ca1.uscourts.gov).gov